# \*\*Aff – Gendered LAWS- FMPS\*\*

## \*\*Notes\*\*

### Thank Yous

Thank you to the following students for their excellent work:

Andrea Yiu, Elizabeth Elliott, Karissa Kromminga, Maze Peters, Mira Baba, and Sasha Turner.

Please send any questions or comments to [jasminestidham@gmail.com](mailto:jasminestidham@gmail.com) or [jstid@umich.edu](mailto:jstid@umich.edu)

### File Navigation + Strategy Tips

Pro-tips:

* Make sure you integrate the applicable cards from various feminist IR files. For example, most of the link cards in those files can serve as Ks of disads for this aff.
* You should also integrate generic cards from other files. We’ve done this for most other relevant files, but there may be other useful cards we missed. For example, a lot of the ethical AI aff/neg cards will be useful.

## \*\*1AC Toolbox\*\*

### 1AC – Plan

#### Two options, depending on your preference:

#### Plan: The United States federal government should substantially increase its artificial intelligence armament prohibitions with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

#### Plan: The United States federal government should substantially increase its security cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to prohibit artificial intelligence in lethal autonomous weapons systems.

### 1AC – Inherency

#### Lethal autonomous weapons are here now- a multilateral response is necessary to prevent runaway proliferation.

Trager and Luca, 22 [Robert F. Trager and Laura M. Luca, 5-11-2022, accessed on 6-28-2022, Foreign Policy, "Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems Are Here—and We Need to Regulate Them", [https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/05/11/killer-robots-lethal-autonomous-weapons-systems-ukraine-libya-regulation/]/ISEE](https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/05/11/killer-robots-lethal-autonomous-weapons-systems-ukraine-libya-regulation/%5d/ISEE)

Swarms of robots with the ability to kill humans are no longer only the stuff of science fiction. Lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS) are here. In Ukraine, Moscow has allegedly deployed an artificial intelligence (AI)-enabled Kalashnikov ZALA Aero KUB-BLA loitering munition, while Kyiv has used Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 drones, which have some autonomous capabilities. Although it’s always hard to determine whether a weapon’s autonomous mode is used, these technologies have reportedly been employed in at least one conflict: Last year, a United Nations report suggested Turkey used autonomous firing by its Kargu-2 drones to hunt fleeing soldiers in Libya’s civil war (though the CEO of the Turkish company that produced the drone denies it is capable of this). Unlike traditional drones, these systems have the ability to navigate on their own, and some can select targets. Although a human controller can still decide whether or not to strike, such weapons are acquiring ever more autonomous capabilities. Now that militaries and paramilitaries worldwide have taken note, these technologies are poised to spread widely. The world today stands at the very moment before much more advanced versions of these technologies become ubiquitous. So far, at least Israel, Russia, South Korea, and Turkey have reportedly deployed weapons with autonomous capabilities—though whether this mode was active is disputed—and Australia, Britain, China, and the United States are investing heavily in developing LAWS with an ever-expanding range of sizes and capabilities. Already, some LAWS can loiter in an area to find targets that machine-learning algorithms have trained them to recognize, including enemy radar systems, tanks, ships, and even specific individuals. These weapons can look vastly different: For instance, the Turkish Kargu-2 drone, which was introduced in 2020 and used in Libya’s war, is 2 feet long, weighs around 15 pounds, and can swarm in groups. Autonomous systems can also be much larger, such as unmanned AI-driven fighter jets like the modified L-39 Albatros, and much smaller, such as rudimentary commercial drones repurposed with autonomous software. Once these technologies have spread widely, they will be difficult to control. The world thus urgently needs a new approach to LAWS. So far, the international community has done nothing more than agree that the issue needs to be discussed. But what it really needs to do is take a page from the nuclear playbook and establish a nonproliferation regime for LAWS.

### 1AC – Advantage

#### LAWS are the ultimate form of dehumanization. Algorithmic biases ensure discriminatory targeting along gendered and racial lines, which guarantees the deaths of marginalized communities.

Acheson, 20 [Ray Acheson has an Honours BA in Peace and Conflict Studies from the University of Toronto and an MA in Politics from The New School for Social Research, and is currently completing a book about the nuclear ban treaty and antinuclear activism to be published by Rowman and Littlefield in 2020,Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, January 2020, accessed on 6-21-2022,“A User Guide to Killer Robots,” https://www.wilpf.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/WILPF\_Killer-Robots-Guide\_EN-Web.pdf]/ISEE

Autonomous weapons are being developed in the context of the established norms of gender and power. These norms can and do affect how we think about weapons, war, and violence. Throughout history, we have seen that weapons symbolise power. The association of weapons with power comes from a dominant understanding of masculinity, in which ideas like strength, courage, and protection are equated with violence. This is not to say that all men agree with or perpetuate this idea, but that this is widely considered the norm or standard for masculinity. It is a masculinity in which the capacity and willingness to use weapons, engage in combat, and kill other human beings is seen as essential to being “a real man”. Turning men (and women) into warfighters has tended to require breaking down their sense of ethics and morals and building up a violent masculinity that is lacking in empathy and glorifies strength as violence and physical domination over others portrayed as weaker. Autonomous weapons would be the pinnacle of a fighting force stripped of the empathy, conscience, or emotion that might hold a human soldier back. While armed drones are on this trajectory towards mechanised violence, autonomous weapons would complete the separation of the body and mind from the battlefield and the process of dehumanisation of warfare. This process of dehumanisation also often includes sexual – or other kinds of gender-based violence. Some people who support the development of killer robots have argued that these weapons will be better than human soldiers because they will not rape. This is a myth. An autonomous weapon could be programmed to inflict terror on a population through sexual violence, which is already ordered by states and armed groups using human soldiers. An autonomous weapon, if programmed to rape, would not hesitate to do so. It is also important to consider the broader culture of rape in relation to weapons and war. Rape and sexual violence are used as weapons in conflict, and is also heightened during and after conflict. War destabilises communities and exacerbates already existing gender inequalities and oppression of women, LGBTQ+ people, and others who do not conform to societies’ standards of gender norms. 8 of 14 A WILPF GUIDE TO: KILLER ROBOTS WILPF is also concerned about the development of autonomous weapons programmed with "target profiles" and algorithmic bias in terms of gender, race, socioeconomic status, ability, and sexual orientation. Facial recognition software struggles to recognise people of colour; voice recognition struggles to respond to women’s voices or non-North American accents; photos of anyone standing in a kitchen are labelled as women; people’s bail is denied because a program decided that a woman of colour was more likely to reoffend than a white woman; trans people are surveilled on the basis of the clothing they wear. Imagine this kind of bias being programmed into a weapon system designed to target and fire upon targets without any meaningful human control, without any human judgment to counteract that bias. Or, imagine that bias being deliberately programmed into the killer robot, to kill all people of a certain ethnicity, religion, or sex. In this way, an autonomous weapon contributes to further dehumanising people by turning them into target profiles and expendable targets. A good example of this is how already in conflict, civilian men are often targeted—or counted in casualty recordings—as militants only because they are men of a certain age. While men are not necessarily targeted only because they are men, taking sex as a key signifier as identity and exacting harm on that basis constitutes gender-based violence. This erodes the protection that civilians should be afforded in conflict and violates many human rights, including the right to life and due process. It also has broader implications in the reinforcement of gender norms, including violent masculinity. Assuming all military-age men to be potential or actual militants or combatants entrenches the idea that men are violent and thus targetable. This devalues male life—it suggests men are relatively more expendable than women. It increases the vulnerability of men, exacerbating other risks adult civilian men face such as forced recruitment, arbitrary detention, and summary execution. The gendered culture of violent masculinities that surrounds the development of autonomous weapons, likely to be embedded within the technology and its use, will create new challenges for preventing violence, protecting civilians, and breaking down gender essentialisms or discrimination. Understanding how autonomous weapons are likely to be perceived in a gendered way by their developers, operators, and their victims is crucial to developing policies that can help break the cycle of violence. This could include an understanding that the operation of weapons without meaningful human control, weapons programmed to target and kill based on pre-programmed algorithms of who is considered to pose a threat, used without consent in foreign lands or in the streets of local cities, will result in civilian casualties, psychological harm, and destruction of civilian infrastructure. That this in turn will result in a violent masculine response from affected communities, reinforcing gender inequalities and oppressions. Such understandings should have significant implications for our thinking about and approach to the development of autonomous weapons. We can think about how this kind of analysis and argumentation could help tech workers and policy experts see the need for meaningful human control over weapon systems. We can also see how autonomous weapon systems could facilitate the profiling, targeting, dehumanisation, and death of various marginalised communities and as well as activists or others confronting power. In a context where weapons are treated as tools of power, violence, and subordination of others, increasing the remoteness and abstraction of violence is not the answer. Dealing with violence and conflict as a social institution, rather than a technical challenge to be “solved” with new weapons technology, is imperative. Understanding these dimensions of both violence and technology could help contextualise our work against weapons in a broader context of social justice.

#### Lethal autonomous weapons are profoundly gendered. They reinforce patriarchal structures by identifying men as potential combatants while running the risk of unchecked sexual violence against women and nonbinary people.

Conway, 20 [Marissa Conway is a CFFP Writer, August 2020, accessed on 6-21-2022, Centre for Feminist Foreign Policy, “Smashing the Patriarchy: The Feminist Case Against Killer Robots” https://static1.squarespace.com/static/57cd7cd9d482e9784e4ccc34/t/5f356f1e5eb59d07e78fb329/1597337376556/Smashing+the+Patriarchy\_+The+Feminist+Case+Against+Killer+Robots.pdf]/ISEE

Killer robots reinforce violence patriarchal structures, which have sustained a long and terrible legacy of targeting violence in gendered ways. The usage of killer robots raises a host of concerns as to how they might target innocent men as potential combatants, as well as increase sexualised violence against women, girls, and non-binary people. Many international regulations have been developed to protect people from gender-based violence, and yet, there is no accountability structure for weapons that operate completely autonomously, meaning these killer robots could commit unchecked violence. Combatants or Civilians? Under the administration of President Obama, during which drone strikes became a critical act of US military intervention and targeted killing, the criteria for distinguishing between a civilian and a militant or terrorist was blurred to the point of non-distinction. The CIA counted all military-age males who were in a strike zone as combatants “unless there [was] explicit intelligence posthumously proving them innocent” (Becker and Shane, 2012). The reasoning behind this (il)logic was that if people are spending time around known terrorist hotspots, then they would likely be up to “no good”. This resulted in incredibly low reported rates of civilian Gender-Based Violence and Accountability casualties, as almost all men killed were considered to be combatants. This is but one example of how profiling based on gender, or any social category for that matter, can be twisted in a way that creates a tangible threat for people who simply share the gender of the target profile. Given the lack of clarity as to how combatants are defined, there is a high risk of false positives and targeting of innocent civilians. Developing sound regulations and processes that would guarantee the safety of civilians is an incredibly challenging, and probably impossible, task (Moyes, 2019). Attempts to do so would also place the burden of navigating legal obligations onto AI, a technology which does not have the capacity to make the kind of judgement calls humans are capable of. Killer robots would not be able to identify nuances within a target profile, and without meaningful human intervention, would always result in the use of force, therefore risking the death of innocent people (Moyes, 2019). Sexualised Violence Gender-based violence also manifests in sexualised violence, including the rape, forced pregnancy, slavery, and torture of women, girls, and non-binary people. While proponents for killer robots have argued that such machinery would reduce sexualised violence, the uncomfortable truth is that the opposite is likely (Sandvik and Lohne, 2015). Acts of this nature are often used purposefully in conflict scenarios as a mechanism to instill fear, humiliation, and shame, or for purposes of ethnic cleansing. A killer robot, with no conscience or ability to reject unethical instructions, would execute orders based upon whatever programming it received, including orders to commit sexualised violence (Sharkey, 2020). The assumption that new technology would function precisely as it “should” without consideration of the context in which it’s developed, as well as the motives of the user, is a reckless presumption (Sandvik and Lohne, 2015). United Nations Security Council Resolution 1820 (2008) takes a specific focus on the use of sexualised violence as a weapon of war and war crime, unilaterally condemning it in alignment with the Rome Statute of the International Court and the Geneva Convention (UN General Assembly, 1998; International Committee of the Red Cross, 1949). However, should these weapons commit such atrocities, their distance from human intervention begs the question of legal accountability. Killer robots themselves cannot be tried for crimes. So who, then, should bear that responsibility (Acheson, 2020)? Ultimately, human intent and system performance can never be fully consistent when it comes to killer robots. This misalignment is of grave concern to a FFP framework. As gender equality and protecting vulnerable populations is of central concern to FFP, the potential for gender-based violence should killer robots be developed is simply too great a risk to take. The margin of error of these weapons results in the death of innocent people, a risk that should be considered too great to consider this technology usable.

#### These weapons cannot be disentangled from inherent biases in artificial intelligence. They’ll inevitably kill the wrong person.

Sharkey 18 Noel Sharkey Emeritus, 8-28-2018, "The impact of gender and race bias in AI," Humanitarian Law & Policy Blog, <https://blogs.icrc.org/law-and-policy/2018/08/28/impact-gender-race-bias-ai//mb24>

Automated decision algorithms are currently **propagating gender and race discrimination** throughout our global community. The major culprits are machine learning with **big data.** Drawing on the lessons learned, the question asked here is, can we take away meaningful human control and put our trust in artificial intelligence (AI) to select targets and attack them with violent force? To answer this, we take a journey into less deadly application domains where the biases of such systems are clear to see. En route we’ll examine the causes of bias inherent in the use of machine learning with big data and why a lack of transparency makes the bias problem difficult to fix. Finally, similar problems of bias in the use of automated face recognition are discussed in relation to target acquisition. Much of the recent discussions about autonomous weapons systems (AWS) have focused on careful military planning, on maintaining wider loops for human control and on human oversight. While conventional military planning is important, we must consider the stark reality of other ways that the technology may be used. Modern armed conflict is rarely about high densities of military personnel meeting on a battlefield with the aim of killing as many of their opponents as they can. It is replete with un-uniformed combatants moving through and hiding among civilian populations. Some believe that AWS will be able to pick out specific people or classes of people who may be legitimate targets of attack (setting aside the plethora of international human rights issues). But is this a **humanitarian disaster waiting in the wings? Bias in decision algorithms** The acceleration in the commercialisation of AI has largely been the product of two main factors (i) an increase in power, memory and speed of computers and (ii) the availability of large quantities of data about so many aspects of our lives. These factors have enabled the use of machine learning tools in an unprecedented way for innovative commercial applications. These include algorithms being delegated with decisions that impact on people’s lives in the belief that algorithms will make more objective and hence fairer and less biased decisions than error prone and biased humans Unfortunately, it is becoming alarmingly clear from a growing body of evidence that decision algorithms are perpetuating injustice for many. Many cases are emerging that postcode, ethnicity, gender, associations and poverty negatively bias the decisions being delegated to machines. Tech giants such as Google and Microsoft openly admit that there are bias problems and they have been doing their best, unsuccessfully so far, to find solutions. Areas of injustice coming to light include: Insurance risk, mortgage loan decisions, shortlisting, hiring and interviewing for jobs, job advertising, bail and recidivism risk, assessment, custodial sentencing, airport security and predictive policing. One of the common causes of decision biases arises from ethnicity or gender biases, often unconscious, of the programmer or of those classifying the data samples. Another major cause is the application of machine learning algorithms, such as deep learning, and the way in which they are trained. I will cover two of the inherent causes below and then explain why lack of transparency makes them difficult to fix. How machine learning can ignore minorities One of the benefits of using machine learning systems in an engineering context is that they reduce or remove the impact of outliers (examples outside of the norms in the data) in the training data. For example, shaky arm movements of a robot can be turned into smooth movements by training with machine learning. However, in the context of a decision algorithm, the ‘outliers’ can be the minority groups in the data. These may be people from different ethnic groups or a low represented gender. Google illustrates this problem by training a system with drawings of shoes. Most of the sample are the plain shoes or trainers drawn by the majority of people. But some people drew high-heels. Because this was a minority, the post training tests misclassified high heels as ‘not shoes’. This is a simple example where the misclassification can be clearly seen. In a targeting context there would be no way of knowing which minorities could mistakenly fall into the category of legitimate targets. And **in conflict it is rarely possible to get clear information about casualties and whether or not they were legitimate targets or collateral damage.** Bias problems in the data Our societal values and norms are constantly evolving with massive changes over the last 50 years in what is acceptable to say in the media or in the workplace and also as to what are discriminatory practices. However, it appears that most of the old values are locked into the internet where much of the training data for machine learning algorithms are derived. Studies have demonstrated that, for example, ‘**man’** is associated with boss, president, leader and director, whereas ‘**woman’** is associated with helper, assistant, employee and aide. Google searches for black names like Leroy and Keisha yield ads associated with crime, whereas white names like Brad and Katie yield sites with contact details. Searches for professional hair yield images of white women whereas for unprofessional hair we get images of well-groomed black women. Then there are latent biases in data created by frequency of occurrence—e.g., searching on Google images for pictures of great physicists yields mostly pictures of men. The societal push towards greater fairness and justice is being held back by historical values about poverty, gender and ethnicity that are ossified in big data. There is no reason to believe that bias in targeting data would be any different or any easier to find. Lack of transparency and explanation In the Google shoe classification example described above—amplification through filtering—the data may contain flat soles, small heels, high heels, laces, no laces, strips, shiny material etc. When the algorithm has completed learning, it would be difficult or perhaps impossible to work out which features of the drawing had been selected to trigger the shoe/non-shoe decision. This lack of transparency is because the end result of learning is large matrices of numbers that are used to generate the decisions. No one has, as yet, found a general means to probe the matrices to find out what features of the data it has assigned to the decision. This means that no explanation can be given for why a particular decision has been made. Imagine the dangers that this poses for targeting decisions where we cannot tell what features are responsible for classifying a person or object as a legitimate target. This is the dark recess where bias lives. **The consequences of bias in armed conflict** All of this injustice is happening in the civilian domain where there has been plenty of time to test, scrutinize and construct these systems. It emphasises the problems of accountability and responsibility in the automation of weaponry that we have been discussing for years. When it comes to armed conflict, data management will be considerably more difficult. If there is bias in civil society, just imagine the kinds of bias that will be built into algorithms being delegated with life and death decisions in conflict zones where we have little or no proper understanding of the cultures involved. Given the enormous challenges we are already facing in trying to develop fair and just AI systems, the chances of justice in civilian laden conflict zones is vanishingly small. There is even bias in **automated face recognition** Proponents of autonomous weapons systems might still argue that automated face recognition could form an objective and unbiased basis for automating kill decisions in urban warfare. They may even suggest that it is the ideal tool to track down and kill ‘high value targets’. After all, it has been shown to be accurate in laboratories and it has been developed and sold by the major tech companies like Amazon, Google and Microsoft. But there are problems. First, the NGO, Big Brother Watch used freedom of information requests to obtain accuracy data on the UK police force’s use of NEC’s NeoFace Watch to find criminal faces among crowds. The results of their ensuing report were shocking. The **average false face recognition was 95%.** Yes, that means that only 5% of those identified were that person. The worst results were the metropolitan police force’s use of the technology at the big Afro-Caribbean Notting Hill Carnival with only 2% correct recognition accuracy over a weekend. Just imagine the humanitarian consequences if that had been an AWS selecting targets Second, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) conducted a range of tests with Amazon’s Rekognition system that is becoming popular among U.S. police departments. One of their tests matched photographs of members of the U.S. Congress against a database of 25,000 publicly available ‘mug shots’ of criminals. **The system incorrectly matched 28 members of Congress with people who had been arrested**. This has led U.S. lawmakers to raise questions about the police use of the technology and both Amazon and Microsoft (who make their own facial recognition software) have called for new regulations. From the perspective of bias, it is important to note that the ACLU test showed that a disproportionate number of African-American and Latino members of Congress were misidentified as criminals. The best results reported for face recognition are for white males and that has been the conclusion of a number of academic studies. Gender, age and shade of skin really do matter to automated face recognition. Joy Buolamwini from MIT, tells the story of how her research on using a computer avatar was hampered because the face recognition software could not even find her face, never mind recognise it—the missing face problem. She had to wear a white mask to be seen. Buolamwini then conducted a comprehensive research study on three major commercial face recognition systems for gender classification: IBM Watson Visual Recognition, Microsoft Face Detect and Face++. The face pictures were of parliamentarians from three northern European countries and three African countries. A range of skin shades were represented. **The result was that all systems perform better on males versus females and the lighter the skin the more accurate the result. All performed worst on darker female faces with error rates from 20.8% to 34.7%.**

#### AI reproduces the subjectivity of the people that create it---statistically that is white, male, and wealthy.

Roff, 16 [Heather M. Roff works for the global security imitative at Arizona State University, 1-11-2016, accessed on 6-21-2022, Taylor & Francis, "Gendering a Warbot", https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14616742.2015.1094246]/ISEE

This brings us full circle to the problem of which objects and concepts get represented in the dataset. If the programmers, who are predominantly white, male, upper-middle class and academic, equip an AI with these perspectives, then it is not difficult to see how gendered constructions will reproduce themselves (AAUW 2015). A particular masculinity might be reproduced, or a particular view of femininity may not be modeled at all (Adam 1998, 23). In either case, the AI is clearly not “gender neutral.” Sub-symbolic systems fare no better. In these “bottom–up” systems, the AIs are left to figure things out on their own. The AI is a blank slate, where programmers envision creating an intelligence on par with a child’s brain.20 By emulating the learning processes of a child, from adolescence through adulthood, one is able to create a generally intelligent AI (Storrs Hall 2007, 137). Aside from the ethical considerations about an AI-baby, there are other technological limitations and hazards about bottom–up systems. In particular, because there are no preprogrammed constraints (e.g. do not kill noncombatants) and it is a learning system, it has the potential to learn the “wrong thing” (Wallach and Allen 2009, 110). Programmers acknowledge the potential for such “bad behavior” and have taken seriously the AI-baby approach where a programmer oversees the “education” of the AI. Yet this does not assuage fears of a gendered AI. In fact, it would almost guarantee not only a masculinist AI, but would also pervert the very nature of learning. The AI would have very limited social interaction: it lives in a lab, does not go to school, interacts with one type of person and is limited to whatever interaction its “caregiver” decides to give it (Weber 2014). This is not to say that there are no women in robotics or AI labs, but that the culture permeating computer science and robotics is predominantly masculine, and that the women have consistently remained a mere quarter of the population of computer scientists since 1960 (Burleigh 2015; AAUW 2015). Finally, the statistical approach will also produce gendered AI. It works off of basic probabilistic mathematical models of how the world operates. The statistical approaches will utilize certain kinds of modeling, such as Bayesian inference or networks. In a Bayesian inference, the model will predict with x probability that a statement is true, whereas a Bayesian network is a graph “whose nodes represent statements or measurements,” and the “links between the statements or measurements correspond to the Bayesian-inference steps with the appropriate probabilistic models” (Storrs Hall 2007, 156). Of course much depends on the model, the available data and the scope of the problem to solve. For the machine to solve a problem requires “taking enough statistics from enough evaluations” to first form the model, and thus requires either interacting many times in a particular situation or a large enough data set from which it could draw to be prepared to act with any reliability in a new context.

#### Lethal autonomous weapons are the newest instantiation of hegemonic masculinity. This imposes new gender hierarchies in warfare, which increases the risk of war and conflict.

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---Root cause to war DA’s

De Carvalho, 18 [Juliana Santos de Carvalho is a research associate at the Public International Law and Policy Group, Spring Issue 2018, accessed on 6-21-2022, Amsterdam Law Review, “A Male Future? An Analysis on the Gendered Discourses Regarding Lethal Autonomous Weapons”, <https://amsterdamlawforum.org/articles/10.37974/ALF.320/galley/450/download/>]/ISEE

However, one cannot disregard the utilitarian element that gendered arguments can lend to militarism and war. Given the gender hierarchy socially imposed by hegemonic masculinity, masculinised ideals can also be imported to societal elements and institutions to give them legitimacy and survival. 46 It is within this scenario that feminist literature propels forward the argument that militarism/militarisation and hegemonic masculinity are made closely intertwined. Feminist literature explains this interplay with two main points. First, it is argued that gendered arguments help war and militarism tobe perceived as legitimate and acceptable social practices. Secondly, transformations in the way in which warfare is conducted can produce new insights on gender, as masculinity needs to respond to the requirements of the war machine to maintain male dominance. These new insights on gender allow for the continued acceptability of new methods of warfare by incorporating them as novel outlooks onideals of hegemonic masculinity. Within this context, international relations scholar Kimberly Hutchings explains how idealised masculine military archetypes vary throughout time and space, 50 as in the examples of the chivalrous just warrior in the Middle Ages to the technologically skilled nuclear intellectual analysed by Carol Cohn. In order to understand how these war transformations can both use gendered discourses as a tool of legitimacy and have transformative implications on masculinised ideals, it is necessary to comprehend how these war transformations first come about. For the purposes of this study’s focus on robotic warfare, the account brought by defence scholar MikkelVedby Rasmussen on its development is particularly useful as the author explains at length how these new technologies serve the needs of the contemporary risk society. Specifically within the context of the U.S military, the author analyses how the revolution in military affairs (RMA) and the development of robotic technologies in warfare emerge as a response to the diminished number of conscripts after Vietnam, 53 as well as the increasing concern in minimising risks at war. Robotic warfare then emerged as an effective, precise and apparent “risk-free” alternative, and the added value of its pre-emptive character and future capacities meets the yearnings of U.S security concerns after 9/11. Within this context where risk to the lives of citizens is to be avoided at all costs, feminist literature emphasises how gendered assertions are being used andtransformed to enhance the acceptability of robotic technologies in military operations. Scholars such as Mary Manjikian and Lorraine B. de Volo, for instance, examine how gendered speech reframes these technological activities as masculine, by associating the idea of the “cyberwarrior” with that of an enhanced super-male: stronger, more efficient and able to operate in offensives for a longer time.56 On the other hand, robotic warfare also “recalibrates” gender by inserting new qualities such as „technical prowess and manual dexterity‟ into the idea of hegemonic masculinity, therefore helping validate robotic usage. This increased association of drones to a „techno-modernised‟ version of masculinity then re-asserts and re-establishes masculine authenticity into robotic warfare, with the aim of validating it as a useful response to the new risk-averse mentality in warfare. At this point, it is interesting to note how the traditional masculinised “protector” role is shifted from the individual soldier to the nation. Rasmussen, for example, investigates how the robotic RMA is construed as a means for the U.S. military to get its soldiers out of danger, and de Volo underscores how the logic of U.S. acting as a patriarchal masculine protector to both its population and soldiers is strengthened by robotic usage. 59However, the discourse of the „masculine protector‟ used by the country willing to deploy robotic technology in its warfare efforts also has other consequences. As explained by de Volo, „one person’s masculine protector is another’s masculine predator‟, and the nation willing to employ robotic usage can project itself as a dominant predator weakening the countries it targets. When a nation cannot protect their own territory against a drone attack, the attacker arises as a global patriarch and its over-powering aggressiveness de-masculinises the country that hosts the offensive.61As a result, this creates a gendered divide among nations – the „masculine‟ predator countries that can use robotic technology in their war efforts, and the „feminised‟ ones that are “penetrated” by the such robotic military enterprises. From the considerations above, it is possible to observe that robotic warfare has been considered to reinforce rather than rewrite gender hierarchies.63It has been seen to perpetuate the mutually constitutive link between militarisation and masculinity through a continual renewing of notions of hegemonic masculinity. At the same time, it has been regarded to import gendered tropes to enhance the acceptability of a “risk-free” warfare project, by imprinting a protector/predator imagery to the nation willing to use such type of technology.

#### Maintaining lethal autonomous weapons causes a tradeoff of priorities. Killer robots won’t create peace, but they do sustain a system where military dominance must come at the cost of human security.

---AT: PICs/DA’s war !---Root cause

Conway, 20 [Marissa Conway is a CFFP Writer, August 2020, accessed on 6-21-2022, Centre for Feminist Foreign Policy, “Smashing the Patriarchy: The Feminist Case Against Killer Robots” https://static1.squarespace.com/static/57cd7cd9d482e9784e4ccc34/t/5f356f1e5eb59d07e78fb329/1597337376556/Smashing+the+Patriarchy\_+The+Feminist+Case+Against+Killer+Robots.pdf]/ISEE

FFP addresses the root causes of violence and insecurity by calling for an institutional overhaul of foreign policy and national security. Our world is structured around the patriarchy and naturally, its systems and power hierarchies will be reflected in the weapons we produce. This report will highlight some of the issues revealed when a feminist lens is turned onto killer robots. In Chapter 1, militarisation and masculinity will be explored, including how ideas about masculinity influence a militarised approach to national security. In Chapter 2, gender-based violence and the question of accountability are discussed. The distinction between combatant and civilian are blurred within a patriarchal and racist context, and the ability for killer robots to commit sexualised violence is highlighted. Lastly, in Chapter 3, racism and imperialism is analysed, with a look at how existing societal biases are built into any new technology we would produce. Finally, the report concludes with a summary of the policy recommendations included throughout each of the three chapters. For decades, feminists have campaigned against the violent patriarchal structures that sustain conflict and keep an elite few in power. By building societal hierarchies so that only a small and specific group of people have access to the top - which often in Western countries means straight white men - particular ideas about who is best suited to lead become intrinsically linked to gender and gendered traits. This means the lens through which foreign policy is often conducted has its roots in stereotypical masculine characteristics that have historically been accepted as best for policymaking. These traits include things like being rational, strong, and assertive, while avoiding more feminine-coded traits like emotion or empathy. These ideas about gender feed directly into how national security is understood as a militarised space (Cohn, 2018). Gender (referring to someone’s identity as a man, woman, or gender non-conforming) and gendered traits (referring to concepts about masculinity and femininity) are overlapping but not entirely synonymous. Reference to masculinity here is done so with the understanding that it is a social construct based upon stereotypes to fuel a patriarchal hierarchy of power. The ability to exercise such traits, however, is not exclusive to men, and this report is not interested in reinforcing dated and static ideas of men as masculine and women as feminine. As bell hooks notes, “Black women are very likely to feel strongly that white women have been quite violent, militaristic in their support and maintenance of racism” (hooks, 1995). Anyone is capable of expressing a wide variety of characteristics. Furthermore, including other social categories like race or class into this consideration likewise continues to reveal a complicated system of power dynamics based around identity that play out both between individuals as well as states. The power dynamics found in much of today’s foreign and security policy are framed around realism, an ideology that understands state relationships through the lens of power optimisation. Part of this process means developing new weapons technology in order to continually seek military dominance. Killer robots fit in well with this strategy, and sustain a system that values maintaining power and security through military dominance. The means of keeping peace, then, rests upon the ability to threaten or inflict violence (Conway, 2016; Starr, 2020). Military domination becomes an easily justifiable form of peacekeeping, and masculine-coded traits like aggression and dominance are seen not just as fundamental to security policy, but taken as objective truth within security policy. In this sense, masculinity is systematised by associating ideas about manliness with the willingness to exercise violence (Cohn, 1993). By centring masculine traits as preferential in security policy, “human bodies and their vulnerability, human lives and their subjectivity - all of which are marked as feminine in the binary dichotomies of gender discourse” (Cohn, 1992), get left out. By making it clear that ideas or traits that are coded as feminine are not legitimate, alternative ideas and approaches to security policy are silenced. However, an FFP framework is interested specifically in these silenced ideas, both to explore the fresh perspective they offer and to understand why they were silenced in the first place. A feminist framing of security also takes a step back from the realist and masculine lens through which much of security policy is developed, and instead is interested in what makes the average person secure and safe. Much more immediate needs must be met when security is reframed with the average individual, rather than the state, in mind. Access to safe housing, healthy food, a good education, and affordable healthcare become some of the most prominent indicators of someone’s health and wellness. The ability to lead a life free from discrimination due to gender, race, class, sexuality, or ability are also much better indicators for how sustainability peaceful a society is (Hudson, 2014). A strong military and extravagant weapons arsenal falls low on the lit of priorities in comparison. An FFP would then call for investment not into weapons technology and the military, but instead into the infrastructure of a society and programs to increase equality. As long as militarisation is the lens through which security policy is developed, and gendered traits remain driving factors behind ideas about security, sustainable peace is not possible. By investing in new weapons technology, we are continuing down a path that guarantees violence rather than challenges it. Killer robots will not contribute to peace, but sustain a system where a narrow and patriarchal understanding of security is supported, continuing to leave many vulnerable and at risk of violence.

#### The negative’s evidence will *almost assuredly* be structured through a Western epistemological frame that marginalizes oppressed bodies. Any “LAWS good” argument must fully account for the epistemic privilege required to reach such conclusion.

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Williams, 21 [John Williams is a professor of International Relations at Durham University, “LAWS: Lethal Autonomous Weapons, Epistemic Space, and “Meaningful Human” Control, Journal of Global Security Studies, Volume 6, Issue 4, December 2021, accessed on 6-21-2022, https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogab015]/ISEE

Epistemologically privileged claims are present within engineering and technology literature on LAWS. Some are highly personal: “As a former fighter pilot for the US Navy, but also as a professor of robotics ...” writes Cummings, going on to decry “debates filled with emotional rhetoric, often made worse by media and activist organizations” (2019, 20). This common rhetorical device—discredit opponents as emotional and thus not fully rational—and claiming of personal epistemological privilege via credentials goes much deeper, though. Technological and engineering writing reinforces LAWS’ ostensible virtues in unemotionally calculating legal compliance, creating a “meaningful human” that is, ironically, so hyper-Western as to be more machine-like than human. This section focuses on how this technological trope works to close down debates about “meaningful humans” and then points toward how efforts to empirically establish ethical bases for assessing MHC ought not to be done. That leads to a fifth and final research agenda item—decentering Western technological history and ideas of progress, and the gendered and racialized assumptions they contain. Rationalistic ideals ascribed to LAWS are already critiqued for their gender stereotypes: rational, utilitarian, detached, logical (read “male”) LAWS are superior to emotional, illogical, and impulsive (read “female”) humans. MHC deploys a masculine stereotype of the “fully” human person that, in the face of technological advances, no human can now fulfill: “all humans become subordinated as weak, incapable and emotional; that is, feminized” (Roff 2016b, 11). “Technology is not going to free us from gendered practices and hierarchies ... but will instead reify those very practices and power relationships. ... [C]reating gendered autonomous machines ... will solidify a version of hegemonic masculinity, and further factionalize and subordinate all other masculinities and femininities” (Roff 2016b, 12). The tragic irony of ascribing Western masculine characteristics used for centuries to oppress women and non-Western men to potentially sideline all humans in decision-making about whether, when, and how to kill humans is seemingly lost. Jones (2018) develops xenofeminist critiques of LAWS (and other technologies), blurring categories between human and technology, and “hacking” AI development based on unspoken paradigms of white, Western, heteronormative masculinity to reorientate technology to advance feminist outcomes. This provides analytical and normative purchase on AI. Challenging the epistemological location of dominant LAWS debate by the two-step move of posthumanism and xenofeminism establishes that apparently taken-for-granted assumptions in LAWS debates should be destabilized. Taking seriously what it means to be human and what it means to look at technology from a marginalized perspective is invaluable. Contra Cummings (2019, 21), MHC cannot be reduced to, “a discussion about role allocation between humans and autonomous systems” where good decision-making is defined algorithmically (e.g., Arkin 2009) as the application of a specific set of rules in a context where the immediate utilitarian maximization of desirable outcomes and the minimization of undesirable harms is the standard of judgment. Killing the “right” people or destroying the permitted material objects, lends itself to quantification and a data-processing epistemology commonplace in the engineering and technology approach. AI can process more data from a wider array of inputs faster than any human or team of humans, so let AI make the decisions, especially in high-pressure, time-critical environments (Cummings 2019). MHC may even become unnecessary, especially at the point of target engagement, if operational simulations validate carefully designed and tested systems. This is Cummings’ (2019) notion of “meaningful human certification,” reflecting technological determinism and algorithmic approaches to decision-making found elsewhere in engineering and technology discussions of autonomous processes in increasingly technologically mediated military functions (e.g., Li, Huai, and Wang 2017). If ethics and law are programmable problem sets solvable through algorithmic processing of large-scale data and machine learning, and in need of insulation from “emotion” or similar pollutants, then the case for LAWS makes itself (Arkin 2010). The benefits of autonomous systems that “help prevent injuries or death, as is the case with advanced driver assistance systems increasingly found in automobiles,” are apparent to “most reasonable people” (Kirkpatrick 2016, 27). This analogy with cars (see also Nyholm 2018) reinforces the idea that “reasonableness” derives from a particular epistemology. Reductions of harms such as death or injury through technological innovation, arising from a capitalist mode of production, speak to a utilitarianism that is universalizing in its assumptions and hostile to accounts of ethical relationships to other humans, to the natural world, or to ideas of spirituality and the divine. These are not calculable, so, by inference, not “reasonable” in thinking about LAWS. The “meaningful human” in this paradigm is abstracted from specific social, political, economic, cultural, and historical circumstances. Yet, in reality, the idealized conditions of post-enlightenment Western modernity are inextricable from the account of reasonableness: the rational, sovereign, liberal, rights-holding subject within a modern project. Particularly pernicious here, however, is that this subjectivity is trivialized through the analogy with civilian technologies, such as autonomous cars, negating the moral distinctions between peace and war via their ethical codes and systems, and the virtues they demand (e.g., Walzer 2006). Technologically rendering violence against the non-Western “ordinary,” a part of the everyday and the everywhere, and imposing a subjectivity onto non-Western peoples that confers permission to kill has been a trend in the use of drone warfare (e.g., Gregory 2011a; Shaw and Akhter 2012; Niva 2013; Williams 2015b; Agius 2017; Gregory 2017; Hurd 2017). This technology prefigures many of the potential uses of LAWS and displays a track record whereby control over drones has been moved away from public scrutiny or engagement, even by citizens of Western democracies, and certainly from the citizens and governments of the places where drone use is most extensive (e.g., Niva 2013). MHC via the engineering and technology processes and principles that drive AI-based autonomy has no room for people who see their relationship to others and their place in the world differently. Disciplinary forgetfulness about racial and colonial legacies manifests here, too. The role of technological and engineering sophistication in constructing “barbarians” and “savages” in the “standard of civilization” is set aside. Bourke (2017) reveals how the language of overt civilizational hierarchy that characterized technological discussions of weapons development in the past has been sublimated and replaced by euphemism. Outcomes, though, are similar: “their” “irrationality” and “unreasonableness” are reasons why LAWS should be developed and deployed to protect “us” from violence stemming from their failure to adopt “our” subjectivity. Technology's centrality to the history of colonial and post-colonial violence, from the civilian bombing strategies of World War II, the conduct of the Vietnam War, to collusion in contemporary conflicts such as Yemen, to pick from an immense list, is glossed over. The human victims of increasingly technologically mediated, amplified, and justified violence count for little; their perspective as “meaningful humans” counts for less. As with IR and security studies, and law and ethics, destabilizing historical mythmaking of Western civilizational superiority in this literature is an important agenda item. This dehumanization of non-Western subjectivities in engineering and technology literature, and trivializing LAWS via analogy to other autonomous technologies, misses another key aspect of how LAWS will develop. As Jones effectively highlights and also discussed in the critical literature on drones (e.g., Williams 2011; Gregory 2011b), the human–AI interface and the development of technologically augmented human combatants make issues of human control and human–machine interconnection increasingly complex. The point in the design, development, deployment, and operational use of LAWS at which “control” occurs is complex and noted in GGE discussions as being a point of concern (e.g., Group of Governmental Experts on Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons System 2021, para. 7–12). However, technological augmentation and increasing AI are not confined to human–technological assemblages of drones and other weapons platforms. The direct technological augmentation of human beings is a near-future prospect, as systems such as exoskeletons to augment human strength, speed, and endurance move from laboratories to operational deployment. LAWS, as Nyholm (2018) discusses, although in a very different way and rooted in the problematic analogy with driverless cars, will most likely operate as parts of systems where human agents are present and acting. While Nyholm addresses the ostensible “accountability gap” LAWS create, following Jones, I show how this opens the door to alternative epistemological perspectives. Jones (2018, 2019) shows how posthumanism asks questions about the nature of (technologically augmented) human agency. Is the MHC concept applicable to a weapon system that includes both human and machine components? Inclusion could be via direct technological augmentation of human decision-making capacities: for example, information gathering, processing, and analyzing, through to partial decision-making. This echoes worries about “on the loop” MHC falling prey to well-established human tendencies to defer to normally accurate and reliable technological systems, even when those systems recommend actions other information challenges (e.g., Roff and Danks 2018, 9). However, the argument goes further—are technologically augmented humans still “humans”? Is their control “human” control? The “X human Y” debate again fails to grapple with the contestable “human” at its center. Robillard's certainty about the binary nature of agency looks doubtful when the human and machine blend. The assumption of LAWS as substitutes for humans falls when they are inextricably entangled elements of a single system. Picking up the discussion of relationality from section “Grounding MHC”, posthumanism points to the possibility that relationality will encompass technology, or, at least, technologically enhanced humans. There has been, up to now, a Western-centrism in key applications of posthumanism, such as xenofeminism (Jones 2019, 131). So the agenda here is also one that can benefit from non-Western engagement, decentering Western historical experience and intellectual assumptions to enrich debate about “meaningful humans.” These epistemological debates are, though, absent in the engineering and technology policy literature considered here. Instead, epistemological questions are ducked through appeals to resolution via public opinion research and (invariably Western) “experts.” Why these are definitive sources of valid knowledge about LAWS is never, in the sources surveyed, properly explained. Verdiesen, Santoni de Sio, and Dignum (2019) instantiate how empirical evidence of public opinion is used to ostensibly validate ethical ideas about LAWS. “We have identified several values that people associate with Autonomous Weapons Systems ... derived from both validated ethical theories [all Western in origin] and from experts ... in the debate on Autonomous Weapons Systems or [who] work in the military domain” (Verdiesen, Santoni de Sio, and Dignum 2019, 42). While they recognize exploring non-Western perspectives on LAWS is an issue for further research (2019, 42–43), we can, it seems, get a good-enough sense from surveying Western public opinion and military personnel, and thus empirically determine “correct” ethical positions. Horowitz (2016b) does much the same to challenge claims that public opinion polling shows opposition to LAWS (Human Rights Watch 2016, 16–17), but without the caveats about needing to ask non-Westerners (or, even, non-Americans) in the future. Seemingly, only US public opinion matters as the US public's perspective can stand as universal. Morgan et al. (2020, 100–117) also focus public opinion research on the United States, showing “in principle” objections to LAWS decline when contextualized in relation to the United States securing victory against LAWS-using enemies. In the absence of public opinion data, technologists appeal to nonengineering expertise on the potential military utility of LAWS, found in current or retired Western military personnel, most commonly from the United States, or in think tanks closely connected to the military (e.g., Kirkpatrick 2016, 28–29). The epistemological closure through privileging Western public and “expert” opinion and specific accounts of Western technological development and progress, typically sanitized of its colonial and racist episodes, goes unnoticed.

### 1AC – Solvency

#### A complete ban is possible and it solves. Only prohibiting LAWS entirely resolves questions of enforcement and circumvention.

Wareham 17 Mary Wareham, 1-5-2017, "The Growing International Movement Against Killer Robots," Human Rights Watch, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/01/05/growing-international-movement-against-killer-robots//mb24>

Affirming the principle of meaningful human control via a preemptive ban This matter of whether autonomous weapons are ethically acceptable lies at the core of the debate over them. The fundamental question is not technological, but philosophical: “Will machines be given the power and authority to kill a human being?” History has shown that for some weapons that significantly threaten non-combatants, including poison gas, biological weapons, chemical weapons, blinding lasers, antipersonnel mines, and cluster munitions, responsible governments have found it necessary to supplement the limits already in the international legal framework. **Fully autonomous weapons have the potential to raise a comparable level of humanitarian concern**. Based on current and foreseeable technology, the ICRC says there are serious doubts about the ability of autonomous weapon systems to comply with IHL “in all but the narrowest of scenarios and the simplest of environments.” Because of this, the ICRC says “it seems evident that overall human control over the selection of, and use of force against, will continue to be required.” The Campaign to Stop Killer Robots fundamentally objects to autonomous weapons because it rejects the notion that a machine should be permitted to take a human life on the battlefield or in policing, border control, or any circumstances. It seeks to affirm the positive principle that weapons systems, military attacks, and the use of violent force in policing should always be kept under meaningful human control. In order to do that, the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots calls on states and others to endorse its call for a preemptive ban on the development, production, and use of fully autonomous weapons systems. The global coalition of non-governmental organizations does not oppose military use of autonomy and technologies relating to artificial intelligence, but it draws the line at the development of machines that could select and fire on targets without human intervention. Research and development activities should be banned if they are directed at technology that can be used exclusively for fully autonomous weapons or that is explicitly intended for use in such weapons. **A preemptive prohibition is both possible and desirable.** **The Convention on Conventional Weapons Protocol IV banning blinding lasers provides precedent for the creation of a protocol on lethal autonomous weapons systems.** The campaign has urged that states ban rather than regulate fully autonomous weapons because a co**mplete prohibition is clearer and easier to enforce than partial regulations or restrictions and eliminates room for different interpretations**. A complete prohibition creates greater stigma against the weapons and discourages their proliferation. Mere regulation would still allow governments to obtain them, and be tempted to use them illegally. The serious international security and proliferation concerns relating to fully autonomous weapons include the real danger that if even one nation acquires these weapons, others may feel they have to follow suit in order to defend themselves and to avoid falling behind in a robotic arms race. There is also the prospect that fully autonomous weapons could be acquired by repressive regimes or non-state armed groups with little regard for the law. These weapons could be perfect tools of repression and terror for autocrats. Another proliferation concern is that such weapons would increase the likelihood of armed attacks, making resort to war more likely, as decision-makers would not have the same concerns about loss of soldiers’ lives. This could have a destabilizing effect on international security. Since 2013, a broad range of individuals, organizations, and states have come forward to endorse the call for a preemptive ban on fully autonomous weapons systems, including: • Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, Ghana, The Holy See, Pakistan, State of Palestine, and Zimbabwe. • The European Parliament, which adopted a resolution by a vote of 534–49 calling for a ban on “development, production and use of fully autonomous weapons which enable strikes to be carried out without human intervention.” • Twenty-one Nobel Peace Laureates, who expressed concern that “leaving the killing to machines might make going to war easier.” • More than 120 religious leaders and organizations of various denominations, who view the weapons as “an affront to human dignity and to the sacredness of life.” • More than 270 scientists in 37 countries, who warned how interactions by devices controlled by complex algorithms “could create unstable and unpredictable behavior … that could initiate or escalate conflicts, or cause unjustifiable harm to civilian populations.” • More than 3,000 artificial intelligence (AI) and robotics experts, who said they have “no interest in building AI weapons and do not want others to tarnish their field by doing so, potentially creating a major public backlash against AI that curtails its future societal benefits.” • Canadian technology company Clearpath Robotics, which said it had “chosen to value our ethics over potential future revenue” by pledging not to manufacture “weaponized robots that remove humans from the loop.” • The ethics council of the $830 billion Norwegian government pension fund, which is looking at whether investments in companies making lethal autonomous weapons systems would violate the fund’s fundamental humanitarian principles. • The UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, who in a report recommended, “Autonomous weapons systems that require no meaningful human control should be prohibited.” Finding the way forward, faster toward an outcome In May 2013, states first deliberated on autonomous weapons in a multilateral forum when a UN special rapporteur presented a report to the Human Rights Council that called for an immediate moratorium on the weapons. At the Convention on Conventional Weapons, also in Geneva, representatives from more than 85 countries met in May 2014 and April 2015 for a total of nine days to discuss lethal autonomous weapons systems, while a third meeting took place in April 2016. Various UN agencies, international organizations, the Red Cross, and civil society groups coordinated by the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots are also participating throughout these deliberations and other meetings, which have helped sharpen the focus on lethal autonomous weapons systems and the concerns raised by them. The process is helping to establish a common base of knowledge from which some nascent norms or principles are finding broad agreement, most notably the notion that human control must be retained over the operation of weapons systems. However, the informal talks are being criticized for “treading water” as they lack ambition, demonstrate no sense of urgency, and reflect the CCW’s usual “go slow and aim low” approach. The Campaign to Stop Killer Robots calls on states to agree to a more formal and substantive process, with up to four weeks of work dedicated in 2017, when they decide on the way forward at the end of the year. The CCW Review Conference in December 2016 should agree to begin formal negotiations and aim to complete them within one or two years by producing a preemptive prohibition on lethal autonomous weapons systems. Pakistan—the first and probably most ardent supporter of the call for a ban—will serve as president of the CCW Review Conference, where states must take crucial decisions on the process going forward and desired outcome. Sustained and substantive national campaigning is required to make any headway reining in autonomous weapons, including legislative scrutiny in the form of debate, questions, and inquiries, and new legislation to ban the weapons. As Canada’s new Minister of Defense Harjit Sajjan commented to the Halifax Security Forum, legislative oversight is required as technology advances so that the burden of deciding on ethical dilemmas associated with their use is not placed on service men and women. The US is the only country with a detailed written policy guiding it on fully autonomous weapons, which it says “neither encourages nor prohibits” development of lethal autonomous weapons systems.” The US has described fully autonomous weapons as a potential “force multiplier.” Recent media interviews with top Pentagon officials provide some disturbing signs that the five-year policy may soon be replaced by guidelines allowing acquisition of human-out-of-the-loop weapons systems. However, officials also express support for retaining human control by stating, for example, that “we will not delegate lethal authority to a machine to make a decision.” Israel has also spoken about the desirability and potential benefits of autonomous weapons systems, urging other countries to “keep an open mind” because it is “difficult” to foresee how developments may look in 10-30 years from now.” No other state has publicly expressed interest in pursuing such systems and several have explicitly stated that they are not developing such systems and that have no plans to do so. But there have been extensive discussions about the potential benefits of such weapons, and many states are concerned that potential enemies will acquire fully autonomous weapons, making their continued development inevitable. The trend toward ever-greater autonomy in warfare has been accelerating greatly in recent years, at an ever-faster pace. **A strong, inclusive, and unified effort is needed now to prevent the unconstrained development of fully autonomous weapons systems.**

#### NATO is key to building international momentum against LAWS. Even if NATO hasn’t previously signaled support for the plan, it still can and should.

**Rideau Institute, 21** [Rideau Institute, 7-5-2021, accessed on 6-24-2022, Rideauinstitute, "Swarming military drones bring new urgency to push for killer robot ban – Rideau Institute", https://rideauinstitute.ca/2021/07/12/swarming-military-drones-bring-new-urgency-to-push-for-killer-robot-ban/]/ISEE

What about NATO? In our 7 June blog we called upon Canada to take a strong position at the then upcoming NATO Summit in support of a ban on the development and use of fully autonomous weapons systems. The NATO Communiqué at paragraph 36 makes only one specific reference to autonomous weapons technologies, stating that: Through NATO-supported multinational cooperation projects, Allies are committed to working together to develop or acquire new capabilities in key areas such as …autonomous systems…. Paragraph 37 contains one positive, albeit passive, reference to regulation of emerging disruptive technologies (EDTs), which would include lethal autonomous systems, with the following statement: This strategy outlines a clear approach for identifying, developing, and adopting EDTs at the speed of relevance, guided by principles of responsible use, in accordance with international law, and taking into account discussions in relevant international fora. [emphasis added] In the view of Ian Davis of NATO Watch: Exactly where the alliance falls on the spectrum between permitting AI-powered military technology in some applications and regulating or banning it in others is expected to be part of the Strategic Concept debate. The 2021 NATO Summit formally launched work on the new Strategic Concept, to replace that developed in 2010. It is to be approved at the next summit in 2022. (See Communiqué paragraph 6.) Reminding us of the UN Secretary-General’s support for a total prohibition on “morally repugnant” weapons that could, by themselves, target and attack human beings, Davis outlines the critical role that NATO can and should play to that end: With NATO leadership such weapons could be banned by a treaty similar to the initiatives that successfully prohibited antipersonnel landmines in 1997 and cluster munitions in 2008. Preserving meaningful human control over the use of force is an ethical imperative and a legal necessity. The development of a new NATO Strategic Concept is an opportunity for member states to lead by example in the global effort to ban killer robots and to develop new norms guiding the use of artificial intelligence for defence purposes. In the view of the Rideau Institute: This would be a tangible demonstration by NATO members of their oft-proclaimed declaratory commitment to strengthening the rules-based international order.

#### NATO has unique authority over AI – legitimacy, legal interoperability, and accountability.

Lockman and Trabucco 22 Zoe Stanley-Lockman (Defense and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University) and Lena Trabucco (Political Science, University of Copenhagen), 3-20-2022, "NATO’s Role in Responsible AI Governance in Military Affairs," The Oxford Handbook of AI Governance, https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197579329.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780197579329-e-69#oxfordhb-9780197579329-e-69-div1-4//mb24

The first pillar considers **NATO’s role in the evolution of ethical and values-driven AI.** One ongoing debate regarding AI as a military technology is the ethical implications and baseline values the Allies, and others, want infused in the development and adoption of AI. The Allies themselves lack uniform consensus on numerous, substantial ethical questions on the use of AI, as most clearly seen in the adjacent area of the ethics of autonomy in weapons systems including lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS). In this discussion, we **spotlight NATO’s role in facilitating and shaping ethical harmonization as an operational requirement to ensure successful future missions.** The second pillar examines legal norms as a domain wherein legal uncertainty regarding AI has tangible implications for Allied legal interoperability, a subset of larger coalition interoperability. Thus far, the legal debate regarding AI has been largely fixed on the issue of a treaty banning the use of LAWS. In this section, we advocate for a more nuanced legal picture in which NATO can facilitate legal coordination and tackle some of the foundational legal issues which will prevent successful legal interoperability in future operations. The third pillar identifies safety and security of AI systems as prerequisite to trustworthy and responsible AI in any context, but especially so for the conduct of military activity. At the NATO level, Allied forces must ensure their systems interoperate safely and predictably both to ensure effective command and control (C2) internally, and to prevent disruptions from attacks. It is a foundational facet of coordination that shows the overlap between NATO interests in military effectiveness and incentivization for responsible innovation. Ethics and values One of the vital aspects of AI which has garnered significant global attention is the ethical implications of artificial intelligence as a military technology—an issue that has divided much of the global community, including NATO member states. As a starting point, researchers and analysts have considered the implications of emerging military technology in terms of ethical responsibility and regulation, especially as states and organizations continue to release AI ethical principles, guidelines, and standards.55 We explore how **NATO can operationalize the debate around ethics and values of military AI to garner coordination and continue progress of EDT harmonization among partners**. Building on the theoretical discussion from STS and military innovation literature above, the adoption of technologies that reinforce values serves the strategic interest of NATO to **shape technological innovation against current waves of illiberalism.** Additionally, infusing AI development with certain ethical principles and values can have operational advantages and benefits, and NATO can, in particular, promote the ethical principles as operational standards for the Allies. A common critique within the ethics debate is that approaching new technology with an ethical or democratic values-driven perspective translates into comparative military disadvantage. Essentially, if your adversary develops technology without the constraints of ethical principles then there will be diminished effectiveness on the battlefield.56 We find this critique unfounded because it assumes there is a false trade-off between ethics and effectiveness; instead, we argue ethical foundations are built into the architecture of modern warfare.57 As such, ethics is a background condition for battlefield effectiveness, which is already infused in military decision-making and helping to guide the boundaries of international humanitarian law. As such, ethical guidelines do not have to detract from a military’s capacity or competency to devise means and methods of warfare that will serve their national or coalition interest.58 If anything, a first-mover advantage can incentivize an ethical and values-driven AI to establish the threshold of technological standards globally.59 The political dimension of the Alliance rests on the bedrock of a shared commitment to the “principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law,” as enshrined in the foundational North Atlantic Treaty of 1949.60 **Shared values are important for NATO operations because they help constitute their legitimacy.** In addition to the North Atlantic Council exerting civilian oversight over NATO operations, legitimacy also includes respect for international legal principles including the core principles of international humanitarian law, or the laws of armed conflict, distinction, proportionality, and necessity. Without political oversight and legitimacy, NATO’s military power would be less effective at shaping norms and promoting stability in the international system. The introduction of AI means that NATO has the moral and strategic imperative to adopt technologies that confer legitimacy and responsible innovation.61 Acting on a shared commitment to democratic values is vital to the political cohesion of the NATO Alliance, just as much as it is a determinant of military effectiveness in a predictable security environment. Put simply, shared values are important to both political and operational coherence between Allies. In its 2018 Framework for Future Alliance Operations, the strategic command Allied Command Transformation urged discussion of the legal and ethical dimensions of technological advancement to both know how it would impact NATO decision-making and how the Alliance would be prepared to address adversaries who do not share in that vision.62 As such, NATO is contending with the ways that ethical AI impacts its own cohesion internally and how differences between allies may project outward in the face of competitors whose ethical frameworks and commitment to the rule of law differ. Internally, there is a strong national government commitment to responsible AI. Recently, **transatlantic cooperation has initiated partnerships of largely NATO states committed to advancing responsible AI with goals towards data sharing and future interoperability.63 AI defense partnerships are not restricted to military innovation but rather aim to facilitate civilian innovation cooperation for defense purposes.** Externally, as AI-enabled autonomous systems enter the arsenals of more technologically advanced countries, uncoordinated ethical frameworks between Allies could pose operational risks. Without wider alignment, AI systems will have “varying technical specifications based on the legal and policy decisions made by individual governments when answering the key questions.”64 Further, although one motivation of autonomous systems is the increased safety of military personnel by removing them from dangerous situations, the lack of alignment could lead some Allies to perceive other capitals’ deployments of unmanned forces as a lack of commitment to put lives on the line, therein posing credibility risks for Allies to assure one another.65 These credibility risks can be mitigated by accountability and verification standards and procedures that NATO can implement for multinational operations, and efforts to institutionalize these procedures for AI are underway.66 While the NATO AI Strategy is expected to create a common foundation for the Alliance’s pursuit of AI, it is the implementation of principles for safe, ethical, legal, and interoperable AI that will reveal how coherent different national perspectives are. As of August 2021, only the United States and France have publicly issued their military AI strategies.67 Other allies, including Canada and the United Kingdom, have emerging views on responsible military AI, but little official information about how they implement their ethical risk assessments is publicly available.68 **NATO’s influence** in the functioning of joint operations and multinational military operations situates the Alliance to coordinate **between how Allies implement ethical principles** in their own national AI development. Specifically, **NATO is well-situated to advocate for transparency, accountability, and data governance, which are also adoption factors that can translate into operational benefits, among other values**.69 For example, these factors can promote coordination among Allies on ethical guidelines on the development and use of AI, as this will be a necessary foundation in any future joint operation that uses this technology. “The transatlantic partnership must focus on coordinating these core principles and systematic governance to ensure AI systems development aligns with the rule of law and democracy. In particular, this must ensure answering questions about human dignity, human control, and accountability … NATO remains the organization that can bring these two (U.S. and EU) together and establishes the ethical bottom line.”70 The issues of transparency and accountability will define the scope of future implementation. Many remaining questions and uncertainty will be addressed in NATO’s forthcoming AI ethical principles guidelines. But the guidelines adopted in 2021 do not address every ethical dilemma. Regarding accountability, especially, likely major questions will continue to affect the Alliance. As Assistant Secretary-General for Emerging Security Challenges David van Weel recently clarified, NATO will offer a framework of responsible use for the Allies—but the question of accountability for member states, as opposed to civilian technology manufacturers for example, is one principle that will not have an easy solution.71 International legal norms In certain respects, the legal debate mirrors much of the ethical debate surrounding AI as the two address many of the same issues. International law is a values-based system embedded in certain principles and practices agreed-upon within the international system. This section certainly identifies the complementarity of the ethical discussion surrounding AI, but it also illustrates where the legal debate can depart from the ethical considerations to address different sorts of legal challenges that face the Alliance. Lawyers, researchers, and civil society grapple with existing legal regimes relevant to military operations and the uncertainty and ambiguity surrounding automated decision-making, particularly in lethal decision-making. Thus far, the legal dialogue has been heavily anchored in the applicability of international humanitarian law (IHL), and other relevant legal regimes, to lethal autonomous weapons systems.72 IHL, also known as the laws of war or the laws of armed conflict, regulate the means and methods of warfare and, as such, is pivotal to the emergence of military technology and how existing legal structures are disrupted. The legal debate often revolves around the **prospect of a “treaty ban” of LAWS.**73 But the legal debate is much more nuanced than the likelihood of international treaties banning any particular weapon system. Especially because NATO is not a regulatory body, it cannot institute measures to regulate emerging technology for the Allies. Instead, NATO’s function in the legal domain may be more effective outside the traditional legal debates around emerging military technology and more embedded in fostering cooperation and coordination among military partners. Other avenues of legal regulation may fall short of an international convention or prohibition, but nevertheless factor significantly in regulating and/or delineating state policies. Additionally, non-lethal applications of AI, as well as applications of AI that do not figure into autonomous systems, also raise important legal questions under international law. Arguably, norms around non-lethal applications are more urgent as their development is more advanced, harder to define, and less controversial in integration.74 Ultimately**, NATO’s facilitative power can help ensure that integration of EDTs like AI into military capabilities and into multinational coalition operations is consistent with member states’ legal obligations.** One **vital and unique contribution for NATO** is facilitating **legal interoperability** among the Allies to resolve some of the most pressing legal barriers for AI implementation in future Allied operations. Legal interoperability, a subset of larger coalition interoperability, refers to the operational coordination around partner legal obligations and interpretations.75 It ensures “that within a military alliance, military operations can be conducted effectively consistent with the legal obligations of each nation.”76 Legal interoperability is a **critical component of multilateral operations** that has thus far been under-examined, despite its centrality to successful military operations. This is largely because “legal factors have a bearing on everything in alliances and coalition operations—from determining basic ‘troop-to-task’ considerations to decisions regarding the targets to be engaged—and the types of ordinances that may be used.”77 To enhance legal interoperability, NATO can exert its influence on how Allies can develop and deploy AI consistent with their legal obligations through its unique standardization capacities. Historically, NATO has taken significant steps to bridge the legal gap between Allies on critical procedures that bridge responsible state behavior with such “troop-to-task” considerations. One instructive example from past operations is detention policies in non-international armed conflicts.78 The promulgation of detention standards illustrates the operational significance of NATO’s common legal procedures, even for coalitions of the willing that formally operate outside NATO structures. By way of background, the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan had internal debates regarding the 96-hour security detention time period.79 The United States advocated extending the 96-hour rule, where coalition partners insisted adhering to the NATO standard, even though it was not a NATO operation.80 Generally the detention example illustrates NATO legal standards providing clarity to non-NATO operations; in some cases, Allies adopt NATO standards as accepted thresholds that continue to inform coalition policies beyond NATO structures and operations. Implementing AI in future military operations will almost certainly complicate legal interoperability as there is a lack of uniform standards, as in the detention example. Even some of the more basic implementation measures will garner legal uncertainty and Allies will inevitably navigate with minimal legal clarity and no standard procedures. Despite the roots of the legal debate stemming from the question of lethality, the most pressing (and urgent) legal issues will address the integration of necessary AI-enablers, such as data gathering and sharing. Furthermore, NATO has coordinated initiatives to promote awareness of Allies’ legal obligations and has a dedicated office focusing on legality. This centralizes the institutional capacity to focus on alignment not only between the policies of NATO Allies, but coherence with the international community more broadly. Among others, the NATO Legal Practitioners’ Workshop and inter-organizational dialogue between NATO, the UN, and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the latter of which has a delegation to NATO that provides legal training and education to practitioners.81 The NATO Office of Legal Affairs (OLA) itself can also play a central role in navigating the challenges to legal interoperability. As the example of detention standards illustrates, NATO has been successful in implementing legal standards which translated into operational clarity and coalition policy outside NATO operations. As part of its focus on responsibility in its EDT agenda, NATO has opportunities to facilitate AI legal standard-setting and coalition policies to ensure safer and responsible use of AI in Allied operations. Safety and security For humans to meet ethical and legal commitments when developing and deploying AI, the systems themselves must be safe, secure, and reliable. More simply put, if humans and institutions interacting with AI do not have confidence that the systems will perform as expected, then they cannot assure that its development and deployment are responsible. This makes safety and security a key pillar of responsible AI governance for any actor.82 As this section explores for NATO in particular, safety and security are indispensable to the Alliance’s stated goals to focus its approach to EDTs in the areas of “deterrence and defense, capability development, legal and ethical norms, and arms control aspects.”83 Politically, democratic militaries using AI cannot be accountable to their citizenries nor their coalition partners if they lack mechanisms to trace and explain how their systems are reliable. Accidents and interference with AI systems could likewise create political risks for the Alliance. For example, if deepfakes and micro-targeted information attacks compromise confidence in the integrity of information used to build a common operating picture, then the operational difficulties could also erode political trust between Allies in a few key ways. In the North Atlantic Council, disagreement about the integrity of information could slow the decision-making body’s ability to react to fast-changing operational realities.84 Further, compromised AI systems may not only make it harder for forces to prevent harm to non-combatants, but also to prevent friendly fire. In this way, coalition forces arguably face even higher obligations to coordinate on the reliability of their systems, relative to adversaries and near-peer competitors that tend to operate alone. As such, responsible AI governance is not purely technical; policy alignment and strategic planning are likewise necessary to draw attention to risk management above the tactical level. Even without being attacked, governability of AI in a NATO context also means understanding how AI-enabled and autonomous systems developed by the 30 Allies—and other partners—will interact with one another. NATO has expressed interest in governability as a principle of AI “to disengage or deactivate in case of unintended behavior,”85 which echoes the U.S. Department of Defense definition of governable AI.86 Disengaging adversaries is important to maintain de-escalation measures in conflict. For NATO, interoperability between systems also relates to governable AI because allies must also consider how the interactions between the 30 Allies’ own AI-enabled and autonomous systems may result in unintended or emergent behavior.87 This means that NATO has a responsibility to coordinate activities—be they technical exchanges, standardization efforts, or training and exercises—to build confidence that the systems perform as humans intend.88 Without this coordination, the lack of interoperability of allied systems could lead to accidents, and separately, the potential loss of operational effectiveness also presents vulnerabilities for adversaries to exploit. In addition to governability, NATO and its Allies are assessing the risks that bias, attacks, and lack of interpretability can introduce in relation to the anticipated uses of a given AI system.89 In security and defense, new and heightened risks include poisoning of the information environment, deception systems and techniques, uncertainty about the performance of systems in new and unknown environments, and the possibility that tensions or accidents escalate at a faster tempo than humans and institutions can process, among others. These risks can manifest either in motivated attacks or unintentional failure modes.90 In both cases, assuring and certifying that military assets are safe and secure is important given the inherently high risk in operational environments. These operational environments include the presumption that an adversary is disrupting one’s own systems, be it by directly attacking the AI systems themselves, or disrupting the broader command, control, and communications systems under which the AI systems are operating.91 Mitigating these types of risks is typically done in testing, evaluation, validation and verification (TEVV) and in experimentation activities.92 Yet AI cannot be validated and verified the way traditional software systems are because there is no guarantee that an AI system will perform in the real world as it does in a testing environment, and because lifelong-learning systems will perform differently over their lifecycle. Having robust assurance and TEVV processes in place are also important for operators to build trust in the systems they are meant to use, as well as for citizenries and coalition partners at large to see that accountability procedures still apply. As such, building institutional procedures to govern AI safety and security is necessary to build trust in the use of the technology—as well as to develop countermeasures and defensive systems that protect against adversarial threats. NATO thus has an institutional responsibility to prevent and mitigate these intentional and unintentional failures if using AI in operations and mission support.93 As Table 69.1 shows, the Alliance also has a range of relevant entities to coordinate national approaches to AI safety and security, as well as facilitate safety measures as part of responsible use in the Alliance-wide ecosystem. NATO has an important role to play in military standardization and Allied policy planning for safe, secure, and interoperable AI. This includes the coordinating role of the Conference of National Armaments Directors and the Command, Control and Consultation Board to implement complementary acquisition processes that fuse AI adoption measures with safety responsibilities. Furthermore, entities including STO and NSO have a significant role setting the technical baseline and promulgating materiel standards that provide the technical framework for safety and security. Although their staffs are themselves small, they both convene hundreds, if not thousands, of subject matter experts in working groups. As such they both offer unique technical networks to help shape safety and security in a way that minimize risk in operations. **NATO’s resources and leadership are vital to using standards and coalition policy to instill safe and secure technological development, a necessary condition to interoperable and successful future operations.**

### 1AC – Framing

#### The metrics and justifications for feminist policies matter just as much as the ends. Moves to resolve the aff by using masculine forms of risk calculus are antithetical to the radical, ethical demands of the plan.

Verloo 05

(Mieke, Senior Lecturer in Political Sciences and Gender Studies at Radboud University Nijmegen and Research Director of an EU-funded comparative research facility, “Displacement and Empowerment: Reflections on the Concept and Practice of the Council of Europe Approach to Gender Mainstreaming and Gender Equality”, Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State and Society 12.3 (2005) 344-365)

Some studies that focus on assessing the success of gender mainstreaming practices at the level of the European Union point to a similar phenomenon of "adding other goals," as happened in the Message to the Committee of Ministers to Steering Committees of the Council of Europe on Gender Mainstreaming. In Hafner-Burton and Pollack's analysis (2000) of five areas (structural funds, employment and social affairs, development, competition and science, research and development), the accent is on explaining cross-sectional variety within the European Commission in the start and the implementation of gender mainstreaming. They show how important it has been that political opportunities in Europe have widened and increased over the course of the last decade, for instance as a result of the entrance of the Nordic countries. They also show how important lobbying and modernization have been, for instance the lobbying of WISE (the European organization for women's studies) in the case of gender mainstreaming in science, research, and development. In assessing the success of gender mainstreaming, they refer to classical power mechanisms that are at the heart of social movement theory: political opportunities and mobilizing. In the context of this article, the most interesting part of their analysis is their use of the concept of strategical framing, another power mechanism conceptualized in social movement theory. Strategical framing is a dynamic concept that enables us to see how different actors adapt existing policy frames to pursue their prospective goals. Strategical framing is defined as attempting to construct a fit between existing frames, or networks of meaning, and the frames of a change agent. Hafner-Burton and Pollack show that gender mainstreaming is "sold" as an effective means to the ends pursued by the European Commission, rather than as an overt challenge to those ends. They argue that the gender mainstreaming efforts, because of this strategical framing, might turn into an integrationist approach, integrating women and gender issues into specific regular policies rather than rethinking the fundamental aims of the European Union from a gender perspective. Especially since the European Union is one of the most successful implementers of gender mainstreaming so far, this threatens the transformative potential of gender mainstreaming, they say. [End Page 358] Mary Braithwaite's work on gender mainstreaming in the structural funds (1999) corroborates these findings. She finds that because of the absence of precise objectives on reducing gender inequalities, gender is easily located within and has been subjected to other goals, such as employment creation, economic growth, or poverty reduction. This is not to say that these are abject goals, just to stress that they are not synonymous with gender equality. Braithwaite concludes that gender equity suffers from the dominance of efficiency and effectiveness in gender mainstreaming practices in the structural funds. Strategical Framing and Power The studies presented point out that "success," in the sense of starting a process of gender mainstreaming, seems to be connected to the "stretching" of the goal of gender equality, to strategical framing, and they also show that the actual goal of gender mainstreaming is not articulated clearly. In the last section of this article, I will therefore take a closer look at framing processes, at the politics of framing. What happens in processes of strategical framing? Why would it be that integration rather than transformation is the inevitable result of strategical framing processes? Strategical framing refers to a process of linking a feminist goal, such as gender equality, to some major goal of an organization that should engage or is engaging in gender mainstreaming, thereby securing the allegiance of these organizations to gender mainstreaming. In technical terms, this means that until now strategical framing in gender mainstreaming practices has usually involved framing bridging or frame extension6 (Benford and Snow 2000). The strategies chosen do not challenge the other, mainstream goals of policy makers, but provide for a link by "stretching" the gender equality goal. This means that the dual agenda that is mostly present in gender mainstreaming (of the feminist goal and some other goal) is presented as the possibility of a win-win situation. In such conceptualizations, power seems to evaporate; it is put between brackets. Gender mainstreaming is presented as a harmonious process, certainly in the Council of Europe report. The state is also mostly conceptualized as "friendly," probably connected to the fact that Sweden and the Netherlands have been among its pioneers, countries that to some extent have been "friendly" states in the past. Yet, if gender inequality is about power and privileges, then gender mainstreaming should be about abolishing privileges, and if gender mainstreaming is about eliminating gender bias in policy making, then the state should be problematized. Why then is a process of abolishing privileges and gender bias conceptualized as harmony? The answer provided in the studies discussed earlier is that it helps in organizing acceptance of gender mainstreaming, by making it less [End Page 359] threatening. The consequence of this avoidance of struggle is the exclusion of opposing voices, including radical feminist voices. The "Beyond Armchair Feminism" volume of Organization (2000) is one of the few studies analyzing the bad results of such a dual agenda: the disappearance of a gender focus altogether. Coleman and Rippin (2000) conclude, after having tried such a process of harmonious change, that there needs to be more challenge and less agreement in such change processes, even if trust is a crucial component. The presentation of harmony, used to help smooth the process of change, is counterproductive in the end. In Hearn's (2000) reflection on the project, not only organizations are gendered (in the Acker 1990 definition), but also models of organizational or societal change are gendered, as well as embodying other forms of social division and domination. Following this analysis, change processes and hence gender mainstreaming processes and activities should be conceptualized as necessarily riddled with power, subject to mechanisms of power, and best understood in terms of power. Looking at processes of strategical framing as connected to power relations through a Foucauldian lens shows the logic of the dual agenda as a mix of enabling and constraining processes. The main enabling part is the opening generated by the bridging of frames. Yet, in this logic that juxtaposes two sets of goals, some options are repressed. Exposing the "organization" goal as not neutral, but already gendered, or positioning the "feminist" goal as an organization goal in its own right, will be difficult. As organizations tend to have a self-image of gender neutrality, the gender bias in their existing goals will not easily be recognized. And as both goals will hardly ever be backed by equal power resources, the feminist goal will be watered down much more, or much more easily than the organization goal. Moreover, in the process of convincing organizations or people to start a process of gender mainstreaming, there will already be a tendency to select more "acceptable" feminist goals. Also, the feminists or femocrats involved in these efforts will necessarily have some kind of acceptance by the (gender-biased) organization, leading to further selection and exclusion of radical or marginalized voices. The logic of the dual agenda therefore leads first to an opening for a feminist agenda, and then to a narrowing down of the feminist focus and feminist voices, to eventually losing the focus on gender and gender equality altogether. This logic functions through mechanisms of power. Both goals are not equally powerful, as they have unequal support and resources within the regular organizations that are the relevant context of gender mainstreaming. Especially when gender mainstreaming is conceptualized in a technocratic way, less external pressure or mobilization of feminist groups is to be expected. [End Page 360] Moreover, this inequality of support and resources hinders a clear articulation of a feminist goal, or the expression of particular feminist goals that are seen as more radical, while such radical goals would be needed in view of the watering-down mechanisms. Mainstream liberal feminism hence has an advantage, while a goal that is articulated as a need to displace gender will meet resistance. Finally, within feminism there are hegemonic processes as well that are not recognized and that lead to the exclusion of certain feminist voices.

#### You should refuse debate’s constant urge to prevent incalculable future threats and recognize the urgency of gendered violence.

Olson 15

(Elizabeth, professor of geography and global studies at UNC Chapel Hill, ‘Geography and Ethics I: Waiting and Urgency,’ Progress in Human Geography, vol. 39 no. 4, pp. 517-526)

Though toileting might be thought of as a special case of bodily urgency, geographic research suggests that the body is increasingly set at odds with larger scale ethical concerns, especially large-scale future events of forecasted suffering. Emergency planning is a particularly good example in which the large-scale threats of future suffering can distort moral reasoning. Žižek (2006) lightly develops this point in the context of the war on terror, where in the presence of fictitious and real ticking clocks and warning systems, the urgent body must be bypassed because there are bigger scales to worry about: What does this all-pervasive sense of urgency mean ethically? The pressure of events is so overbearing, the stakes are so high, that they necessitate a suspension of ordinary ethical concerns. After all, displaying moral qualms when the lives of millions are at stake plays into the hands of the enemy. (Žižek, 2006)¶ In the presence of large-scale future emergency, the urgency to secure the state, the citizenry, the economy, or the climate creates new scales and new temporal orders of response (see Anderson, 2010; Baldwin, 2012; Dalby, 2013; Morrissey, 2012), many of which treat the urgent body as impulsive and thus requiring management. McDonald’s (2013) analysis of three interconnected discourses of ‘climate security’ illustrates how bodily urgency in climate change is also recast as a menacing impulse that might require exclusion from moral reckoning. The logics of climate security, especially those related to national security, ‘can encourage perverse political responses that not only fail to respond effectively to climate change but may present victims of it as a threat’ (McDonald, 2013: 49). Bodies that are currently suffering cannot be urgent, because they are excluded from the potential collectivity that could be suffering everywhere in some future time. Similar bypassing of existing bodily urgency is echoed in writing about violent securitization, such as drone warfare (Shaw and Akhter, 2012), and also in intimate scales like the street and the school, especially in relation to race (Mitchell, 2009; Young et al., 2014).¶ As large-scale urgent concerns are institutionalized, the urgent body is increasingly obscured through technical planning and coordination (Anderson and Adey, 2012). The predominant characteristic of this institutionalization of large-scale emergency is a ‘built-in bias for action’ (Wuthnow, 2010: 212) that circumvents contingencies. The urgent body is at best an assumed eventuality, one that will likely require another state of waiting, such as triage (e.g. Greatbach et al., 2005). Amin (2013) cautions that in much of the West, governmental need to provide evidence of laissez-faire governing on the one hand, and assurance of strength in facing a threatening future on the other, produces ‘just-in-case preparedness’ (Amin, 2013: 151) of neoliberal risk management policies. In the US, ‘personal ingenuity’ is built into emergency response at the expense of the poor and vulnerable for whom ‘[t]he difference between abjection and bearable survival’ (Amin, 2013: 153) will not be determined by emergency planning, but in the material infrastructure of the city.¶ In short, the urgencies of the body provide justifications for social exclusion of the most marginalized based on impulse and perceived threat, while large-scale future emergencies effectively absorb the deliberative power of urgency into the institutions of preparedness and risk avoidance. Žižek references Arendt’s (2006) analysis of the banality of evil to explain the current state of ethical reasoning under the war on terror, noting that people who perform morally reprehensible actions under the conditions of urgency assume a ‘tragic-ethic grandeur’ (Žižek, 2006) by sacrificing their own morality for the good of the state. But his analysis fails to note that bodies are today so rarely legitimate sites for claiming urgency. In the context of the assumed priority of the large-scale future emergency, the urgent body becomes literally nonsense, a non sequitur within societies, states and worlds that will always be more urgent.¶ If the important ethical work of urgency has been to identify that which must not wait, then the capture of the power and persuasiveness of urgency by large-scale future emergencies has consequences for the kinds of normative arguments we can raise on behalf of urgent bodies. How, then, might waiting compare as a normative description and critique in our own urgent time? Waiting can be categorized according to its purpose or outcome (see Corbridge, 2004; Gray, 2011), but it also modifies the place of the individual in society and her importance. As Ramdas (2012: 834) writes, ‘waiting … produces hierarchies which segregate people and places into those which matter and those which do not’. The segregation of waiting might produce effects that counteract suffering, however, and Jeffery (2008: 957) explains that though the ‘politics of waiting’ can be repressive, it can also engender creative political engagement. In his research with educated unemployed Jat youth who spend days and years waiting for desired employment, Jeffery finds that ‘the temporal suffering and sense of ambivalence experienced by young men can generate cultural and political experiments that, in turn, have marked social and spatial effects’ (Jeffery, 2010: 186). Though this is not the same as claiming normative neutrality for waiting, it does suggest that waiting is more ethically ambivalent and open than urgency.¶ In other contexts, however, our descriptions of waiting indicate a strong condemnation of its effects upon the subjects of study. Waiting can demobilize radical reform, depoliticizing ‘the insurrectionary possibilities of the present by delaying the revolutionary imperative to a future moment that is forever drifting towards infinity’ (Springer, 2014: 407). Yonucu’s (2011) analysis of the self-destructive activities of disrespected working-class youth in Istanbul suggests that this sense of infinite waiting can lead not only to depoliticization, but also to a disbelief in the possibility of a future self of any value. Waiting, like urgency, can undermine the possibility of self-care two-fold, first by making people wait for essential needs, and again by reinforcing that waiting is ‘[s]omething to be ashamed of because it may be noted or taken as evidence of indolence or low status, seen as a symptom of rejection or a signal to exclude’ (Bauman, 2004: 109). This is why Auyero (2012) suggests that waiting creates an ideal state subject, providing ‘temporal processes in and through which political subordination is produced’ (Auyero, 2012: loc. 90; see also Secor, 2007). Furthermore, Auyero notes, it is not only political subordination, but the subjective effect of waiting that secures domination, as citizens and non-citizens find themselves ‘waiting hopefully and then frustratedly for others to make decisions, and in effect surrendering to the authority of others’ (Auyero, 2012: loc. 123).¶ Waiting can therefore function as a potentially important spatial technology of the elite and powerful, mobilized not only for the purpose of governing individuals, but also to retain claims over moral urgency. But there is growing resistance to the capture of claims of urgency by the elite, and it is important to note that even in cases where the material conditions of containment are currently impenetrable, arguments based on human value are at the forefront of reclaiming urgency for the body. In detention centers, clandestine prisons, state borders and refugee camps, geographers point to ongoing struggles against the ethical impossibility of bodily urgency and a rejection of states of waiting (see Conlon, 2011; Darling, 2009, 2011; Garmany, 2012; Mountz et al., 2013; Schuster, 2011). Ramakrishnan’s (2014) analysis of a Delhi resettlement colony and Shewly’s (2013) discussion of the enclave between India and Bangladesh describe people who refuse to give up their own status as legitimately urgent, even in the context of larger scale politics. Similarly, Tyler’s (2013) account of desperate female detainees stripping off their clothes to expose their humanness and suffering in the Yarl’s Wood Immigration Removal Centre in the UK suggests that demands for recognition are not just about politics, but also about the acknowledgement of humanness and the irrevocable possibility of being that which cannot wait. The continued existence of places like Yarl’s Wood and similar institutions in the USA nonetheless points to the challenge of exposing the urgent body as a moral priority when it is so easily hidden from view, and also reminds us that our research can help to explain the relationships between normative dimensions and the political and social conditions of struggle.¶ In closing, geographic depictions of waiting do seem to evocatively describe otherwise obscured suffering (e.g. Bennett, 2011), but it is striking how rarely these descriptions also use the language of urgency. Given the discussion above, what might be accomplished – and risked – by incorporating urgency more overtly and deliberately into our discussions of waiting, surplus and abandoned bodies? Urgency can clarify the implicit but understated ethical consequences and normativity associated with waiting, and encourage explicit discussion about harmful suffering. Waiting can be productive or unproductive for radical praxis, but urgency compels and requires response. Geographers could be instrumental in reclaiming the ethical work of urgency in ways that leave it open for critique, clarifying common spatial misunderstandings and representations. There is good reason to be thoughtful in this process, since moral outrage towards inhumanity can itself obscure differentiated experiences of being human, dividing up ‘those for whom we feel urgent unreasoned concern and those whose lives and deaths simply do not touch us, or do not appear as lives at all’ (Butler, 2009: 50). But when the urgent body is rendered as only waiting, both materially and discursively, it is just as easily cast as impulsive, disgusting, animalistic (see also McKittrick, 2006). Feminist theory insists that the urgent body, whose encounters of violence are ‘usually framed as private, apolitical and mundane’ (Pain, 2014: 8), are as deeply political, public, and exceptional as other forms of violence (Phillips, 2008; Pratt, 2005). Insisting that a suffering body, now, is that which cannot wait, has the ethical effect of drawing it into consideration alongside the political, public and exceptional scope of large-scale futures. It may help us insist on the body, both as a single unit and a plurality, as a legitimate scale of normative priority and social care.¶ In this report, I have explored old and new reflections on the ethical work of urgency and waiting. Geographic research suggests a contemporary popular bias towards the urgency of large-scale futures, institutionalized in ways that further obscure and discredit the urgencies of the body. This bias also justifies the production of new waiting places in our material landscape, places like the detention center and the waiting room. In some cases, waiting is normatively neutral, even providing opportunities for alternative politics. In others, the technologies of waiting serve to manage potentially problematic bodies, leading to suspended suffering and even to extermination (e.g. Wright, 2013). One of my aims has been to suggest that moral reasoning is important both because it exposes normative biases against subjugated people, and because it potentially provides routes toward struggle where claims to urgency seem to foreclose the possibilities of alleviation of suffering. Saving the world still should require a debate about whose world is being saved, when, and at what cost – and this requires a debate about what really cannot wait. My next report will extend some of these concerns by reviewing how feelings of urgency, as well as hope, fear, and other emotions, have played a role in geography and ethical reasoning.¶ I conclude, however, by pulling together past and present. In 1972, Gilbert White asked why geographers were not engaging ‘the truly urgent questions’ (1972: 101) such as racial repression, decaying cities, economic inequality, and global environmental destruction. His question highlights just how much the discipline has changed, but it is also unnerving in its echoes of our contemporary problems. Since White’s writing, our moral reasoning has been stretched to consider the future body and the more-than-human, alongside the presently urgent body – topics and concerns that I have not taken up in this review but which will provide their own new possibilities for urgent concerns. My own hope presently is drawn from an acknowledgement that the temporal characteristics of contemporary capitalism can be interrupted in creative ways (Sharma, 2014), with the possibility of squaring the urgent body with our large-scale future concerns. Temporal alternatives already exist in ongoing and emerging revolutions and the disruption of claims of cycles and circular political processes (e.g. Lombard, 2013; Reyes, 2012). Though calls for urgency will certainly be used to obscure evasion of responsibility (e.g. Gilmore, 2008: 56, fn 6), they may also serve as fertile ground for radical critique, a truly fierce urgency for now.

#### The drive to prevent extinction is a form of masculine survivalism where gendered bodies become the unwilling tools to sustain humanity. You should refuse the obsession with patriarchal reproduction.

Mitchell 15

(Audra Mitchell, Audra Mitchell is a settler scholar who lives and works on the Ancestral and treaty lands of the Neutral (Attawandaron), Haudenosaunee and Mississaugas of the New Credit (please see Honouring the Land). She currently holds the the Canada Research Chair in Global Political Ecology at Wilfrid Laurier University. From 2015-18 she held the CIGI Chair in Global Governance and Ethics at the Balsillie School of International Affairs Audra is an Associate Professor at Wilfrid Laurier University, Canada, 8-3-2015, "Gendering extinction," Worldly, <https://worldlyir.wordpress.com/2015/08/03/gendering-extinction/>, JKS)

The reproduction of survival/ the survival of reproduction

Extinction is almost always understood against the horizon of survival and the imperative to sustain it – at least for life forms deemed to be of value to humans. In many cases, this imperative takes the form of deliberate strategies for enforcing existence. Donna Haraway’s influential book When Species Meet devotes considerable attention to the logics, practices and politics of Species Survival Plans. These plans monitor and enforce reproduction amongst ‘endangered’ species, not least by collecting data on populations, genetic profiles and genetic materials to enable selective breeding. This strategy assumes that all organisms can, should, and can be made to exercise their reproductive capacities in order to resist extinction, and it actively mobilizes members of ‘endangered species’ into this project. In so doing, it helps to entrench norms regarding gender, sexuality and reproductive labour that are deeply entrenched in modern, Western human cultures. Attention to these programmes highlights an important way in which extinction is gendered in dominant scientific and policy frameworks. Specifically, strategic breeding programmes share in the belief that reproduction is an imperative for those capable of reproducing if ‘the species’ is at risk’. This belief is directly related to Western norms of the reproductive imperative for women. Indeed, Haraway points out that it is precisely “‘woman’s’ putative self-defining responsibility to ‘the species’ as this singular and typological female is reduced to her reproductive function”. In a similar sense, within SSPs and other strategies of enforced survival, entire life forms are reduced to their reproductive capacities. Moreover, programmes of enforced survival can, in the context of sexual reproduction, disproportionately burden female organisms with the task of avoiding extinction. This logic is particularly fraught in discussions of the possibility of human extinction, in which female fertility (captured in the standard policy language of ‘births per woman’) is framed simultaneously as a threat to survival, and the only hope for escaping extinction (see, for instance, Alan Weisman’s comments on this). In these ways, the securitization of survival entrenches the intersectional categories of gender, species and race discussed above. Dominant discourses of extinction and conservation also entrench and privilege sexual reproduction, in ways that entrench heteronormative assumptions and norms. This is reflected in the way that the subjects of extinction and conservation are framed. The standard object of conservation is the biological ‘species’, a term which is defined by the ability of organisms to reproduce sexually. As Myra Hird has pointed out, this conception of ‘species’ makes it appear as if sexual reproduction is the ‘best’ means of sustaining the existence of a life form. However, Hird’s work demonstrates that Earthly life forms actually engage in myriad forms of reproduction, from the free exchange of DNA between bacteria to the hermaphroditic practices of some fish. The upshot of these arguments is that Earthly life is sustained through a huge variety of reproductive activities that do not conform to biological understandings of life processes or species. Crucially, Hird argues that there is no necessary hierarchy between forms of reproduction. In Darwinian terms, all species that manage to survive are equally successful. However, by conflating survival with sexual reproduction, existing discourses of extinction embed hetero-normative frameworks that devalue other forms of reproduction. They also reduce reproduction to the imperative to survive, ignoring the myriad cultural, political, aesthetic, sensual and other dimensions of reproduction.

#### The panic over potential threats to the nation is a form of masculine futurity which allows reproductive bodies to be regulated. Claims of utilitarianism justify the endless sacrifice of reproductive freedom in the name of the “greatest good.”

Petersen 15

(Kristin Petersen B.A., University of Southern California 2003 M.A. New York University 2008, A dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the James T. Laney School of Graduate Studies of Emory University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Women’s, Gender, and Sexuality Studies, The Logic of Futurity: Reproduction, Cultural Eugenics, and Contingencies of Women’s Citizenship in the Contemporary United States, Proquest, JKS)

Cultural theorist Ruth McElroy suggests, “Women’s belonging to nations is indissoluble from their reproductive biology” (325). For all that motherhood may be conceived as a private choice occurring in the supposedly private sphere, reproduction and motherhood are nonetheless public and political as well, and thoroughly entangled with women’s status as members of their nation. By virtue of their reproduction (or even lack thereof!), women can be constructed in cultural narratives and political scripts as contributors to society or threats to the national good, caretakers of the future who merit protection and support or wayward parents who must be disciplined back into the national fold, national maternal ideals or outsiders within. The state’s identification of and response to women as reproducers reflects the continuous processes of the politics of belonging, which “involve not only the maintenance and reproduction of the boundaries of the community of belonging by the hegemonic political powers...but also by their contestation, challenge and resistance by other political agents” (Yuval-Davis 20). We see these politics of belonging manifested not only discursively, but also in the policies and laws that protect or privilege some mothers and not others, some children, but not all. When anthropologists Faye Ginsburg and Rayna Rapp ask, “who defines the body of the nation into which the next generation is recruited? Who is considered to be in that national body, who is out of it?” (3), therefore, there is no one answer; rather, this is the question perpetually being asked and answered by political discourse and practice infused with the logic of futurity. The hopes and fears of the present political moment and the imaginative desires for the future are thus continually projected upon the bodies of women and their procreative capacities. Futurity, I suggest in this project, as a possibly inevitable perspective or worldview, allows for the state to focus on women as reproductive beings in a way that it does not for men. Following from Foucault’s explication of biopower, the modern state takes an interest in the workings and ostensible health of its populations, creating new knowledges and indices for the normal as it counts up the characteristics of its citizenry and sets goals for demographic management. While Foucault tends not to focus on the reproductive elements of the state’s biopolitical interest—for instance, the setting of ideal rates of fertility, health expectations for women and children, creation of access to the medical, economic, and social resources needed for reproduction—these are, I would argue, operations of the state that have potential for tremendous impacts upon women particularly. The other biopolitical interests of the state—appropriate number of workers, manageable immigration rates, proper ratio of elderly to young, and so on—are also all implicated in the procreative behaviors of women, which would seem to intensify the state’s interest in them. Brought into the broader framework of women’s political status and national belonging, reproduction in this context seems poised to function as an axis upon which the dispensation of women’s citizenship can pivot, with particular regard to her racial, economic, and social demographic and the state’s assessment of her (and her children’s) value to the national future. Penelope Deutscher suggests that through the emergence of biopower: Women would later assume a status as a reproductive threshold of the future and health of nations, populations and peoples. But the condition for this role for women and maternal reproductivity was the very possibility of reproduction being associated with a shifting field of possible substances, telos, outcomes and obligations: the overall good, the general happiness, the future of the nation, the health of the nation, the competitiveness of the nation, the future of the people, individual flourishing or freedom, individual rights, domestic happiness, the family unit as building block of the nation, the transmission of the bloodline, the family name, transmission of property or family or genealogical transmission, reproduction of the labour force, etc. That reproduction be plausibly thought of in such terms at all was a precondition of it becoming associated with women’s role as threshold of futurity. (Deutscher 129) The state’s biopolitical management of women’s reproduction may thus allow it to approach women primarily as reproductive beings, an essentalist or even utilitarian collapse that may make it easier to intervene upon their bodies and perhaps reflects a deeply ingrained discomfort with the notion that women have tremendous potential power to impact the composition of the future. In this project, I am proposing a framework of futurity that is in operation, characterized by discursive and eugenic aspects, that uses women as the vehicle for future world-building and nation-making. This futurity aims to enact particular visions of the future via changes in the present, particularly through the management of women’s reproduction in the present such that the future population comports with present desires. When this futurity framework is picked up by the state in its various capacities, I suggest there are significant consequences for women’s citizenship as women because they are so intrinsically linked in the cultural and political imaginary with reproduction. In the process of grappling with these concepts, this project asks how the logic of futurity functions to organize the terms of women’s social or political belonging in reproductive terms. How does the state pick up and extend this logic to women, and how might that impact the meaningfulness of women’s citizenship or national belonging? Does the logic of futurity, the constant pressure of the forward vision combined with the imaginative limitations of the present, insist upon women’s citizenship being or becoming something fundamentally different from men’s by virtue of reproductive capacity and association? Exploring these questions brings this project into several disciplinary contexts, including feminist theory and philosophy, political theory, disability theory (eugenics), and even the sphere of economics. In connecting these concepts to ongoing conversations about women and citizenship in the contemporary United States, this project is ultimately working to tie together disparate fields and illuminate how they interact with respect to a model of futurity that I theorize as containing discursive and eugenic aspects. It may be that state-based discourses and practices related to women’s reproduction and citizenship are not so much causes as they are effects of the logic of futurity.

#### Our impact outweighs on probability and magnitude – risk assessment is epistemologically biased towards white masculine elites who discount the severity of everyday localized violence in destroying marginalized populations.

Verchick 96 [Robert, Assistant Professor, University of Missouri -- Kansas City School of Law. J.D., Harvard Law School, 1989, “IN A GREENER VOICE: FEMINIST THEORY AND ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE” 19 Harv. Women's L.J. 23]

Because risk assessment is based on statistical measures of risk, policymakers view it as an accurate and objective tool in establishing environmental standards. n275 The scientific process used to assess risk purports to focus single-mindedly on only one feature of a potential injury: the objective probability of its occurrence. n276 Risk assessors, who consider most value judgments irrelevant in determining statistical risk, seek to banish them at every stage. n277 As a result, the language of risk assessment -- and of related environmental safety standards -- often carry an air of irrebuttable precision and certainty. The EPA, for example, defines the standard acceptable level of risk under Superfund as "10<-6>" -- that is, the probability that one person in a million would develop cancer due to exposure to site contamination. n278 [\*76] Feminism challenges this model of scientific risk assessment on at least three levels. First, feminism questions the assumption that scientific inquiry is value-neutral, that is, free of societal bias or prejudice. n279 Indeed, as many have pointed out, one's perspective unavoidably influences the practice of science. n280 Western science may be infused with its own ideology, perpetuating, in the view of the ecofeminists, cycles of discrimination, domination, and exploitation. n281 Second, even if scientific inquiry by itself were value-neutral, environmental regulation based on such inquiry would still contain subjective elements. Environmental regulation, like any other product of democracy, inevitably reflects elements of subjectivity, compromise, and self-interest. The technocratic language of regulation serves only to "mask, not eliminate, political and social considerations." n282 We have already seen how the subjective decision to prefer white men as subjects for epidemiological study can skew risk assessments against the interests of women and people of color. The focus of many assessments on the risk of cancer deaths, but not, say, the risks of birth defects or miscarriages, is yet another example of how a policymaker's subjective decision of what to look for can influence what is ultimately seen. n283 Once risk data are collected and placed in a statistical form, the ultimate translation of that information into rules and standards of conduct once again reflects value judgments. A safety threshold of one in a million or a preference for "best conventional technology" does not spring from the periodic table, but rather evolves from the application [\*77] of human experience and judgment to scientific information. Whose experience? Whose judgment? Which information? These are the questions that feminism prompts, and they will be discussed shortly. Finally, feminists would argue that questions involving the risk of death and disease should not even aspire to value neutrality. Such decisions -- which affect not only today's generations, but those of the future -- should be made with all related political and moral considerations plainly on the table. n284 In addition, policymakers should look to all perspectives, especially those of society's most vulnerable members, to develop as complete a picture of the moral issues as possible. Debates about scientific risk assessment and public values often appear as a tug of war between the "technicians," who would apply only value-neutral criteria to set regulatory standards, and the "public," who demand that psychological perceptions and contextual factors also be considered. n285 Environmental justice advocates, strongly concerned with the practical experiences of threatened communities, argue convincingly for the latter position. n286 A feminist critique of the issue, however, suggests that the debate is much richer and more complicated than a bipolar view allows. For feminists, the notion of value neutrality simply does not exist. The debate between technicians and the public, according to feminists, is not merely a contest between science and feelings, but a broader discussion about the sets of methods, values, and attitudes to which each group subscribes. Furthermore, feminists might argue, the parties to this discussion divide into more than two categories. Because one's world view is premised on many things, including personal experience, one might expect that subgroups within either category might differ in significant ways from other subgroups. Therefore, feminists would anticipate a broad spectrum of views concerning scientific risk assessment and public values. Intuitively, this makes sense. Certainly scientists disagree among themselves about the hazards of nuclear waste, ozone depletion, and global warming. n287 Many critics have argued that scientists, despite their allegiance [\*78] to rational method, are nonetheless influenced by personal and political views. n288 Similarly, members of the public are a widely divergent group. One would not be surprised to see politicians, land developers, and blue-collar workers disagreeing about environmental standards for essentially non-scientific reasons. Politicians and bureaucrats are two sets of the non-scientific community that affect environmental standards in fundamental ways. Their adherence to vocal, though not always broadly representative, constituencies may lead them to disfavor less advantaged socioeconomic groups when addressing environmental concerns. n289 In order to understand a diversity of risk perception and to see how attitudes and social status affect the risk assessment process, we must return to the feminist inquiry that explores the relationship between attitudes and identity. 1. The Diversity of Risk Perception A recent national survey, conducted by James Flynn, Paul Slovic, and C.K. Mertz, measured the risk perceptions of a group of 1512 people that included numbers of men, women, whites, and non-whites proportional to their ratios in society. n290 Respondents answered questions about the health risks of twenty-five environmental, technological, and "life-style" hazards, including such hazards as ozone depletion, chemical waste, and cigarette smoking. n291 The researchers asked them to rate each hazard as posing "almost no health risk," a "slight health risk," a "moderate health risk," or a "high health risk." The researchers then analyzed [\*79] the responses to determine whether the randomly selected groups of white men, white women, non-white men, and non-white women differed in any way. The researchers found that perceptions of risk generally differed on the lines of gender and race. Women, for instance, perceived greater risk from most hazards than did men. n292 Furthermore, non-whites as a group perceived greater risk from most hazards than did whites. n293 Yet the most striking results appeared when the researchers considered differences in gender and race together. They found that "white males tended to differ from everyone else in their attitudes and perceptions -- on average, they perceived risks as much smaller and much more acceptable than did other people." n294 Indeed, without exception, the pool of white men perceived each of the twenty-five hazards as less risky than did non-white men, white women, or non-white women. n295 Wary that other factors associated with gender or race could be influencing their findings, the researchers later conducted several multiple regression analyses to correct for differences in income, education, political orientation, the presence of children in the home, and age, among others. Yet even after all corrections, "gender, race, and 'white male' [status] remained highly significant predictors" of perceptions of risk. n296 2. Explaining the Diversity From a feminist perspective, these findings are important because they suggest that risk assessors, politicians, and bureaucrats -- the large majority of whom are white men n297 -- may be acting on attitudes about security and risk that women and people of color do not widely share. If this is so, white men, as the "measurers of all things," have crafted a system of environmental protection that is biased toward their subjective understandings of the world. n298 [\*80] Flynn, Slovic, and Mertz speculate that white men's perceptions of risk may differ from those of others because in many ways women and people of color are "more vulnerable, because they benefit less from many of [society's] technologies and institutions, and because they have less power and control." n299 Although Flynn, Slovic, and Mertz are careful to acknowledge that they have not yet tested this hypothesis empirically, their explanation appears consistent with the life experiences of less empowered groups and comports with previous understandings about the roles of control and risk perception. n300 Women and people of color, for instance, are more vulnerable to environmental threat in several ways. Such groups are sometimes more biologically vulnerable than are white men. n301 People of color are more likely to live near hazardous waste sites, to breathe dirty air in urban communities, and to be otherwise exposed to environmental harm. n302 Women, because of their traditional role as primary caretakers, are more likely to be aware of the vulnerabilities of their children. n303 It makes sense that such vulnerabilities would give rise to increased fear about risk. It is also very likely that women and people of color believe they benefit less from the technical institutions that create toxic byproducts. n304 Further, people may be more likely to discount risk if they feel somehow compensated for the activity. n305 For this reason, Americans worry relatively little about driving automobiles, an activity with enormous advantages in our large country but one that claims tens of thousands of lives per year. The researchers' final hypothesis -- that differences in perception can be explained by the lack of "power and control" exercised by women and people of color -- suggests the importance that such factors as voluntariness and control over risk play in shaping perceptions. [\*81] Risk perception research frequently emphasizes the significance of voluntariness in evaluating risk. Thus, a person may view water-skiing as less risky than breathing polluted air because the former is accepted voluntarily. n306 Voluntary risks are viewed as more acceptable in part because they are products of autonomous choice. n307 A risk accepted voluntarily is also one from which a person is more likely to derive an individual benefit and one over which a person is more likely to retain some kind of control. n308 Some studies have found that people prefer voluntary risks to involuntary risks by a factor of 1000 to 1. n309 Although environmental risks are generally viewed as involuntary risks to a certain degree, choice plays a role in assuming risks. White men are still more likely to exercise some degree of choice in assuming environmental risks than other groups. Communities of color face greater difficulty in avoiding the placement of hazardous facilities in their neighborhoods and are more likely to live in areas with polluted air and lead contamination. n310 Families of color wishing to buy their way out of such polluted neighborhoods often find their mobility limited by housing discrimination, redlining by banks, and residential segregation. n311 The workplace similarly presents workers exposed to toxic hazards (a disproportionate number of whom are minorities) n312 with impossible choices between health and work, or between sterilization and demotion. n313 Just as marginalized groups have less choice in determining the degree of risk they will assume, they may feel less control over the risks they face. "Whether or not the risk is assumed voluntarily, people have greater [\*82] fear of activities with risks that appear to be outside their individual control." n314 For this reason, people often fear flying in an airplane more than driving a car, even though flying is statistically safer. n315 If white men are more complacent about public risks, it is perhaps because they are more likely to have their hands on the steering wheel when such risks are imposed. White men still control the major political and business institutions in this country. n316 They also dominate the sciences n317 and make up the vast majority of management staff at environmental agencies. n318 Women and people of color see this disparity and often lament their back-seat role in shaping environmental policy. n319 Thus, many people of color in the environmental justice movement believe that environmental laws work to their disadvantage by design. n320 [\*83] The toxic rivers of Mississippi's "Cancer Alley," n321 the extensive poisoning of rural Indian land, n322 and the mismanaged cleanup of the weapons manufacturing site in Hanford, Washington n323 only promote the feeling that environmental policy in the United States sacrifices the weak for the benefit of the strong. In addition, the catastrophic potential that groups other than white men associate with a risk may explain the perception gap between those groups and white males. Studies of risk perception show that, in general, individuals harbor particularly great fears of catastrophe. n324 For this reason, earthquakes, terrorist bombings, and other disasters in which high concentrations of people are killed or injured prove particularly disturbing to the lay public. Local environmental threats involving toxic dumps, aging smelters, or poisoned wells also produce high concentrations of localized harm that can appear catastrophic to those involved. n325 Some commentators contend that the catastrophic potential of a risk should influence risk assessment in only minimal ways. n326 Considering public fear of catastrophes, they argue, will irrationally lead policymakers to battle more dramatic but statistically less threatening hazards, while accepting more harmful but more mundane hazards. n327 [\*84] At least two reasons explain why the catastrophic potential of environmental hazards must be given weight in risk assessment. First, concentrated and localized environmental hazards do not simply harm individuals, they erode family ties and community relationships. An onslaught of miscarriages or birth defects in a neighborhood, for instance, will create community-wide stress that will debilitate the neighborhood in emotional, sociological, and economic ways. n328 To ignore this communal harm is to underestimate severely the true risk involved. n329 Second, because concentrated and localized environmental hazards tend to be unevenly distributed on the basis of race and income level, any resulting mass injury to a threatened population takes on profound moral character. For this reason, Native Americans often characterize the military's poisoning of Indian land as genocide. n330 [\*85] 3. Understanding Through Diversity Flynn, Slovic, and Mertz challenge the traditional, static view of statistical risk with a richer, more vibrant image involving relationships of power, status, and trust. n331 "In short, 'riskiness' means more to people than 'expected number of fatalities.'" n332 These findings affirm the feminist claim that public policy must consider both logic and local experience in addressing a problem**.** n333 Current attempts to "re-educate" fearful communities with only risk assessments and scientific seminars are, therefore, destined to fail. n334 By the same token, even dual approaches that combine science and experience will fall short if the appeal to experience does not track local priorities and values. Cynthia Hamilton illustrates these points in her inspiring account of how a South Central Los Angeles community group, consisting mainly of working-class women, battled a proposed solid waste incinerator. n335 At one point, the state sent out consultants and environmental experts to put the community's fears into perspective. The consultants first appealed to the community's practical, experience-based side, by explaining how the new incinerator would bring needed employment to the area and by offering $ 2 million in community development. n336 But the community group found the promise of "real development" unrealistic and the cash gift insulting. n337 When experts then turned to quantifying the risks "scientifically" their attempts backfired again. Hamilton reports that "expert assurance that health risks associated with dioxin exposure were less than those associated with 'eating peanut butter' unleashed a flurry of dissent. All of the women, young and old, working-class and professional, had made peanut butter sandwiches for years." n338 The sandwich analogy, even assuming its statistical validity, could not convince the women because it did not consider other valid risk factors (voluntariness, dread, and so on) and because it did not appear plausible in the group members' experience. In the end, Hamilton explains that the superficial explanations and sarcastic responses of the male "experts" left the women even more united and convinced that "working-class women's [\*86] concerns cannot be dismissed." n339 Thus even the "science" of risk assessment, if it is to serve effectively, must include the voices of those typically excluded from its practice.

#### The aff is an act of feminist foreign policy that reshapes how nations operate through an ethics of care. Rather than adopt traditional methods of decision-making, you should employ empathetic understandings of human security.

Aggestam et al 18

(Karin Aggestam, Annika Bergman Rosamond and Annica Kronsell, Lund University, Theorising feminist foreign policy, International Relations 2019, Vol. 33(1) 23–39, JKS)

While feminist IR theory remains alert to and critical of the structural underpinnings of world politics, the ontological relationality of the ethics of care provides a key contribution because it takes stock of the experiences of the people at the receiving end of feminist foreign policy. In contrast with orthodox foreign policy practice and theory, which tends to disregard the lived histories of women and colonial subjects, an ethics of care approach would actively seek to uncover their stories to enable intersectional and situated analyses of foreign policy. This involves investigating whether states and other actors actually employ care and empathy as a normative ideal in their pursuit of foreign, security, defence and development policies. States tend to vary in their commitment to such dialogue, but this does not mean that a global ethics of care should be dismissed in the context of foreign and security policy analysis. Instead a critical analysis of feminist- oriented foreign policy should seek to address the ethical question how our view of security in global politics would change once we recognize and accept ... the ways responsibilities and practices of care grow out of relations of dependence and vulnerability of people in the context of complex webs of relations of responsibility.63 This entails exploring to what extent the makers of feminist foreign policy take note of ‘the everyday’ and whether Robison’s notion of ‘a feminist ethics of security’ which centres on ‘marginalised sites’ has some resonance with actual policy-making.64 Ethics of care as foreign policy conduct is often expressed in notions of gender-just protection of such marginalised groups, in particular, the protection of women and children from gendered violence and discrimination. Here ethics of care scholar Joan Tronto highlights the shift in global relations from what previously was a ‘right to intervene’ and sovereign-based logic to ‘the responsibility to protect’ and an ethics of global care.65 We propose here that protection, though at times requiring military means, should always rest on the act of listening to marginalised voices – a diplomatic tool that is key to the successful conduct of feminist foreign policy. A foreign policy, which builds on the ethics of care as its foundation, rests on the idea of inclusive and ethical dialogues as well as acts of listening across borders and intersectional confines. Virginia Held holds that emotions, such as empathy, sensitivity and responsiveness, are sentiments that need to be cultivated as a significant element when making moral decisions.66 Central to the analysis of feminist foreign policy then is the extent to which care, the act of listening and dialogical engagement really are key norms in the implementation of gender-just external relations? Here we find Christine Sylvester’s67 concept of empathetic cooperation particularly useful and closely associ- ated with the ethics of care.68 Empathetic cooperation challenges sovereign rights and national interests as the sole platforms for international interactions in favour of empathy across intersectional and ethical boundaries. Laura Sjoberg also suggests that emphatic cooperation is a fruitful platform for the development of a feminist international security ethic, which pays attention to care and justice as well as the gendered structures that have led to the marginalisation of vulnerable groups across international society.69 It may also lead to ‘a form of knowledge of other persons that draws explicitly on the commonalty of feelings and experiences to enrich one’s understanding of another in his or her own right’.70 If empathy is an expressed willingness and ability to appreciate the other then empathetic cooperation is ‘a process of positional slippage that occurs when one listens seriously to the concerns, fears and agendas of those one is unaccustomed to hearing’.71 In short, we argue that empathetic cooperation, as part of the making of a feminist for- eign policy, may be a way of opening up for a global ethic and concrete expressions of politics, which do not privilege statist interests and notions of security. Moreover, it moves the agenda towards human security while respecting cultural difference.72 Thus, to explore the presence of empathetic cooperation in the conduct of feminist and gender- based foreign policy is key to the analysis of feminist foreign policy and to ethical inves- tigations into ethically minded foreign policy more broadly.

## \*\*2AC AT: Case\*\*

### 2AC – LAWS = Hegemonic Masculinity

#### Autonomous weapons reaffirm the idea that men are more desirable than women – they represent masculinity in its most ideal form

Daniel M. Sutko 19(Department of Human Communication Studies, California State University, Fullerton, Fullerton, CA, USA), 9-26-2019, "Theorizing femininity in artificial intelligence: a framework for undoing technology’s gender troubles," Taylor & Francis, <https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/09502386.2019.1671469>

Finally, we could frame a cyborg narrative to theorize about long-term gender effects as a result of the introduction of the Human Universal Load Carriage (or HULC), a type of prosthetic armor in development for use by able-bodied soldiers (Chavez 2011). Thompson describes the exoskeleton as ‘a robotic device the soldier wears like a full body suit. It would enhance Soldier performance, increasing strength without losing agility’ (Hames 2008). Both implants and the exoskeleton thus create a situation where technology is not merely something used by the warrior, but rather part of who he or she is. The cyborg narrative suggests that an exoskeleton could level the playing field through increasing the ability of women warriors to lift heavy loads through augmenting their upper body strength. In an article on the official Army.mil website, a developer notes that ‘this is absolutely focused on the American Warfighter and all of the jobs he or she will have to do’ (emphasis added)7. A woman interviewed in the same article notes as well that ‘this will magnify human strength while on the battlefield’ (Chavez 2011). Harnessing of robotic technology thus holds the promise that women soldiers may more successfully enter combat, since physical requirements are replaced by requirements for mental acuity and reflexes. Indeed, increased use of new technologies of this type might affect the gender makeup of the military in the long term as many different types of people might be drawn to the military as a career, including more women. In addition, many new autonomous technologies are focused on the areas of tracking and communications, again invoking the language of the cyborg, as planners explain how in the future the military unit will be linked together through two-way blue force tracking capabilities which provide GPS coordinates for individual soldiers to be shared among a unit, thus providing info on where the friendly unit is located and who the friendly unit is, as well as info on status and intent (Sweeney 2008). Using these technologies, each member can be aware of the physical position, physical health and intent of all members of the unit. In this way, the unit could in the future behave more like a hive or a swarm (or the Borg of the Star Trek canon). Leadership would thus rest not on a traditional, hierarchical unit but rather on a network in which members interact not only with the leadership but also laterally with each other. Such a development could go far towards destabilizing traditional hierarchical leadership forms in the military, which are often coded as male instead of creating a more cooperative mode of war fighting. Once again, these technologies might thus represent a step towards the destabilization of the traditional gendered regime of women's jobs and men's jobs. While new developments thus appear to give feminists much reason for optimism, in reality a new narrative has arisen which describes how robotic technologies will create not a cyborg but a ‘super soldier’. In this narrative, the human operator is not seen or described as dependent upon or merged with technology. Rather he (or she) is seen as controlling the technology, subduing it in the ways in which man has traditionally utilized and subdued nature and thus, in this way reinforcing a binary distinction between that which dominates and that which is dominated (Kaplan 1994). This narrative appears in guidelines developed by military planners and passed to organizations of defense contractors who create new technologies. Designers are encouraged to expropriate features of the animal kingdom in creating weaponized bugs and animals, thus replicating the way in which scientists previously expropriated women's bodies through taking technological control of the reproductive process (Wajcman 1991). Designers expropriate nature to create new weapons, or they harvest and harness features from the animal kingdom to create a new type of supersoldier or superwarrior; one with better eyesight, better hearing and other technologically enhanced features as he either wears the technology or has it surgically implanted in his own body. Both developers and those who hire them often refer to Darwin, suggesting both that the new soldier represents a higher stage of evolution, as well as the fact that (in Hobbesian or Realist terms) survival of the fittest is still the rule when it comes to warfare. Robotic technology, thus, becomes an adjunct of the warfighter, who is coded as male and, instead of eliminating gender differences, technological advances create a new soldier who is a **more virile and a more deadly male**. In this narrative, technology does not protect the soldier but instead enhances the soldier. The new ‘super soldier’ is described in the 2009 report Future Soldier 2030 Initiative (US Army Natick Soldier RD and E Center 2009). In addition, when a drone or robot acts to protect a warfighter or carries out an act of combat, the narrative is often adjusted to suggest that the activities which occur are not the achievement of the robot, but are instead achievements of the (usually male) designers of the technology. Thus, Major Ray Maher, Assistant Product Manager for the Air Warrior Product Office, notes that ‘the formula is soldiers helping soldiers helping soldiers’ – referring to the way that soldiers act as weapons testers assisting engineers who create technology for defending soldiers (Siniard 2011). In this way, soldiers are seen not as being aided by technology, but rather by engineers. In both of these situations, the US military's reading of the ways in which technology enhances gender contradicts Haraway's narrative. **Reliance on new technologies becomes not a weakening or a form of dependence but rather the ultimate male enhancement**. Here, we can consider the naming of the exoskeleton as the ‘HULC’ and the intertextual reference to the masculine comic book hero The Incredible Hulk who represents a sort of supermale. New technologies are thus described as creating a ‘super soldier’ who is more male, more lethal and more dominant than previous human alone soldier, thus reinforcing what Peterson (2010: 26) calls the **valorization of hypermasculinity**. In addition, Haraway's cyborg narrative rests on the assumption that robotics will be available to all individuals or all soldiers and, thus, a blurring of the lines between human and machine, female and male as well as disabled and able will occur. However, strict, hierarchical access regimes for new body-enhancing technologies currently exist. Within the Marine Corps, Blue Force Tracking systems are only available to Special Operations Forces and Other Government Agency (OGA) personnel, as are Personnel Recovery (PR) BFT systems. And within the Army, Blue Force Tracking Technology is available only to combat units (Schwerin 2011) from which women are still excluded. Thus, women have been systematically excluded from using these two technologies, just as Berg and Lie suggest that women have been denied access to other technological capabilities and equipment in the past (Berg and Lie 1995: 340). In this way, new body-enhancing and communications technologies access regimes threaten to create a new type of digital divide – not between the poor and the wealthy based on who can afford technology, but between male and female, **as technology is presented as being created for men to enjoy and use and often in ways that demean women.**8 Thus, rather than flattening gender differences through the use of new technology, instead a new hierarchy will emerge between enhanced and non-enhanced soldiers. Indeed, one can imagine a new hierarchy in which ‘supermales’ – with superior hearing, eyesight (including the ability to see in the dark), the ability to heal themselves when injured, and to go without sleep and food – dominate over both ‘regular men’ and women.9 Again, robotic technology would thus reinforce hegemonic masculinity rather than eliminating it. AUTONOMOUS TECHNOLOGY AND THE GENDER CONSTRUCT OF WARFARE Thus far, we have illustrated how social constructs of the technology of autonomous warfare have successfully contained and limited its revolutionary or emancipatory effects – showing how the military has successfully created a **narrative which reframes technological activity as masculine**, as well as the one which reframes technological dependence as technological enhancement. However, we still need to consider the question of distance from the battlefield. In what ways does the fact that men and women now fight virtually from the comfort of home change our understanding of combat as a gendered phenomenon? Clearly, the ability to fight virtually has allowed for more women soldiers to participate in ‘combat’. Data indicates that 17 per cent of those assigned to drone activities at Creech Air Force Base in Nevada are female (Singer 2012). But does the participation in war activity from a remote location where one is not actually at risk of death change how we think about war as an activity? Presently, the US military's answer to these questions is simply that there is no distinction between remote combat and close-range combat. In the words of Colonel Chris Chambliss of Creech Air Base: ‘I don't think we're 7500 miles away at all. I think if you walk out the hangar and you go into one of the ground control stations, you're in the fight’ (Sixty Minutes 2009). The military also reinforces a distinction between home activity and combat activity through mandating that drone operators not take phone calls from home while on duty, and that they wear the same uniforms as those engaged in air combat. Studies on the prevalence of PTSD in drone operators indicate that adopting a ‘combat mindset’ can be just as wearing emotionally regardless of the location where one is while engaged in combat. Thus far, the military strategy of equating virtual and real tasks, regarding virtual assistance as enhancement rather than weakness, and simply ignoring the distances from the battlefield, has been quite effective. The debate about the changed meaning of combat simply is not present in the military community. Thus, developments in the field of autonomous warfare provide fodder for the constructivist position that technological developments do not necessarily lead to social progress or change. In the SCOT school, analysts argue that **technology's meaning is largely dictated by the environment and by the usage regimes imposed by those who control the technology**. According to this view, technological inventions alone can never force a change in social structures, though, in certain instances, technological developments might help to support social changes being carried out by the users (Pinch and Bijker 1984; LaTour 2005; Oldenziel and Zachmann 2009). As Grint and Woolgar suggest: The gender of a technology does not lie encased in the fabric of the material. It is instead a temporary contingent upshot of ongoing interpretation by designers, sellers and users. The politics and values of technology result from the gaze of the human; they do not lie in the gauze of the machine. (Grint and Woolgar 1995: 305) Thus, so far it appears that the military has been able to ‘hold the line’, introducing new technologies while simultaneously dictating to their designers and their end-users what they will mean and how they will be used. In this instance, it, thus, appears possible to introduce revolutionary technologies without necessarily leading to a significant change in the activity of a warfighter, the role of a warfighter or the overall meaning of warfare. The emancipatory potential of autonomous technology, thus, might exist but has not so far been realized.

### 2AC – LAWS -> Racist

#### LAWs will increase racial discrimination

Conway 20 – Marissa Conway is the CEO of United Nations Association UK and a Co-Founder of the Centre for Feminist Foreign Policy, 8-2020, "Smashing the Patriarchy: The Feminist Case Against Killer Robots," Centre for Feminist Foreign Policy, https://static1.squarespace.com/static/57cd7cd9d482e9784e4ccc34/t/5f356f1e5eb59d07e78fb329/1597337376556/Smashing+the+Patriarchy\_+The+Feminist+Case+Against+Killer+Robots.pdf/KK

As noted throughout this report, the current state of foreign policy, and in particular national security, is rooted in deeply patriarchal values. This can be seen perhaps none more acutely than when we turn an anti-racist lens to conflict, where violence is sanctioned to reinforce specific ideas about imperial power and white supremacy. As killer robots would use technology that carries existing biases, developing these weapons would only further reinforce violence and discrimination against Low Income Countries (LICs) and against people of colour. In Western states, people of colour are traditionally underrepresented in science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) fields. Technology is a field still dominated by white men, which means that it will also reflect a specific set of biases that privilege white men. Target profiles are an excellent example of how this plays out in practice. In the context of killer robots, developing weapons technology that can select and fire upon targets independent of human involvement guarantees that people of colour will disproportionately suffer violence. In a recent study from the US government, it was demonstrated facial recognition technology does in fact reflect racism in dangerous ways. In the case of one-to-one matching, or when an algorithm matches two photos of the same person, Black and Asian faces were falsely matched between ten to 100 times more than white faces. And in instances of one-to-many matching, where one photo is compared to many others in a database, Black women were more likely to be misidentified (Facial Recognition Fails on Race, Study Says, 2019). In the UK, a report from Big Brother Watch showed that the facial recognition technology the London Metropolitan Police used at the 2017 Notting Hill Carnival, a street parade celebrating Caribbean music and culture, misidentified people at a rate of 98% (Big Brother Watch, 2018). These are only two examples of how racism is inevitably built into and reflected in our technology. For these exact reasons, facial recognition software is being abandoned by developers, like IBM, and banned by users, like the city of San Francisco. In the wake of the 2020 Black Lives Matter protests after the murder of George Floyd by police officers, newfound scrutiny has been given to facial recognition technology, resulting in growing widespread agreement that it is too dangerous to use. Timnit Gebru, for example, who is one of Google’s ethical artificial intelligence team leads, recently went on the record to confirm the risks of facial recognition technology, arguing that it’s too dangerous to be used for law enforcement purposes (Ovide, 2020). It is clear that the algorithms and AI that killer robots would be programmed with are not capable of eliminating the risk of wrongful death without human intervention. Should violence become automated, “power disparities based on racial and other hierarchies” would cause “irreparable harm to targeted communities” (Ramsay-Jones, 2020). And while facial recognition software is an apt example used throughout this report, it is not a standalone example of a poorly programmed algorithm or a piece of problematic technology. The reflection of systemic racism across all current technology makes it clear that self-governing weapons like killer robots would only increase violence against people of colour. Attempts to counter the bias built into technology can only be done through meaningful human intervention in the deployment and use of weapons. The fully autonomous nature of killer robots would render such a process impossible, guaranteeing that communities of colour would suffer increased violence. The imperialist patterns of the global hierarchy must be likewise taken into account. As it currently stands, the technology for killer robots is concentrated in just a handful of powerful, mostly Western states that have ample resources to spend on developing AI (Haner and Garcia, 2019). These countries, which tend to be led by white men, use weapons and the threat of violence to maintain “peace” to keep other states in line with their wishes. Killer robots would reinforce these hierarchies, and would be developed by High Income Countries (HICs) to be used in LICs. It would be a case of HICs using killer robots to maintain their status within the global hierarchy, as well using it against their own people to maintain specific power hierarchies within their own borders (Reaching Critical Will, 2018). As Joy Buolamwini argues, “[w]e have a responsibility to think about how we create equitable and accountable systems, and sometimes what that means is you don’t create the tool” (Wood, 2020). People of colour and people in LICs have been historically excluded from decision making spaces, yet experience the consequences of those decisions regardless. In the case of killer robots, and in parallel with a long history of using people of colour as test subjects for new science developments, it is unlikely that killer robots will do anything but amplify violence (Ramsay-Jones, 2020). Simply put, they should not exist.

#### LAWS are programmed to be biased – they can’t recognize POC or non-North American accents which guarantees civilian casualties

Acheson 21 Ray Acheson (Ray brings an intersectional feminist approach to disarmament and antiwar activism. Ray represents the organization on the International Steering Group of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), which won the 2017 Nobel Peace Prize for highlighting the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons and working with governments to negotiate and adopt the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Among other things, Ray also works to prevent the development of fully autonomous weapons with the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots and to challenge the international arms trade and war profiteering.), September 2021, "Gender and Bias" Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, https://www.stopkillerrobots.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/Gender-and-Bias.pdf//mb24

A GENDER ANALYSIS OF TECHNOLOGY AND AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS Autonomous weapons are being developed in the context of the aforementioned norms of gender and power. Scholars of gender and technology have long argued that gender relations are “materialized in technology”. That is, the meaning and character (the norms) of masculinity and femininity are “embedded” in machines. These scholars argue that technological products bear their creators mark. If technology is developed and utilized primarily by men operating within a framework of violent masculinity, their creations will be instilled with that framework of thought, knowledge, language, and interpretation. Erin Hunt of Mines Action Canada has noted that “human biases are baked into the algorithms and the data we use to train a machine learning program often reflects our own patriarchal society with its class and race issues.” She argues, “One thing to keep in mind is that only around 0.0004% of global population has the skills and education needed to create [artificial intelligence] programing and most of those people were born into pretty privileged circumstances. Similarly, a recent estimate done by WIRED with Element AI found that only 12% of leading machine learning researchers were women.” In this context, autonomous weapons, as tools of violence and of war, will likely have specific characteristics that may simultaneously reinforce and undermine hegemonic gender norms. This in turn may have implications for the notion of men as expendable and vulnerable, as predators and protectors, and pose serious challenges for breaking down gender essentialisms or achieving gender equality or gender justice in a broader context. PROJECTING “POWER WITHOUT VULNERABILITY” If we look at how armed drones are used and thought about now, we can see that the development of fully autonomous weapons present similar risks. The argument for these weapons is similar: drones and autonomous weapons are described as weapons that can limit casualties for the deploying force, and that can limit civilian casualties in areas where they are used because they will be more precise. It is a typical argument from the perspective of violent masculinity: those using the weapon can deploy violence without fear of facing physical danger themselves; and in turn argue that it will actually result in less violence. Yet as we have seen with drones, this—at least, the later argument—is far from the case. The tools and procedures used for determining targets for “signature strikes”—attacks based on “producing packages of information that become icons for killable bodies on the basis of behavior analysis and a logic of preemption” 1 —have resulted in hundreds of civilian casualties in drone strikes. The same risks apply to fully autonomous weapons. If weapons without meaningful human control are deployed on the battlefield or a policing situation, programmed to target and engage people on the basis of software and sensors, the risks of mistaken identity or unlawful engagement run high. It is not at all clear to tech workers, scientists, academics, or other experts that weaponized robots will be able to comply with international humanitarian law or other rules of engagement.2 In addition to these concerns, there is also the risk of bias in those software and sensors. If we look at bias in programming algorithms, it’s easy to be concerned. Bias in terms of gender, race, socioeconomic status, ability, and sexual orientation can be programmed into machines, including “**Bias in terms of gender, race, socioeconomic status, ability, and sexual orientation can be programmed into** machines, including **autonomous weapons.”**. **Facial recognition software struggles to recognize people of colour; voice recognition struggles to respond to women’s voices or non-North American accents**; photos of anyone standing in a kitchen are labeled as women; people’s bail is denied because a program decided that a woman of colour was more likely to reoffend than a white woman.3 **Imagine this kind of bias being programmed into a weapon system designed to target and fire upon targets without any meaningful human contro**l, without any human judgment to counteract that bias. It’s not a pretty picture.

### 2AC – Ban Key

#### Banning LAWs is a key step in preventing the proliferation of patriarchal military violence

Sharkey 20 – Noel Sharkey PhD, DSc FIET, FBCS CITP FRIN FRSA is Professor of AI and Robotics and Professor of Public Engagement at the University of Sheffield and was an EPSRC Senior Media Fellow (2004-2010). He has held a number of research and teaching positions in the UK (Essex, Exeter, Sheffield) and the USA (Yale,and Stanford), 3-8-2020, "A Feminist Future Begins By Banning Killer Robots," Forbes, https://www.forbes.com/sites/noelsharkey/2020/03/08/a-feminist-future-begins-by-banning-killer-robots/?sh=7daa61541fd8KK

On International Women’s Day, weapons development won’t be the first thing that springs to mind for achieving global gender equality. But banning autonomous weapons systems AKA “killer robots” is needed to strengthen global peace, advance human security and ensure a feminist future. Technology could be a benevolent force in our increasingly integrated society. The potential benefits of innovative advancements in the fields of artificial intelligence, robotics, and machine learning could secure our future. As United Nations Secretary General Antonio Guterres said: "…these new capacities can help us to lift millions of people out of poverty, achieve the Sustainable Development Goals and enable developing countries to leap‑frog into a better future." But that assumes that proper safeguards are in place. They are not. Without them technology has the power to harm and disrupt societal values and norms. It is becoming alarmingly clear from a growing body of evidence that automated decision algorithms are propagating gender and race discrimination throughout our global community and perpetrating injustices on the poor, the vulnerable and people with disabilities. But perhaps the greatest concern is the application of algorithmic bias in the control to targeting with autonomous weapons systems. Autonomous weapons systems work entirely without human intervention once they have been launched. They select and engage targets on the basis of sensor inputs. There is no meaningful human control to determine the appropriateness or legitimacy of targets. That means decisions about what to attack and when to fire would be delegated to inanimate machines rather than being made directly by qualified humans. So what does this have to do with gender equality? Quite a lot. For starters, they will carry the same bias baggage as other decision algorithms. And there is much more that I have learned from attending powerful feminist events at the United Nations (like the one shown in the opening picture). Many feminist humanitarian disarmament organisations such as Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) are concerned that killer robots would lack empathy, conscience, emotion and understanding of human rights and human dignity–aspects of human judgment that are crucial for decision-making in war. Delegating life and death decision making to machines would dehumanise warfare and killing and perpetuate patriarchal structures of military violence. Because they would select and fire on the basis of target profiles, fully autonomous weapons raise the risk of gender-based violence. Target profiling based on perceived gender or pattern of behaviour could increase risks to men–who are more likely to be assumed to be potential or active combatants–but could also pose risks to any group whose gender identity has been included in a target profile. Despite claims to the contrary by some men, killer robots would not end sexual violence in armed conflict. Rape and sexual violence are often used as weapons, and are already ordered by states and armed groups as a means of inflicting terror. Autonomous weapons systems would not question an order to round up women to be raped. Unlike human soldiers they entirely lack the conscience and empathy that would make honorable humans disobey. In short, autonomous weapons systems could contribute to or exacerbate notions of militarized masculinity, be used to commit acts of gender-based violence, or increase inequality as a result of algorithmic bias or target profiling. But these weapons are not inevitable, and we have the ability to prevent them from ever being used. The Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, a global coalition of more than 150 non-governmental organizations in over 60 countries, is urging states to immediately launch negotiations on an international treaty to retain meaningful human control over targeting and attack decisions by prohibiting the development, production, and use of autonomous weapons and to have a positive obligation for the meaningful human control of all weapons systems. A treaty banning fully autonomous weapons would support feminist foreign policy goals by focusing on human security and preventing militarisation of emerging technology and technological advancements. This International Women’s Day, the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots has called for political leadership in the movement to ban autonomous weapons systems. True equality cannot be achieved through the further dehumanisation of conflict. A feminist future starts now, with a ban on killer robots.

### 2AC - LAWS -> War

#### LAWS increase the risk of war and encourages militaries to kill civilians

Payne 16

(This CRS report was written by Thomas B. Payne, U.S. Air Force Fellow. 4-14-2016, Congressional Research Service, "Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems: Issues for Congress," https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/R44466.html#\_Toc448405890//mb24)

**Likelihood of War/Jus Ad Bellum** A common concern regarding the development of LAWS is that it will **encourage inappropriate aggression.**86 The justification for initiating armed conflict is generally described by the concept of jus ad bellum, or Just War theory.87 However, although sometimes couched as such, the concern that LAWS will lead to more warfare is not actually a legal one, since use of LAWS does not affect the legal evaluation of the propriety of war initiation.88 Rather, the argument is that LAWS would create a moral hazard for national leadership. This presupposes that current or future leaders are willing and desire to engage in unlawful war-making but are inhibited by the likelihood that it will result in military casualties, either for moral reasons or because of spin-off effects of those casualties.89 If these suppositions are accurate, then LAWS would appear to increase the likelihood that leaders would engage in unlawful aggression since it would minimize these casualties. Some argue, however, that this objection seems excessively generic.90 They contend that any weapon system that minimizes casualties, or gives a substantial advantage to one side in armed conflict, would trigger this same moral hazard.91 Uncontrolled Arms Race Another potential risk to the development of LAWS that has been noted is that it will trigger wider arms races.92 This argument takes two forms. First, that because of the tremendous tactical advantage associated with the development of LAWS, peer and near-peer competitors will be forced to develop autonomous capabilities for their own weapon systems.93 Second, asymmetric competitors, such as international terrorist organizations, would have access to the technology once it becomes widely used in warfare.94 For both of these versions of an "arms race," one harm contemplated, in addition to the inherent instability associated with arms race dynamics95, is that competitors will have either less incentive or less capacity to control the behavior of LAWS, resulting in development or fielding of LAWS that fail to comply with the laws of war (generally, this is conceived as competitors developing indiscriminate LAWS, since automation is far easier to accomplish than discrimination or ethical decision-making).96 A number of counterpoints have been presented to this risk. First, many contend that an arms race is already in progress, with peer and near-peer competitors currently developing autonomous weapon systems—regardless of U.S. development of these systems.97 It is argued these nations would refuse to adopt, or successfully evade enforcement of, any potential multilateral ban.98 Second, it is argued that asymmetric competitors may be capable of taking advantage of technological development, particularly civilian sector advancements, even if not actively developed for military purposes by nation-states.99 Under this argument, once the basics of autonomy in machines are developed for civilian purposes, weaponization of these autonomous systems is relatively trivial.100 Asymmetric Warfare Another risk associated by some with the development of LAWS is an **increased likelihood of attacks on civilian targets**, particularly in the United States itself.101 The argument is that the development of LAWS will result in the absence of U.S. soldiers from the war zone. Enemies of the United States, it is argued, will see no political/strategic benefit in attempting to fight, or carry out attacks on autonomous weapon systems if the United States is not suffering human casualties. The opponent, under this argument, is therefore incentivized to carry out attacks on civilian rather than military targets.102 Counter-arguments presented by others include at least one made against the discussion in the "Likelihood of War/Jus Ad Bellum" section above, in that any generic technological advantage that makes U.S. service-members less susceptible to enemy attack appears to create the same risk.103 In the same vein, a DOD analyst has noted that this argument essentially "blames the victim," by discouraging protection of soldiers because of the enemy's presumed willingness to violate the laws of war by assaulting civilians.104 Finally, it has been pointed out, considering the history of nuclear strategy as well as terrorist targeting, that both peers and asymmetric opponents are not **generally reluctant to place civilians in jeopardy if it serves strategic ends,** and therefore the presence or absence of U.S. casualties away from the battlefield is irrelevant.105

### 2AC - AT: “Robots Don’t Rape”

#### Lethal autonomous weapons will be used to carry out structural sexual violence against civilians.

Sanvik and Lohne, 15 [Kristin B. Sandvik is Research Professor in Humanitarian, Kjersti Lohne is a Postdoctoral Reseracher,University of Oslo, August 13, 2015, accessed on 6-21-2022, “Lethal Autonomous Weapons: Killing the ‘Robots-don’t-Rape’ Argument”]/ISEE

Thus, in thinking critically about the nature of the progress narrative of which the ‘Robots don’t rape’ argument is part, we make three observations: First, the politics of rape denunciation are now also becoming the politics of lobbyists, vendors and military manufacturers seeking access to new customers and markets. The recognition of wartime rape as a fundamental violation of international law has been a hard fought victory. Moving rape from the realm of silence, shame and mutedness and into the public domain has taken enormous effort. The denunciation of sexual violence as one of the worst features of armed conflict is thus welcome. However, this should not blur our view from recognizing how the struggle against rape has attained moral currency, a moral currency that may be useful when someone is trying to legitimate a particular set of past actions or political choices, or when someone is trying to prepare the ground for a future project. Second, this instrumentalization of the ‘Very Worst Sex Crimes’ is nothing new: the scourge of online child pornography has for a long time been used to legitimate widespread government censorship and surveillance in cyberspace. What Paul Amar (2013) calls ‘gendered cultural rescue‘ is by now an established form of securitization of gender and sexuality, legitimating intervention for the ‘protection’ of (female) civilians. It should therefore be noted that there is not only commercial interest; there is government interest too. Third, this type of argument belongs to a broader category of technological utopianism, signifying the belief that emergent military technologies create better wars not only because they are pre-programmed and remotely controlled, but because the technology in question is assumed to always function as intended: The surgical precision argument in drone warfare and its attendant claims for ‘humane warfare’ because drones (allegedly) limit collateral damage, should be familiar by now. Similarly, commentators argue that Cyberwarfare is preferable to conventional war because it is presumed to make war less bloody. Following the same type of transformative logic, autonomous robots are portrayed as the vehicles for perfect legality and perfect soldiering, which in combination will produce ‘perfect combat’. This third argument brings the normative crowd of law and ethics professors into the project. In sum, the deployment of the robots-don’t-rape argument can be understood as an attempt to build a moral economy; an environment in which social expectations, cultural transactions, and emotional investments collectively create a shared understanding between the participants in an economic exchange. Leveraging the argument that robots don’t rape—and doing so through market-based, governance and ethical discourses—can therefore be interpreted as an attempt to create this type of moral economy out of which robot soldiers are supposed to emerge. If this is the case, and the progress narrative is indeed one of strategy as indicated here, how may we respond? In an excellent posting at Duck of Minerva last year, Charlie Carpenter lamented the fact that a recurrent argument at the first Convention of Conventional Weapons (CCW) experts meeting in Geneva in May 2014 was the idea that, unlike human soldiers, autonomous weapons would never commit rape. She noted that this argument was a subset of the more general argument that killer robots would be good for human security, since they are assumed better at keeping to the norms of the laws of war (as argued by Ronald Arkin and others). Carpenter also observed that the 1998 definition of rape in international law, as codified in the Rome Statute for the International Criminal court is a broad one, according to which rape is not reducible to forcible penetration of women committed by men. Rather, rape occurs when the perpetrator invaded the body of a person by conduct resulting in penetration, however slight, of any part of the body of the victim or of the perpetrator with a sexual organ, or of the anal or genital opening of the victim with any object or any other part of the body. Carpenter suggests that this conceptualization of rape is accompanied by an implicit understanding of motivation and rationale: that rapes in war are spontaneous and unplanned and thus a breach of discipline. Contrary to widespread assumptions, sexual violence is not the male soldier’s appropriation of his ‘war dividend’; rather, as the research on sexual violence as a weapon of war has showed us, sexual violence is often strategically used against civilians. If LAWS are programmed to kill, they may also be programmed to do other forms of violence, including rape. Carpenter’s eloquent rejection of the rape argument on account of factual inaccuracy (wrong definition of rape; killer robots could technically be programmed to carry out rape) along with misleading assumptions about the uses of rape in conflict is one that we should prepare ourselves to repeat. As often as necessary. Not least as the cost of accepting the ‘Robots don’t rape’ argument risk undermining hard-fought gender battles, reducing wartime rape to an issue of uncontrolled/uncontrollable male sexuality and penis penetration of predominantly female victims instead of recognizing it primarily as an act of violence, and one which may or may not be deliberate, intentional, and programmed.

### 2AC - AT: LAWS More Ethical

#### LAWs lacking emotion is an aff argument – that makes them unethical because they lack the empathy to decide whether or not they should kill.

Kenneth **Anderson** (Contact Author), 2-28-20**17**, "Debating Autonomous Weapon Systems, Their Ethics, and Their Regulation Under International Law," No Publication, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=2978359

In the foreseeable future, we will be turning over more and more functions with life or death implications to machines—such as driverless cars or automated robot surgery technologies—not simply because they are more convenient but because they prove to be safer—and our basic notions about machine and human decisionmaking will evolve. Aworld that comes, if it does, to accept self-driving autonomous cars may also be one in which people expect those technologies to be applied to weapons and the battlefeld as a matter of course, precisely because it regards them as better (and indeed might fnd the failure to use them morally objectionable). Te second argument is that AWS should be banned because machine learning and AI will never reach the point of being capable of satisfying the requirements of LOAC, law, and ethics. Te underlying premise here is that machines will not be capable, now or in the future, of the requisite intuition, cognition, and judgment to comply with legal and ethical requirements—especially amid the fog of war. Tis is a core conviction held by many who favour a complete ban on autonomous lethal weapons. They generally deny that, even over time and, indeed, no matter how much time or technological progress takes place, machine systems will ever manage to reach the point of satisfying legal and ethical codes and principles applicable in war. Tat is because, they believe, no machine system will ever be able to make appropriate judgments in the infnitely complex situations of warfare, or because no machine will ever have the capability, through its programming, to exhibit key elements of human emotion and affect that make human beings irreplaceable in making lethal decisions on the battlefeld—compassion, empathy, and sympathy for other human beings (Losing Humanity 2012: 4). Tese assessments are mostly empirical. Although many who embrace them might also fnally rest upon moral premises denying in principle that a machine has the moral agency or moral psychology to make lethal decisions, they are framed here as distinct factual claims about the future evolution of technology. Te argument rests on assumptions about how machine technology will actually evolve over decades or longer or, more frankly, how it will not evolve, as well as beliefs about the special nature of human beings and their emotional and afective abilities on the battlefeld that no machine could ever exhibit, even over the course of technological evolution. It is as if to say that no autonomous lethal weapon system could ever pass an ‘ethical Turing Test’ under which, hypothetically, were a human and a machine hidden behind a veil, an objective observer could not tell which was which on the basis of their behaviours. It is of course quite possible that fully autonomous weapons will never achieve the ability to meet the required standards, even far into the future. Yet, the radical scepticism that underlies the argument that they never will is unjustifed. Research into the possibilities of autonomous machine decision-making, not just in weapons but across many human activities, is only a couple of decades old. No solid basis exists for such sweeping conclusions about the future of technology.

#### LAW’s cause a restructuring of values codifying the worst values of humanity.

Roff, 16 [Heather M. Roff works for the global security imitative at Arizona State University, 1-11-2016, accessed on 6-21-2022, Taylor & Francis, "Gendering a Warbot", https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14616742.2015.1094246]/ISEE

This article is a first step in understanding the future of robotic warfare. The US military’s push for autonomous weapons systems, in conjunction with DARPA’s move to create humanoid robots, is something that should not be ignored. Scholars have only looked to the arguments about whether autonomous weapons will be capable of upholding the principles of proportionality and distinction. Yet even these arguments are dependent on an antecedent question: how a machine might be programmed to do so. As I have argued elsewhere (Roff 2014b), the level of programming necessary for a warbot requires an autonomous learning AI. This conclusion, however, is not a sufficient answer. AI is not a monolithic and neutral entity. It is dependent on what gets included in the software, which concepts and ideas and “facts” are data. AIs are biased as much as, or perhaps more than, their creators. This conclusion, presses us to question not merely the purposes of these machines, but the very values we hold. It requires us to examine the values, practices and ideals we assume and publicly espouse. The gendered humanoid warbot might distill the very worst of humanity, rather than its best, as it will not only be capable of killing efficiently, but will potentially dominate all those in its path.

### 2AC - AT: Circumvention

#### Memoriam on deployment of LAW’s solves.

Russell et al. 21 [Stuart Russell is a professor of computer science at the University of California, Berkeley, Anthony Aguirre is a professor of physics at the University of California, Santa Cruz, Max Tegmark is a professor of physics, June 2021, Accessed 6/22/22, “Lethal Autonomous Weapons Exist; They Must Be Banned It may not be too late to put the **evil** "Slaughterbots" genie back in the bottle, if the world acts now,” https://spectrum.ieee.org/lethal-autonomous-weapons-exist-they-must-be-banned]/ISEE

A chilling future that some had said might not arrive for many years to come is, in fact, already here. According to a recent UN report, a drone airstrike in Libya from the spring of 2020—made against Libyan National Army forces by Turkish-made STM Kargu-2 drones on behalf of Libya's Government of National Accord—was conducted by weapons systems with no known humans “in the loop." In so many words, the red line of autonomous targeting of humans has now been crossed. To the best of our knowledge, this official United Nations reporting marks the first documented use case of a lethal autonomous weapon system akin to what has elsewhere been called a “Slaughterbot." We believe this is a landmark moment. Civil society organizations, such as ours, have previously advocated for a preemptive treaty prohibiting the development and use of lethal autonomous weapons, much as blinding weapons were preemptively banned in 1998. The window for preemption has now passed, but the need for a treaty is more urgent than ever. The STM Kargu-2 is a flying quadcopter that weighs a mere 7 kg, is being mass-produced, is capable of fully autonomous targeting, can form swarms, remains fully operational when GPS and radio links are jammed, and is equipped with facial recognition software to target humans. In other words, it's a Slaughterbot. The UN report notes: “Logistics convoys and retreating [Haftar Affiliated Forces] were subsequently hunted down and remotely engaged by the unmanned combat aerial vehicles or the lethal autonomous weapons systems such as the STM Kargu-2 (see Annex 30) and other loitering munitions. The lethal autonomous weapons systems were programmed to attack targets without requiring data connectivity between the operator and the munition." Annex 30 of the report depicts photographic evidence of the downed STM Kargu-2 system. In a previous effort to identify consensus areas for prohibition, we brought together experts with a range of views on lethal autonomous weapons to brainstorm a way forward. We published the agreed findings in “A Path Towards Reasonable Autonomous Weapons Regulation," which suggested a “time-limited moratorium on the development, deployment, transfer, and use of anti-personnel lethal autonomous weapon systems" as a first, and absolute minimum, step for regulation. A recent position statement from the International Committee of the Red Cross on autonomous weapons systems concurs. It states that “use of autonomous weapon systems to target human beings should be ruled out. This would best be achieved through a prohibition on autonomous weapon systems that are designed or used to apply force against persons." This sentiment is shared by many civil society organizations, such as the UK-based advocacy organization Article 36, which recommends that “An effective structure for international legal regulation would prohibit certain configurations—such as systems that target people." The “Slaughterbots" Question In 2017, the Future of Life Institute, which we represent, released a nearly eight-minute-long video titled “Slaughterbots"—which was viewed by an estimated 75 million people online—dramatizing the dangers of lethal autonomous weapons. At the time of release, the video received both praise and criticism. Paul Scharre's Dec. 2017 IEEE Spectrum article “Why You Shouldn't Fear Slaughterbots" argued that “Slaughterbots" was “very much science fiction" and a “piece of propaganda." At a Nov. 2017 meeting about lethal autonomous weapons in Geneva, Switzerland, the Russian ambassador to the UN also reportedly dismissed it, saying that such concerns were 25 or 30 years in the future. We addressed these critiques in our piece—also for Spectrum— titled “Why You Should Fear Slaughterbots–A Response." Now, less than four years later, reality has made the case for us: The age of Slaughterbots appears to have begun. The first step must be an immediate moratorium on the development, deployment, and use of lethal autonomous weapons that target persons, combined with a commitment to negotiate a permanent treaty. We produced “Slaughterbots" to educate the public and policymakers alike about the potential imminent dangers of small, cheap, and ubiquitous lethal autonomous weapons systems. Beyond the moral issue of handing over decisions over life and death to algorithms, the video pointed out that autonomous weapons will, inevitably, turn into weapons of mass destruction, precisely because they require no human supervision and can therefore be deployed in vast numbers. (A related point, concerning the tactical agility of such weapons platforms, was made in Spectrum last month in an article by Natasha Bajema.) Furthermore, like small arms, autonomous weaponized drones will proliferate easily on the international arms market. As the “Slaughterbots" video's epilogue explained, all the component technologies were already available, and we expected militaries to start deploying such weapons very soon. That prediction was essentially correct.

### 2AC - AT: No Clear Definition of LAWs

#### Yes definition---LAW’s are weapons systems that select and fire upon targets without human intervention

Conway, 20 [Marissa Conway is a CFFP Writer, August 2020, accessed on 6-21-2022, Centre for Feminist Foreign Policy, “Smashing the Patriarchy: The Feminist Case Against Killer Robots” https://static1.squarespace.com/static/57cd7cd9d482e9784e4ccc34/t/5f356f1e5eb59d07e78fb329/1597337376556/Smashing+the+Patriarchy\_+The+Feminist+Case+Against+Killer+Robots.pdf]/ISEE

Lethal autonomous weapons (LAWs), also known as killer robots, are weapons systems that select and fire upon targets without any human intervention. In order to do this, they use Artificial Intelligence (AI) programmed with algorithms and data analysis capabilities. Such weapons are worrying to actors across the policy, technology, and activist sectors for a multitude of reasons. This report will explore these concerns from a feminist perspective, with particular focus on how a Feminist Foreign Policy (FFP) would respond to such weapons.

### 2AC - AT: ILAW Bad

#### International law needs to be engaged with any other method cedes ILAW.

**Sen, 22** [Rohini Sen is an Assistant Professor at the Jindal Global Law School, 10-3-2022, accessed on 6-24-2022, Voelkerrechtsblog, "We Must All Engage with Feminist Approaches to International Law", https://voelkerrechtsblog.org/we-must-all-engage-with-feminist-approaches-to-international-law/]/ISEE

In course of the last few weeks, my Twitter feed displayed three different trending news with varying degrees of urgency: Ukrainian responses to the Russian armed attack, a record complaint of rape and sexual assault in the United Kingdom and Wales, and growing tensions between state and private interest in tribal lands of central India. Any contemporary account of international law is likely to read these as three separate and recurrent patterns of how international law ‘happens’. The first is a pattern of state-centric territorial dispute with emphasis on securitization-based responses. The second is a data driven account of legal subject making – vulnerable objects of violence with a focus on sexual violence. And the third, nestled under transnational corporate legality, is the story of regulating land ownership in the language of private capital. Each of these, despite their seemingly separate spheres of operation in international law, are deeply entangled in fundamental ways. The relationships between legal subjects and institutions of international law have been subjected to critique and analysis through various discourses of power before. However, Feminist Approaches to International Law (FtAIL), oscillating between the prescriptive and the analytic, enables a very different, enmeshed mode of relational engagement with these institutions and subjects. One that is rooted in discomfort, self-awareness and affect. In the following sections I discuss two significant turns in FtAIL; the ways in which these turns have engendered the production of particular feminist pedagogical approaches, and some ways of ‘doing’ of them. What are Feminist Approaches to International Law? Old Question, New Answers Revisiting this old question is necessary not to attempt to provide a definition, but to indicate shifts in FtAIL’s perception in the mainstream writings. Some of these approaches include conversations on feminist pedagogy and the visibility of scholars such as myself who espouse a distinct ambivalence towards international law’s masculine format of academe and ‘expertise’. Earlier iterations of FtAIL, through Chinkin, Charlesworth and Wright’s now classic intervention have been around international law’s treatment of the ‘woman question’. From liberal feminisms essentializing to radical feminism’s restructuring, the questions asked were centered around the absence of women in international law and how to best intercept this figure as an essentialized legal subject. This narrative took a turn for a certain form of contingency with transnational and post-colonial feminism calling attention to extremely differential conditions and forms of alliances for women of the Global South. Their interactions led to two things. The first was the formation of an ensemble feminism that seems to espouse some characteristics of post-colonial criticality while reposing faith in liberal feminism and mainstream international law in a particular way. Pedagogically, I call this the turn of didactic discomfort. The second has been a contemporary and assertive call to center feminisms that emerged parallelly, marginally and somewhat apposite to the mainstream narrative of feminism and previous feminist positions in international law. In this account, if ‘woman’ was a multifaceted, socially produced category, then FtAIL became a structural (and structured) critique of international law’s institutions and practices with special focus on questions of labour, land ownership, and legal subjecthood as sites of analytical and prescriptive enquiries. This approach uses female subjecthood and subjection to analyse the ways in which international law produces and sustains structural inequalities and ways to subvert them. In moving away from the gender question to the colonial gendering question FtAIL became a heuristic that implicates and benefits everything and everyone rather than the previously presumed“women speaking about women”paradigm. This, I note as the pedagogical turn to entanglements. While the turn to didactic discomfort has led to academic deconstructions of the category of women and an effort to provincialize dominant feminist approaches, the turn to entanglements have led to epistemological questions around structures and praxis of international law and its knowledge systems. Both of these can be presented through ideas of relationship politics and relationship making where we give form to discomforts and epistemic alterities by examining relationships between institutions, others and selves. In the following section, I employ these two pedagogical approaches to think about international law differently, as an idea of relational politics through a) its teaching and b) knowledge production and sites of knowledge. Some ways of doing FtAIL: Relational Politics and Relationship Making in International law There are many ways to do feminisms and FtAIL and none of them are/should be prescriptive in an inflexible way. The ones I discuss below centre academia and teaching as sites of dialogic praxis. Using the two pedagogical turns stated above, I offer certain feminist interventions that ask us to turn the gaze on ourselves as agents of international law and then, to contemplate it as a project, where we co-constitute its elements and (are compelled to) move as an interconnected unit rather than disparate features and systems. A unit, where excesses are coded into structures that sustain inequalities and imbalances. FtAIL as a relational project in teaching Through this approach, teaching is foregrounded as a social process with social actors, where the teaching and teachers of international law embody differential politics as well. The core requirement is twofold – first, to turn the gaze on ourselves as knowledge interlocutors occupying striated positions, so that we can recognize where we are placed in relation to institutional knowledge making. Accordingly, we locate ourselves as social actors in the process of teaching international law where we may or may not find ourselves reflected in the discipline. And second, we subject the teaching itself to uncover similar relational arrangements. Moving away from the mainstream international law’s traditional depiction of itself as ‘regulations that govern states’, this feminist approach is grounded in identifying and teaching the various relationships that under-gird the international legal project. In contradistinction to the theories of statehood and sources of law, the basis of this approach is drawing out and examining the different forms of relationships in international law. For instance, is there a relationship of continuity between Eurocentric sovereignty and post-colonial sovereignty? What is the arrangement of power between the sovereign states and its various subjects? What are the linkages between human rights and the neoliberal market? Are sources of international law distinct from the states that make them? Let us unpack two such arrangements transversally and conceptually. Transversal, in this instance, is apprehending existing ideas of international law with critique but not disregarding them. Teaching a feminist account of sovereignty could entail a relational study of how the European sovereign state (and its post-colonial successor) securitize law to set normative notions of heterosexual relationships and family. For instance, the Women Peace and Security Resolution 1325 can be taught through exploring the forms and roles of womanhood it assumes in relation to the roles played by women in public and private places. Its emphasis on sexual vulnerability can also be contemplated in relation to other forms of gendered structural vulnerabilities such as labour, land ownership, recognition that do not feature in the ‘woman question’. The relationship between securitization and other forms of non-state interventions to address crisis can also be examined in relation to this paradigm. Similarly, the teaching of sources of international law could be approached by analyzing how the colonial distinction is written into formal and informal sources of customary international law. Once the coding is made visible, we are also able to notice how the binaries of formal and informal sources are identical to feminist analysis of international law’s false binary of public and private distinctions; a relationship between who is erasing and what is erased.

### 2AC - NATO Say Yes

#### NATO wants to set AI standards---US is the last holdout.

Heikkilä, 21 [Melissa Heikkilä, 3-29-2021, accessed on 6-24-2022, POLITICO, "NATO wants to set AI standards. If only its members agreed on the basics.", [https://www.politico.eu/article/nato-ai-artificial-intelligence-standards-priorities/]/ISEE](https://www.politico.eu/article/nato-ai-artificial-intelligence-standards-priorities/%5d/ISEE)

On paper, NATO is the ideal organization to go about setting standards for military applications of artificial intelligence. But the widely divergent priorities and budgets of its 30 members could get in the way. The Western military alliance has identified artificial intelligence as a key technology needed to maintain an edge over adversaries, and it wants to lead the way in establishing common ground rules for its use. “We need each other more than ever. No country alone or no continent alone can compete in this era of great power competition,” NATO Deputy Secretary-General Mircea Geoană, the alliance’s second in command, said in an interview with POLITICO. The standard-setting effort comes as China is pressing ahead with AI applications in the military largely free of democratic oversight. David van Weel, NATO’s assistant secretary general for emerging security challenges, said Beijing's lack of concern with the tech's ethical implications has sped along the integration of AI into the military apparatus. "I'm ... not sure that they're having the same debates on principles of responsible use or they're definitely not applying our democratic values to these technologies,” he said. Meanwhile, the EU — which has pledged to roll out the world's first binding rules on AI in coming weeks — is seeking closer collaboration with Washington to oversee emerging technologies, including artificial intelligence. But those efforts have been slow in getting off the ground. For Geoană, that collaboration will happen at NATO, which is working closely with the European Union as it prepares AI regulation focusing on “high risk” applications. The pitch NATO does not regulate, but “once NATO sets a standard, it becomes in terms of defensive security the gold standard in that respective field,” Geoană said. The alliance's own AI strategy, to be released before the summer, will identify ways to operate AI systems responsibly, identify military applications for the technology, and provide a “platform for allies to test their AI to see whether it's up to NATO standards,” van Weel said. The strategy will also set ethical guidelines around how to govern AI systems, for example by ensuring systems can be shut down by a human at all times, and to maintain accountability by ensuring a human is responsible for the actions of AI systems. “If an adversary would use autonomous AI powered systems in a way that is not compatible with our values and morals, it would still have defense implications because we would need to defend and deter against those systems,” van Weel said. “We need to be aware of that and we need to flag legislators when we feel that our restrictions are coming into the realm of [being detrimental to] our defense and deterrence,” he continued. Mission impossible? The problem is that NATO's members are at very different stages when it comes to thinking about AI in the military context. The U.S., the world's biggest military spender, has prioritized the use of AI in the defense realm. But in Europe, most countries — France and the Netherlands excepting — barely mention the technology’s defense and military implications in their national AI strategies. “It’s absolutely no surprise that the U.S. had a military AI strategy before it has a national AI strategy," but the Europeans "did it exactly the other way around," said Ulrike Franke, a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, said: That echoes familiar transatlantic differences — and previous U.S. President Donald Trump's complaints — over defense spending, but also highlights the different approaches to AI regulation more broadly. The EU's AI strategy takes a cautious line, touting itself as "human-centric," focused on taming corporate excesses and keeping citizens' data safe. The U.S., which tends to be light on regulation and keen on defense, sees things differently. There are also divergences over what technologies the alliance ought to develop, including lethal autonomous weapons systems — often dubbed “killer robots” — programmed to identify and destroy targets without human control. Powerful NATO members including France, the U.K., and the U.S. have developed these technologies and oppose a treaty on these weapons, while others like Belgium and Germany have expressed serious concerns about the technology. These weapons systems have also faced fierce public opposition from civil society and human rights groups, including from United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres, who in 2018 called for a ban. Geoană said the alliance has “retained autonomous weapon systems as part of the interests of NATO.” The group hopes that its upcoming recommendations will allow the ethical use of the technology without “stifling innovation.” Staying relevant These issues threaten to hamper NATO's standard-setting drive. "I think there’s a certain danger that if NATO doesn’t take this on as a real challenge, that it may be marginalized by other such efforts,” Franke said. She pointed to the U.S.-led AI Partnership for Defense, which consists of 13 countries from Europe and Asia to collaborate on AI use in the military context — a forum which could supplant NATO as the standard-setting body. That could have consequences for human rights, too. “NATO… is a great place to responsibly think about how to harness the good parts of this technology and how to prohibit the parts that would be catastrophic for humanitarian law and human rights law, and people at the end of the day,” said Verity Coyle, a senior adviser at Amnesty International, which is part of the Stop Killer Robots campaign. “Without oversight mechanisms to ensure ethical standards and measures, which would guarantee that this technology will operate under meaningful human control” NATO’s strategy could head into an “ethical vacuum,” Coyle said. Franke said it's better for the alliance to focus on the basics, like increased data sharing to develop and train military AI and cooperating on using artificial intelligence in logistics. “If NATO countries were to cooperate on that, that could create good procedures and set precedents. And I think we should then move on to the more controversial things such as autonomous weapons systems,” she said.

#### NATO says yes-- all NATO allies have met to discuss LAWs and agree major regulation is needed

Christie, 22 [Edward Hunter Christie is a Researcher, consultant, economist, EU affairs professional, former NATO official, public policy expert, November 24, 2020, accessed on 6-21-2022, NATO Review. “Artificial Intelligence at NATO: dynamic adoption, responsible use,” https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2020/11/24/artificial-intelligence-at-nato-dynamic-adoption-responsible-use/index.html]/ISEE

The Alliance’s success with AI will also depend on new and well-designed principles and practices relating to good governance and responsible use. Certain Allied governments have already made certain public commitments in the area of responsible use, addressing concepts such as lawfulness, responsibility, reliability, and governability, among others. In parallel, Allies have taken part in the Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems under the auspices of the United Nations, leading to the formulation of 11 guiding principles. Importantly, there is a good case for viewing work on adopting AI and work on principles of responsible use as complementary and synergistic. In effect, there are certain essential principles or goals that will underpin and facilitate both engineering good practice, as well as responsible state behaviour. Certain national principles imply a need for specific design requirements. For example, a principle of governability may be linked to technical abilities to detect and avoid unintended consequences, and to disengage or deactivate in case of unintended behaviour.

#### U.S. is the global leader on AI, other countries will follow on.

**Insinna, 22** [Valerie Insinna is a point person for major Pentagon policy and strategy developments, 5-26-2022, accessed on 6-24-2022, Breaking Defense, "Updated autonomous weapons rules coming for the Pentagon: Exclusive details - Breaking Defense", https://breakingdefense.com/2022/05/updated-autonomous-weapons-rules-coming-for-the-pentagon-exclusive-details/]/ISEE

WASHINGTON: The Defense Department is updating its guidance on autonomous weapons to consider advances in artificial intelligence, with a revised directive slated for release later this year, the head of the Pentagon’s emerging capabilities policy office told Breaking Defense in an exclusive interview. DoD directive 3000.09 [PDF], signed by then-Deputy Secretary of Defense Ash Carter on Nov. 21, 2012, established policy, responsibilities and review processes for the “design, development, acquisition, testing, fielding, and employment of autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems, including guided munitions that can independently select and discriminate targets.” But in the decade since its release, artificial intelligence and machine learning technologies have made a massive leap forward, and it’s “entirely plausible” there may need to be revisions that reflect the Pentagon’s “responsible AI” initiative and other ethical principles adopted by the department, said Michael Horowitz, DoD director of emerging capabilities policy. “Autonomy and AI are not the exact same thing,” Horowitz told Breaking Defense on May 24. “But given the growing importance that AI plays, and thinking about the future of war and the way the department has been thinking about AI, I think ensuring that’s reflected in the directive seems to make sense.” It’s important to note that, based on the definition inscribed in DoD directive 3000.09, the military currently does not operate any weapon systems that qualify as an autonomous weapon — and at least publicly is not currently developing such a weapon. The department characterizes an “autonomous weapon” as an autonomous or semi-autonomous system that can choose its own targets and apply lethal or nonlethal force without a human in the loop. The directive does not apply to unarmed drones or armed drones like the MQ-9 Reaper, whose flight path and weapons release is controlled by a human pilot sitting at a remote location. It also doesn’t apply to systems like the Switchblade loitering munitions the US has provided to Ukraine, which are programmed by a human operator to hit specific targets and can be called off when needed. “It was the first national policy published on autonomous weapons systems, and actually remains one of the only publicly available national policies,” Horowitz said. “It set the standard essentially for the global dialogue that followed and demonstrated America’s responsible approach to the potential incorporation of autonomy into weapon systems.” In a 2012 interview with Defense News, David Ochmanek, then the deputy assistant secretary for policy force development, described the doctrine as “flexible” and stressed the imposition of a “rigorous review process” that would now be in place before any future autonomous weapon could be approved. But that promise has done little to assuage opponents, who raise comparisons to Terminators and have organized into efforts, such as the eponymous Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, to preemptively ban the technology. Horowitz — a longtime drone expert who once authored a paper titled “The Ethics & Morality of Robotic Warfare: Assessing the Debate over Autonomous Weapons” — is well aware of the debate around such systems, and while avoiding commenting on those concerns directly, he noted that the department’s increased focus on autonomy and AI in recent years has always been with the idea of a human being involved in the process. “I would say the one of the things about the approach of the United States to the role of AI and autonomous systems has been imagining these systems as a way to enhance the warfighter,” he said. “It’s why, dating back a couple of administrations, the United States has talked about things like human-machine teaming, because it tends to think about AI and autonomous systems as things that work synergistically with the best trained military in the world to improve its capacity.” Modernized AI The update is occurring not because a major technological breakthrough is on the horizon, but because of a department standard that requires directives be updated every 10 years. Right now, it’s unclear exactly how much of the original directive will need to be revised, but Horowitz seemed to downplay massive rewrites. “Our instinct entering this process is that the fundamental approach in the directive remains sound, that the directive laid out a very responsible approach to the incorporation of autonomy and weapons systems,” Horowitz said. “But we want to make sure, of course, that the directive still reflects the views of the department and the way the department should be thinking about [autonomous] weapon systems,” he continued. “You know, it has been a decade. And it’s entirely plausible that there are some updates and clarifications that would be helpful.” Horowitz declined to go into details about where he thinks changes may be needed, but did highlight that the document reflects the Pentagon of 2012, which has morphed over the course of the Obama, Trump and Biden administrations. For instance, the review process laid out in the original directive references the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics — a position that no longer exists, whose responsibilities are now split between the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment and the Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering. He also underlined that this directive would be focused on the specific subject of autonomous weapons, and not the broader AI efforts that exist throughout the department. “When this directive was published in 2012, the notion of the way that algorithms, how algorithms might impact the military seemed pretty futuristic, or seemed further away. And autonomous weapon systems were a specific thing that the department chose to write a directive about,” he continued. “I think it’s important that the department consider the way that should then also influence this directive … given the intersection between AI and autonomous systems, and I say autonomous systems as opposed to autonomous weapon systems deliberately. “There’s so many AI applications that can or are already influencing the American military and will influence the American military that, you know, that have nothing to do with this.” While Horowitz’s office — only recently established — will seek out input from the relatively new defense organizations that have been stood up in the past decade, such as the office of the Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Officer (CDAO), other organizations that may be relative to the revamp of DoD Directive 3000.09—the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center, Defense Digital Service and Office of Advancing Analytics—are slated to become part of the CDAO office on June 1, Breaking Defense reported earlier this week. He also expects to get inputs from the services, Joint Staff and other stakeholders — of which, he noted, there are significantly more now than a decade ago.

### 2AC - NATO Key

#### LAWS are inevitable absent a unified pushback from NATO – NATO policies are specifically designed with ethics in mind

Michelson 21 Brian Michelson, 2-23-2021, "Why NATO Needs Lethal Autonomous Weapon Standards," CEPA, https://cepa.org/why-nato-needs-lethal-autonomous-weapon-standards//mb24

**Lethal autonomous weapon systems will come to dominate warfare** in the coming years. **NATO needs to harmonize its approach to their development** and use, or risk being left behind. The rapid weaponization of artificial intelligence, “big data,” social media, robotics, and a host of other technologies presents a clear competitive challenge to NATO, an alliance with members that exist on a wide spectrum of military-technological capabilities. The future effectiveness of NATO will be driven in large part by how it handles these challenges from hobbling its ability both to act in unison and to prevail in a contest of wills. While there are numerous potential technology gaps, one that will likely only increase is partner nations’ ability and willingness to employ lethal autonomous weapon systems. **These systems will inevitably grow more capable**, and more necessary, in the coming decade. Technological gaps are inevitable considering the disparities in GDP and military budgets. The United States accounts for over 70 percent of NATO’s overall military spending, while the next three largest contributors (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) provide approximately half of the remaining 30 percent. And with most NATO nations continuing to fund their militaries at under the 2 percent GDP goal, technological gaps will continue to grow. For perspective, the 2021 United States Department of Defense research and development budget is approximately equal to the entire defense outlay of France and Germany combined. With such a large differential, what can be done to help enable effective investments in autonomous weapons by smaller nations? Even more specifically, how can smaller nations provide capabilities that can integrate into, and contribute to the alliance? To better invest limited funds, now is the **time to look at a NATO standard for lethal autonomous weapons and their ethical use.** While there is no agreed-upon international definition of lethal autonomous weapons systems, the U.S. Department of Defense defines them as “weapon system[s] that, once activated, can select and engage targets without further intervention by a human operator.“ While these are not Schwarzenegger-style Terminators and still have a degree of human control over them, the technology enabling these systems is maturing rapidly, and military necessity will increasingly demand that these systems gain broader parameters of autonomous action. Yet despite the complexity of these systems and the inevitability of their proliferation, NATO does not currently have a common standard for their use or development. In fact, some NATO countries even have opposing views of how to handle them. NATO standards are designed to ensure compatibility among weapon systems, communication architecture, and a host of other warfighting systems. The 7.62mm small arms round is a good example of this. But what is the 7.62mm equivalent standard for the development and employment of autonomous weapon systems? This opens a host of related questions regarding the employment of these systems: What Identification – Friend – Foe (IFF) capability should ground and air units require to prevent fratricide? What degree of certainty does a lethal autonomous weapon system require before final engagement? What level of collateral damage is acceptable? What degree of compatibility between systems is required? Should all these parameters (and others) be adjustable, and if so, at what command level? The attendant ethics also need to be addressed. NATO’s experience in Afghanistan was a case study in the challenges of coalition warfare. Differing risk tolerances, legal requirements, ethical views, domestic political concerns, and at times simply combat capability, all combined into to complex policy cocktail that impeded the effectiveness of combat operations. While modern militaries have accountability, legal, and ethical systems incorporated into their command structures, **they are not uniform and leaders in differing militaries have varying degrees of authority.** The key questions hinge on two issues: Who gets to decide to employ an autonomous weapon, and who is responsible should things go wrong? The Kunduz hospital strike in October of 2015 was driven primarily by human error. Responsibility was fixed on the chain of command and 16 leaders were disciplined. Who will be responsible if a member nation conducts a NATO-authorized strike and it goes terribly wrong? If this framework is not thoroughly established ahead of time, not only is it likely that commanders may hesitate to use this capability, the risk-aversion inherent in bureaucracies may limit the development of autonomous weapons that will be needed in future conflicts. In the emerging field of **lethal autonomous weapons, establishing a common NATO standard for the development and use of autonomous weapons will help address the gap in capabilities among NATO member nations. By establishing these standards, nations can ensure that their defense expenditures on autonomous weapons will create systems that are interoperable, able to contribute to NATO’s capability, and can be employed within defensible ethical guidelines.**

#### NATO is key – the EU is inefficient, and NATO is the only organization capable of setting an ethical precedent on AI

HeikkilÄ 22 Melissa HeikkilÄ, 6-22-2022, "NATO wants to set AI standards. If only its members agreed on the basics.," POLITICO, <https://www.politico.eu/article/nato-ai-artificial-intelligence-standards-priorities//mb24>

NATO wants to set AI standards. If only its members agreed on the basics. Big differences over how to treat autonomous weapons could undermine NATO’s drive. On paper, NATO is the ideal organization to go about setting standards for military applications of artificial intelligence. But the widely divergent priorities and budgets of its 30 members could get in the way. The Western military alliance has identified artificial intelligence as a key technology needed to maintain an edge over adversaries, and it wants to lead the way in establishing common ground rules for its use. “We need each other more than ever. No country alone or no continent alone can compete in this era of great power competition,” NATO Deputy Secretary-General Mircea Geoană, the alliance’s second in command, said in an interview with POLITICO. The standard-setting effort comes as China is pressing ahead with AI applications in the military largely free of democratic oversight. David van Weel, NATO’s assistant secretary general for emerging security challenges, said Beijing's lack of concern with the tech's ethical implications has sped along the integration of AI into the military apparatus. "I'm ... not sure that they're having the same debates on principles of responsible use or they're definitely not applying our democratic values to these technologies,” he said. Meanwhile, the EU — which has pledged to roll out the world's first binding rules on AI in coming weeks — is seeking closer collaboration with Washington to oversee emerging technologies, including artificial intelligence. But those efforts have been slow in getting off the ground. For Geoană, that collaboration will happen at NATO, which is working closely with the European Union as it prepares AI regulation focusing on “high risk” applications. The pitch NATO does not regulate, but “**once NATO sets a standard, it becomes in terms of defensive security the gold standard in that respective field**,” Geoană said. The alliance's own AI strategy, to be released before the summer, will identify ways to operate AI systems responsibly, identify military applications for the technology, and provide a “platform for allies to test their AI to see whether it's up to NATO standards,” van Weel said. The strategy will also set ethical guidelines around how to govern AI systems, for example by ensuring systems can be shut down by a human at all times, and to maintain accountability by ensuring a human is responsible for the actions of AI systems. “**If an adversary would use autonomous AI powered systems in a way that is not compatible with our values and morals, it would still have defense implications because we would need to defend and deter against those systems,”** van Weel said. “We need to be aware of that and we need to flag legislators when we feel that our restrictions are coming into the realm of [being detrimental to] our defense and deterrence,” he continued. Mission impossible? The problem is that NATO's members are at very different stages when it comes to thinking about AI in the military context. The U.S., the world's biggest military spender, has prioritized the use of AI in the defense realm. But in Europe, most countries — France and the Netherlands excepting — barely mention the technology’s defense and military implications in their national AI strategies. “It’s absolutely no surprise that the U.S. had a military AI strategy before it has a national AI strategy," but the Europeans "did it exactly the other way around," said Ulrike Franke, a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, said: That echoes familiar transatlantic differences — and previous U.S. President Donald Trump's complaints — over defense spending, but also highlights the different approaches to AI regulation more broadly. The EU's AI strategy takes a cautious line, touting itself as "human-centric," focused on taming corporate excesses and keeping citizens' data safe. The U.S., which tends to be light on regulation and keen on defense, sees things differently. There are also divergences over what technologies the alliance ought to develop, including lethal autonomous weapons systems — often dubbed “killer robots” — programmed to identify and destroy targets without human control. Powerful NATO members including France, the U.K., and the U.S. have developed these technologies and oppose a treaty on these weapons, while others like Belgium and Germany have expressed serious concerns about the technology. These weapons systems have also faced fierce public opposition from civil society and human rights groups, including from United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres, who in 2018 called for a ban. Geoană said the alliance has “retained autonomous weapon systems as part of the interests of NATO.” The group hopes that its upcoming recommendations will allow the ethical use of the technology without “stifling innovation.” Staying relevant These issues threaten to hamper NATO's standard-setting drive. "I think there’s a certain danger that if NATO doesn’t take this on as a real challenge, that it may be marginalized by other such efforts,” Franke said. She pointed to the U.S.-led AI Partnership for Defense, which consists of 13 countries from Europe and Asia to collaborate on AI use in the military context — a forum which could supplant NATO as the standard-setting body. That could have consequences for human rights, too. “NATO… is a great place to responsibly think about how to harness the good parts of this technology and how to prohibit the parts that would be catastrophic for humanitarian law and human rights law, and people at the end of the day,” said Verity Coyle, a senior adviser at Amnesty International, which is part of the Stop Killer Robots campaign. “Without oversight mechanisms to ensure ethical standards and measures, which would guarantee that this technology will operate under meaningful human control” NATO’s strategy could head into an “ethical vacuum,” Coyle said. Franke said it's better for the alliance to focus on the basics, like increased data sharing to develop and train military AI and cooperating on using artificial intelligence in logistics. “If NATO countries were to cooperate on that, that could create good procedures and set precedents. And I think **we should then move on to the more controversial things such as autonomous weapons systems,”** she said.

### 2AC - AT: NATO Bad 4 Women

#### NATO will do the plan – they’ve already signaled a commitment to feminism

**Doyle et al 21** [Gabriela R. A. Doyle (Assistant director for the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security), Leah Sheunemann (The deputy director of the Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council. In her role, she oversees the Initiative’s programming and research covering US transatlantic policy, NATO defense policy, and European security), and Christopher Skaluba (Expert lecturer and writer on international relations, national security, and defense policy), 3-9-2021, "Why NATO should adopt a feminist foreign policy," Atlantic Council, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/why-nato-should-adopt-a-feminist-foreign-policy/>] // st

As values-based democracies, NATO allies and partners have been at the forefront of the global women’s rights movement. And as an alliance, NATO plays an important role in advancing equity within foreign policy. When NATO foreign ministers meet later in March, they should take the natural next steps toward adopting a feminist foreign policy (FFP).¶ FFP is a multifaceted framework that offers an additive lens to more traditional approaches to foreign policy. It aims to amplify the experiences and perspectives of women and marginalized people to dismantle existing systems of patriarchy, colonization, and racism in a way that builds peace, attains gender equality, and protects human rights. FFP’s goals, which are oriented toward changing global systems of power, include eliminating the gender gap, supporting equal representation, and funding diversity initiatives. They also encompass achieving inclusivity for LGBTQ individuals and institutionalizing gender equality and female empowerment. FFP proponents imagine a world where women and minorities are central to decision-making and accounted for in every aspect of policy, rather than an afterthought. In pursuit of this objective, the framework prioritizes expanding opportunities for women and minorities within national governments, among other policy recommendations.¶ In 2014, Sweden became the first country to officially adopt a feminist foreign policy. Since then, a handful of other countries have begun applying FFP as well. So far, all but one of the six countries that have committed to adopting or officially adopted a feminist foreign policy are affiliated with NATO. Canada, France, Luxembourg, and Spain are treaty allies. Sweden is a close official partner. And while Mexico has no formal ties to the Alliance, there is a good case that it should.¶ The Alliance has already incorporated gender perspectives into its policy-planning processes, training, and operations; adopted a zero-tolerance approach to sexual exploitation and abuse; and increased the participation of women across the organization. But NATO should formally adopt a feminist foreign policy for two reasons: because morally it is the right thing to do and because FFP will strengthen the Alliance.

# \*\*AT: Counterplans\*\*

## \*\*2AC – Top Level\*\*

### 2AC AT: PICs Generics

#### PICs create loopholes that are impossible to close---the judge should throw out util calculus in the context of exceptions to the AFF plan.

**Wallach, 17** [Wendell Wallach a bioethicist and author focused on the ethics and governance of emerging technologies, in particular artificial intelligence and neuroscience, May 2017, accessed on 6-30-2022, Cacm.acm, "Toward a Ban on Lethal Autonomous Weapons: Surmounting the Obstacles", https://cacm.acm.org/magazines/2017/5/216318-toward-a-ban-on-lethal-autonomous-weapons/fulltext]/ISEE

From April 1115, 2016, at the United Nations Office at Geneva, the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) conducted a third year of informal meetings to hear expert testimony regarding a preemptive ban on lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS). A total of 94 states attended the meeting, and at the end of the week they agreed by consensus to recommend the formation of an open-ended Group of Government Experts (GGE). A GGE is the next step in forging a concrete proposal upon which the member states could vote. By the end of 2016 a preemptive ban has been called for by 19 states. Furthermore, meaningful human control, a phrase first proposed by advocates for a ban, has been adopted by nearly all the states, although the phrase's meaning is contested. Thus a ban on LAWS would appear to have gained momentum. Even the large military powers, notably the U.S., have publicly stated that they will support a ban if that is the will of the member states. Behind the scenes, however, the principal powers express their serious disinclination to embrace a ban. Many of the smaller states will follow their lead. The hurdles in the way of a successful campaign to ban LAWS remain daunting, but are not insurmountable. The debate to date has been characterized by a succession of arguments and counterarguments by proponents and opponents of a ban. This back and forth should not be interpreted as either a stalemate or a simple calculation as to whether the harms of LAWS can be offset by their benefits. For all states that are signatories to the laws of armed conflict,a any violation of the principles of international humanitarian law (IHL)b must trump utilitarian calculations. Therefore, those who believe the benefits of LAWS justify their use and therefore oppose a ban, are intent that LAWS do not become a special case within IHL. Demonstrating that LAWS pose unique challenges for IHL has been a core strategy for supporters of a ban. Those among the more than 3,100 AI/Robotics researchers who signed the Autonomous Weapons: An Open Letter From AI & Robotics Researchersc are reflective of a broad consensus among citizens and even active military personnel who favor a preemptive ban.4 This consensus is partially attributable to speculative, futuristic, and fictional scenarios. But perhaps even science fiction represents a deep intuition that unleashing LAWS is not a road humanity should tread. Some nations will be emboldened to start wars if they believe they can achieve political objectives without the loss of their troops. Researchers who have waded into the debate over banning LAWS have come to appreciate the manner in which geopolitics, security concerns, the arcana of arms control, and linguistic obfuscations can turn a relatively straightforward proposal into an extremely complicated proposition. A ban on LAWS does not fit easily, or perhaps at all, into traditional models for arms control.

### 2AC – AT: Weapons PICs

#### Hegemonic masculinity informs the use of weapon systems. The aff’s analysis of gender is key to break down those norms.

Myrttinen 03

(Henri, researcher with the Institute for Social Transformation in Yogyakarta, Indonesia. He is also currently a post-graduate student at the University of Natal in Durban, South Africa, researching masculinities in violent nation-building processes. “Disarming masculinities” Women, Men Peace and security from Disarmament forum)

Conventional wisdom has it that men enjoy a ‘special relationship’ with weapons, a view which seems to be corroborated by empirical evidence. The relationship between ‘masculine’ men and weapons is such a prevailing cliché that one finds it everywhere, from advertising to left-wing revolutionary posters, fascist imagery to the novels of Hemingway, war memorials to homoerotic art, from the porn industry to feminist critiques of male militarism. Weapons systems are designed mostly by men, marketed mostly for men and used mostly by men—and in many parts of the world, they are the primary source of death for men. Boys are given guns and swords to play with or they make them for themselves. Adolescent male warriors and middle-aged male hunters pose for cameras brandishing their weapons. Michael Ignatieff describes entering ‘zones of toxic testosterone’ in the Bosnian war.1 War memorials depict muscular men clutching their guns or hurling grenades with flexed, oversized pectoral muscles bulging out of the opened shirts of their uniforms. If one considers gender, in this case masculinity, to be socially constructed, and one additionally wants to further the cause of disarmament, it becomes evident that this bond between men and weapons and how this is linked with violent notions of masculinity need to be investigated and analysed further in order to be able to develop sustainable disarmament policies. The importance of analysing violent masculinity gains even more significance if one accepts the notion of conflicts increasingly being ones of ‘identity’, in which the gendered ethnic identities that are constructed and mobilized tend to be highly militarized.2 In this article, I will analyse some of the ways in which enactments of masculinities and the wielding of weapons go together, the sexualized imagery used in conjunction with weapons, and the models of masculinity that lie behind these concepts. I will argue that the public display, the threat of or actual use of weapons is an intrinsic part of violent, militarized models of masculinityThe specific ‘message’ conveyed by the display and use of weapons is dependent on the social and cultural environment. I will argue that weapons are part of one notion of masculinity, a militarized view that equates ‘manliness’ with the ‘sanctioned use of aggression, force and violence’.3 Weapons are used as status symbols but also as tools to achieve economic and social gains, wielding power over unarmed males and females. This can often be linked to a crisis of masculinity, when there is a ‘fear of loss of male power and privilege’4 through social transformations, leading to a backlash in which ‘traditional’ gender roles are reinforced. The construct of the male warrior/protector relies on the suppression of others— including competing concepts of masculinity. Weapons and their public display seek to underline the ‘manly’ prowess of the bearer, but tragically often also undermine it—men are not only disproportionately the perpetrators of violence, but also often its victims. This contribution is intended to open up discussion. As I consider gender roles to be highly dependent on the cultural and social environment in which men and women act, I will start by delineating which socio-cultural environment I shall examine. Unfortunately, by necessity rather than by choice**,** the limited scope of this study will lead me to concentrate heavily on ‘western’ (i.e. North American, European and Australian) perceptions of masculinity, though I will endeavour, where possible, to broaden this scope.

## \*\*2AC – AT: Patriot PIC\*\*

### Competition

#### No competition---Patriot has humans in the loop.

Atherton, 22 [Kelsey Atherton is a military technology journalist based in Albuquerque, New Mexico. His reporting has appeared in Popular Science, Breaking Defense, and The New York Times, 5-6-2022, accessed on 6-28-2022, Brookings, "Understanding the errors introduced by military AI applications", https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/understanding-the-errors-introduced-by-military-ai-applications/]/ISEE

The Patriot missile began development in the 1960s, when the U.S. Army sought a means to reliably shoot down enemy airplanes. Later, the missile would gain the ability to also intercept other missiles, and as the roles assigned to the missile expanded, its autonomous capabilities increased. Patriot missile batteries use a phased array radar to detect and identify targets. This information is then fed into a computer control station to manage how the missiles are launched in response. Once fired, the missiles fly toward an identified intercept point calculated before firing, directions that can be altered by sending updated sensor readings over radio signal to the fired missile. As it approaches for impact, the missile’s own radar tracks the target. Raytheon, which manufactures the Patriot, has described the system as having “automated operations” with “man-in-the-loop (human) override” capabilities—technology that allows the weapon to quickly engage targets with the necessary speed to carry out its missile defense mission.

### Patriot Bad

#### The patriot system is faulty---Iraq proves.

Atherton, 22 [Kelsey Atherton is a military technology journalist based in Albuquerque, New Mexico. His reporting has appeared in Popular Science, Breaking Defense, and The New York Times, 5-6-2022, accessed on 6-28-2022, Brookings, "Understanding the errors introduced by military AI applications", https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/understanding-the-errors-introduced-by-military-ai-applications/]/ISEE

On March 22, 2003, two days into the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, American troops fired a Patriot interceptor missile at what they assumed was an Iraqi anti-radiation missile designed to destroy air-defense systems. Acting on the recommendation of their computer-powered weapon, the Americans fired in self-defense, thinking they were shooting down a missile coming to destroy their outpost. What the Patriot missile system had identified as an incoming missile, was in fact a UK Tornado fighter jet, and when the Patriot struck the aircraft, it killed two crew on board instantly. The deaths were the first losses suffered by the Royal Air Force in the war and the tragic result of friendly fire. A subsequent RAF Board of Inquiry investigation concluded that the shoot-down was the result of a combination of factors: how the Patriot missile classified targets, rules for firing the missiles, autonomous operation of Patriot missile batteries, and several other technical and procedural factors, like the Tornado not broadcasting its “friend or foe” identifier at the time of the friendly fire. The destruction of Tornado ZG710, the report concluded, represented a tragic error enabled by the missile’s computer routines. The shoot-down of the Tornado happened nearly 20 years ago, but it offers an insight into how AI-enabled systems or automated tools on the battlefield will affect the kinds of errors that happen in war. Today, human decisionmaking is shifting toward machines. With this shift comes the potential to reduce human error, but also to introduce new and novel types of mistakes. Where humans might have once misidentified a civilian as a combatant, computers are expected to step in and provide more accurate judgment. Across a range of military functions, from the movement of autonomous planes and cars to identifying tanks on a battlefield, computers are expected to provide quick, accurate decisions. But the embrace of AI in military applications also comes with immense risk. New systems introduce the possibility of new types of error, and understanding how autonomous machines will fail is important when crafting policy for buying and overseeing this new generation of autonomous weapons. What went wrong in 2003 The Patriot missile began development in the 1960s, when the U.S. Army sought a means to reliably shoot down enemy airplanes. Later, the missile would gain the ability to also intercept other missiles, and as the roles assigned to the missile expanded, its autonomous capabilities increased. Patriot missile batteries use a phased array radar to detect and identify targets. This information is then fed into a computer control station to manage how the missiles are launched in response. Once fired, the missiles fly toward an identified intercept point calculated before firing, directions that can be altered by sending updated sensor readings over radio signal to the fired missile. As it approaches for impact, the missile’s own radar tracks the target. Raytheon, which manufactures the Patriot, has described the system as having “automated operations” with “man-in-the-loop (human) override” capabilities—technology that allows the weapon to quickly engage targets with the necessary speed to carry out its missile defense mission. Automation is a compelling feature for an anti-air and, especially, for an anti-missile system. The calculations involved in shooting down aircraft and missiles are hard and require immediate translation of sensor information. Both interceptors and targets are traveling exceptionally fast. It’s the kind of task in which the involvement of a human introduces lag, slows down the process, and makes it less likely a missile is going to successfully shoot down an incoming projectile or aircraft. But human operators also serve an essential role: preventing accidental, incorrect shootdowns. And this requires a balance between human and machine decisionmaking that is difficult to achieve. When the Pentagon investigated the causes of the Tornado shootdown, as well as two other incidents of friendly fire involving Patriot systems, the missile system’s automated functions were identified as contributing factors in misidentifying friend as foe. U.S. Patriot batteries deployed to Iraq under the assumption that they would face heavy missile attacks, which would require the batteries to operate with a relative degree of autonomy in order to respond with sufficient speed. As a 2005 report by the Defense Science Board Task Force on the Patriot system’s performance observed, operating autonomously required U.S. forces to trust that the automated features of the system were functioning properly. So when the assumptions underlying the decision to allow the Patriot system to autonomously identify and sometimes fire on targets no longer applied, the soldiers operating the system were not in a position to question what the weapon’s sensors were telling them. Had U.S. and coalition forces faced heavy missile attacks in the war, automating such defenses would have made more sense. Instead, U.S. and allied forces quickly established air superiority, enough to drastically shift the balance of what was in the sky. Instead of facing large amounts of incoming missiles, Patriot batteries were observing large numbers of allied planes operating in the sky above them and sometimes struggling to identify friend from foe. According to the Defense Science Board’s task force, the first 30 days of combat in Iraq saw nine ballistic missile attacks that Patriot batteries might have been expected to counter, compared to 41,000 aircraft sorties, amounting to a “4,000-to-1 friendly-to-enemy ratio.” Picking out the correct targets against the background of a large number of potential false positives proved highly challenging.

## \*\*2AC – AT: TB2 PIC\*\*

### Competition

#### TB2 is not a LAW.

Pike, 19 [John Pike one of the world's leading experts on defense, space and intelligence policy, worked for the Federation of American Scientists, where he directed the Space Policy, Cyberstrategy, Military Analysis, Nuclear Resource and Intelligence Resource projects., 12-16-2019, accessed on 6-28-2022, Globalsecurity, "Bayraktar TB Tactical Armed UAV", https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/europe/bayraktar-tb.htm]/ISEE

The Bayraktar Tactical Block 2 (TB2) is a Tactical Armed / UAV System, developed and manufactured by Baykar. Bayraktar TB2, which can carry 4 MAM-L and MAM-C missiles produced by Roketsan on its wings, has the ability to perform precise targeting with its built-in laser target marker. While the Turkish Armed Forces describes Bayraktar as "Tactical UAV Class" to prevent it from being a competitor to the TAI Anka UAV, international standards would classify it as a medium-altitude long-endurance UAV. With its 650 kg MTOW and 12 meters wingspan platform powered by an internal combustion engine, Bayraktar is capable of flying at 22,500 feet and loitering for more than 24 hours. A highly sophisticated design that provides all solutions that operator may need in one integrated system. The system consists of Bayraktar TB2 Armed / UAV Platform, Ground Control Station, Ground Data Terminal, Remote Display Terminal, Advanced Base with Generator and Trailer modules. Thanks to Baykar's technological accumulation and capabilities, the entire system is produced indigenously.

### Whole World Deficit

#### TB2 won’t be sold to just Ukraine but the entire world. Even if the instance of Ukraine is good, the proliferation to Russia, the US, etc. links to all our offense.

Bagirova, 22 [Nailia Bagirova graduated from Azjarbajžan Tibb Universiteti, May 30, 2022, accessed on 6-28-2022, Reuters, "After Ukraine, 'whole world' is a customer for Turkish drone, maker says,” https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/exclusive-after-ukraine-whole-world-is-customer-turkish-drone-maker-says-2022-05-30/]/ISEE

Ukraine's destruction of Russian artillery systems and armoured vehicles with Turkish Bayraktar TB2 aerial drones has made "the whole world" a customer, according to its designer. Selcuk Bayraktar, who runs the Istanbul firm Baykar with his brother Haluk, said the drones had shown how technology was revolutionising modern warfare. "Bayraktar TB2 is doing what it was supposed to do – taking out some of the most advanced anti-aircraft systems and advanced artillery systems and armoured vehicles," he told Reuters in English beside the new Akinci drone at an exhibition in Baku. "The whole world is a customer." Advertisement · Scroll to continue At least for a time, the TB2, which has a 12-metre wingspan and can soar to 25,000 feet before swooping to destroy tanks and artillery with laser-guided armour-piercing bombs, helped undermine Russia's overwhelming military superiority. Such is the drone's renown that it became the subject of a patriotic expletive-strewn hit song in Ukraine that mocked Russian troops, with the chorus "Bayraktar, Bayraktar". Advertisement · Scroll to continue Beyond satire, the Bayraktar drone has received attention from Russian President Vladimir Putin, and the defence ministry has mentioned it at least 45 times in public since the war began on Feb. 24. Baykar, founded in the 1980s by Bayraktar's father, Ozdemir Bayraktar, began to focus on unmanned aircraft in 2005 as Turkey sought to strengthen its local defence industry. The TB2 has been such a factor in the conflicts in Syria, Iraq, Libya and Nagorno-Karabakh as well as Ukraine that it now spearheads Turkey's global defence export push. Advertisement · Scroll to continue President Tayyip Erdogan says international demand is huge for the TB2 and the newer Akinci. Bayraktar, who is married to Erdogan's daughter, said Baykar can produce 200 TB2 drones a year. COMBAT AIRCRAFT AND TAXIS He said he was proud that the drones had been used in Nagorno-Karabakh, an ethnic Armenian enclave of Turkey's ally Azerbaijan where Baku's forces recaptured swathes of territory in 2020, and in Ukraine. "It is an illegal invasion so TB2 is helping the honourable people of Ukraine defend their country," he said. "The illegal occupation of Karabakh was like a heart wound since our youth. And as engineers developing the technology, it is an honour to have helped our brothers and sisters here to regain their land." Russia two weeks ago touted a new generation of laser weapons including a mobile system that Moscow said could blind orbiting satellites and destroy drones. read more But Bayraktar, who was born in Istanbul and studied at the University of Pennsylvania and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, said such weapons were ineffective against the TB2. "Their ranges are limited so if your sensory and munition range is longer, they are not going to be effective," he said. Baykar is working on a TB3, which has foldable wings and can take off or land on short-runway aircraft carriers, and an unmanned combat aircraft called MUIS or Kizilelma. "Inshallah, the first flight of Kizilelma will be next year, and TB3 either by the end of this year or the beginning of next year," Bayraktar said. "If you look at the longer time horizon, we are working on taxi drones – for that we need to develop more higher-level autonomy technology – which is AI basically – but it will revolutionise how people will be transported in cities." Russia's invasion has killed thousands of people, displaced millions, and raised fears of a direct confrontation between Russia and the United States. Putin says Washington was using Ukraine to threaten Russia through NATO enlargement, and that Moscow had to defend Russian-speakers from persecution. Ukraine and its Western allies reject these as baseless pretexts to invade a sovereign country.

### Won’t win the war

#### Tanks are more important than the TB2.

**Kallberg, 22** [Jan Kallberg is a Non-resident Senior Fellow with the Transatlantic Defense and Security program at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). He is a former Research Scientist with the Cyber Operations Research Element (CORE) with the Army Cyber Institute at West Point., 6-24-2022, accessed on 6-28-2022, CEPA, "Drones Will not Liberate Ukraine – but Tanks Will | CEPA", https://cepa.org/drones-will-not-liberate-ukraine-but-tanks-will/]/ISEE

Drones have changed the battlefield, providing additional situation awareness and the ability to strike targets, but their high success rates in the Ukraine war is a result of unique conditions unlikely to be replicated elsewhere. Unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAV) such as the Turkish Bayraktar TB2 have been successful in the Russian-Ukrainian war and helped prevent the Ukrainian defenses from crumbling under the initial Russian onslaught. The absence of short-range air defenses (SHORAD) in the initial months of the war gave drones free range. But four months later, man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS) like the US-manufactured Stinger, its Russian counterpart the SA-25, and other air defense systems, are bringing down drones. Air defenses can as easily target larger, slow-moving drones such as TB2 Bayraktar just like other slow moving aerial targets such as helicopters and transport aircraft. Drones have additional points of vulnerability. They require frequent radio contact with their operator, and most need close-to-constant communication. These comms channels were largely undisturbed in the early stages of the war, but that has not lasted — both sides are increasingly capable of executing electronic warfare attacks to degrade or deny the drone operators’ radio links. The connection between operator and drone is a single point of failure, which, if attacked with electronic warfare, can render the drones useless on the battlefield. The Russians are trying to imitate the Ukrainian drone success, but they too face the same issue since the Ukrainians are becoming more capable of electronic warfare. Naturally, there will be large patches of the battlefield where electronic warfare is absent (as with this filmed Ukrainian attack on a Russian oil refinery), but this will change over time and as the fight develops. The next step will be to locate the electronic warfare units, seeking their spectrum and electronic signatures, so that they can be located and struck. This ability to hit electronic warfare units is an additional argument for supplying Ukraine with advanced long-range rocket artillery, which can be used for this purpose. While there has perhaps been too much enthusiasm for the drone, there have been too many obituaries written for the tank. The success of drone warfare, starting with the war in Nagorno-Karabach in 2020 to today’s war in Ukraine may give the appearance that the military environment has radically changed and that armored vehicles are as much used as armored cavalry It is true that the Ukraine war has seen enormous losses of Russian tanks (almost 800 confirmed, plus the loss of another 3,500 armored vehicles, though the real number is believed to be far higher) against lighter Ukrainian forces using modern antitank missiles spying out the battlefield with small, cheap commercial drones. Ukrainian forces have used Javelin and the Next generation Light Anti-tank Weapon (NLAW) to destroy hundreds of tanks – most of these crews never had the chance even to react to what eventually killed them. Such destruction has triggered questions about the relevance of tanks on the modern battlefield. This is not new. Earlier challenges to tanks led to adaptation. The first time the tank was widely considered obsolete was the Yom-Kippur War of 1973, where Israeli tanks suffered heavily in the initial phases of the war. Israeli counterattacks after the Egyptians crossed into the Sinai peninsula were costly. The Soviets had provided the Egyptians with wire-guided AT-3 Sagger antitank missiles that could strike an armored target up to 3km (2 miles.) The AT-3 missile itself was no surprise for Israel or NATO. Designed and in Soviet service since the early 1960s, it was well-known to foreign observers, but it wasn’t until 1973 that it was employed at large scale in wartime. Armies adapted with increased integration between artillery, infantry, and armor. The second challenge to the tank’s relevance came in the late-1970s and early 1980s when NATO needed a response to the huge tank armies of the Warsaw Pact armies. The answer was the tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided (TOW) antitank missile, which was considered the ultimate tank killer and was widely distributed among NATO forces and on different platforms. Attack helicopters and the Fairchild Republic A-10 Warthog airplane were designed to strike Soviet armored echelons from above. Finally, in operation Desert Storm in 1991, the coalition to liberate Kuwait tested these antitank concepts’ lethality by unleashing them on Saddam Hussein’s forces. The Iraqis lost more than 3,000 tanks and 2,500 armored vehicles in a limited number of days. The absolute annihilation of the retreating Iraqi armored forces along Highway 80 is a grim reminder of the destructive consequences. In an effort to offset these threats, tanks were equipped with “active armor,” comprising plates of explosive material that degrade the impact from the kinetic impact of a shape charge explosive warhead. Many forces also introduced short-range air defense units to be integrated with their armored units to defend against ground attack aircraft and helicopters. The high losses of Russian tanks in Ukraine are partly related to the flawed design of the Soviet T-72 design where the crew sits surrounded by 22 rounds of ammunition to feed its automatic loader. The T-72 was designed for another battlefield; during the Cold War, it was intended to charge westward towards the Rhine and maximize forward firepower with little concern for crew survivability or protection from being hit from the side. Russian tactics have also been very strange. Deprived of covering infantry or access to artillery support, unsupported tanks became almost an invitation for Ukrainian troops to inflict maximum damage in the early stages of the war. The Russians have now adjusted their tactics. Ukrainians of course will face a similar problem in using the same flawed tank design, since it too has T-72s and other Russian models. Yet this actually presents the West with a major opportunity to change the picture on the battlefield. By supplying modern Western tanks offering much higher survivability for the crew and the tank against artillery, and enemy antitank weapons, it could supply Ukraine with the firepower needed to launch a counteroffensive. Russia is now deploying 50-year-old tanks into the fight from long-term storage, vehicles that only have combat value if used against unsupported infantry. It hopes to use these obsolete tanks to shore up its defensive positions around Kharkiv and Kherson against a Ukrainian counteroffensive. Any mothballed NATO tank from the 1990s or early 2000s will outperform this Russian armor, and would be devastating against it. Germany’s blocking of Spain’s desire to provide Leopard 2s is, therefore, a direct threat to the war’s pro-democratic strategic outcome. A counteroffensive needs protected firepower that can follow the maneuvering units. Tanks fill that role to support mechanized and light infantry in their forward movement. Post-1990, modern Western tanks have improved sensors and targeting systems, the later versions with laser range finders and thermal imaging. Electronic warfare cannot intercept a tank round; once it is on its way, the round will continue until it hits (anti-projectile systems, like Israel’s Trophy, are now appearing but remain rare.) Properly used, tanks remain a key system on the frontlines. Advanced armored vehicles (many of which now sit in Western storage facilities) have the power to turn the military tide. The pretense by democratic countries that supplying tanks to Ukraine is escalation, is simply fatuous. It is time to dust them down and send them eastwards.

## \*\*2AC – AT: Regulations CP\*\*

### Gendered Stereotypes

#### War programmers rely on gendered stereotypes posit the image of the child as the center of protection.

Roff, 16 [Heather M. Roff works for the global security imitative at Arizona State University, 1-11-2016, accessed on 6-21-2022, Taylor & Francis, "Gendering a Warbot", https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14616742.2015.1094246]/ISEE

Recently, concerns about weapons technology and “postmodern” war have come to the fore, and with them a crosspollination of particular feminist critiques between disciplines (Gray 1997; Wilcox 2009; Blanchard 2011; Manjikan 2013). I follow this trend here. As the vision of the humanoid robot fighter I am working from is one that is both physically humanoid and artificially intelligent (AI), we must look to how both the body and the artificial mind are constructed, and the gendered assumptions and practices involved in each. As to the physical body, I have already argued that designers of the DRC robots are explicitly and implicitly gendering their machines. A weapon becomes an artificially intelligent learning machine through its software architecture. There are two ways of considering how a gendered AI would arise: one where the programmers believe they are creating a genderless AI but it emerges gendered, and one where they purposefully create a gendered AI. Let us refer to the first as the Unintended Case and to the second as the Intended Case. The Unintended Case is one in which software designers, programmers or engineers (hereafter “programmers”) believe that they are creating AIs that are merely learning machines. Programmers are concerned with creating an AI that can fight effectively, reduce the monetary and manpower costs of war and extend the military’s and warfighter’s range. Gender has nothing to do with it. To reach these goals, programmers must find a way to make the warbot capable of: reasoning about its goals (and perhaps creating its own goals or subgoals); planning; learning from its experiences and thus formulating memories from which to draw; understanding communications through natural language (as opposed to symbolic language); perceiving the world around it through its sensors; and moving and manipulating objects, including but not limited to objects in the battlespace and its own weapons.14 They are attempting to make the warbot intelligent in order to be capable of “doing things that would require intelligence if done by men” (Minsky 1968, v). To reach this goal, programmers can draw from a variety of existing software programming techniques, such as creating symbolic systems, sub-symbolic systems or using statistical methods.15 Within each of these approaches there are also a variety of types, but for present purposes I will limit the discussion to the broader classes to show how gendered knowledge is transmitted into the system. A programmer working with a symbolic system will begin from a sufficiently large dataset (Adam 1998; Storrs Hall 2007). The general idea behind this approach is that an AI can simulate the problem-solving capacities of human minds, such as through searching for a solution by way of deduction (through logic), or reasoning by way of analogy or example when there is no general inference from logical predicates. The programmer provides a large dataset of “facts” and writes in a “fixed set of concepts” to the software architecture from which the AI can draw when confronted with a task or problem. For a warbot, this will of course mean a very complex set of factors and concepts, as it will require not merely information about its potential physical environment (e.g. hill, valley, road, building, stairs) but also more abstract concepts such as combatant and noncombatant. The base knowledge provided and the process by which it is accessed is key. What “facts” or pieces of information go into the database will affect the actions of the machine. If a data point or “piece” is not present, there is no opportunity for it to get there. An AI might be able to rearrange existing bits of information to combine them into new insights, but it will never generate something outside of its existing set of information structures. There is a gatekeeping function present in the construction of all symbolic representations. As Adam (1998) notes, “A formal system, in other words a computer system, is a political choice to maintain existing power structures” (108).16 To bring this back to gendered warbots, if programmers decide that “child” as an object or representation can never be paired with “combatant,” then the machine will not be capable of identifying child soldiers. Moreover, what constitutes “child” will have to be represented in some way. The process by which such “knowledge” is represented is thus crucial. As Adam (1998) explains, the problem about deciding “what sort of objects there are in the world” becomes another problem about knowledge about “facts,” and how a knowledge base about “facts” is recreated within a system of purely propositional knowledge” (39).17 The purely propositional knowledge approach is open to all of the feminist critiques from feminist epistemology, in particular, that there is some sort of Truth about which the facts must correspond and that knowledge derived from skills (such as a “knowing how”) is not real knowledge (Adam 1998, 114). Warfighting is as much an art as it is a science, and so prohibiting this kind of embodied or practical knowledge would appear to undermine the ability of a warbot to fight effectively. The most pressing problem for symbolic systems, however, comes from the direction of analogical reasoning. Faced with the certainty that warbots will encounter complex situations, which they cannot have prior knowledge of, they will require some mechanism to abstract the situation to one about which they do have some higher order representation. This is done by way of analogy. A program will have to break down the situation into smaller objects that it can represent, and then it will search its database for something that is analogous where the concepts are equivalent or appropriate. To find such an abstract analogy, the AI uses stereotypes (Adam 1998, 39).18 Programmers may not readily admit to this, claiming that “the important thing is to break the overall experience reflected in the memory into composable regularities” (Storrs Hall 2007, 221). “Composable regularities” might be that all hills are convex physical structures, but they might also be that “all women speak with a high voice” or “all combatants are men between 18 and 35.” Reasoning by analogy is a heuristic that humans employ when they are being cognitive misers and is not appropriate for complex situations requiring critical thought.

#### They cannot regulate their way out of gendered warbots

Roff, 16 [Heather M. Roff works for the global security imitative at Arizona State University, 1-11-2016, accessed on 6-21-2022, Taylor & Francis, "Gendering a Warbot", https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14616742.2015.1094246]/ISEE

Finally, one might claim my arguments here are overstated. Some might argue that the gender of the warbot is the least of our issues. I think, however, that this objection misses the larger problems of gendered humanoid warbots. First, there is no ostensibly good reason to create masculinist humanoid robot fighters. If their function were to instill terror and be effective fighters, a variety of biomimetic robots would be far superior in this task and easier from a design standpoint. One could imagine a giant robot spider easily maneuvering around debris, as well as being generally terrifying (Dvorsky 2014). Second, the gendering of a humanoid warbot is a conscious political decision to perpetuate practices of domination. We have ample work from feminist philosophy, feminist IR and feminist security studies that shows the wide-ranging impact of such a decision. Implications will extend to areas such as targeting decisions during war, to leadership positions in government offices or to ideals of a republican citizenry. We must be critical of the beginnings of this process, for if Sjoberg (2013) is correct, and gender is “not just in war and/or our theories of it, but is fundamental to them, legitimating of them, and inseparable from them” (13–14), then gendered humanoid warbots will impact how we fight, when we fight and who we fight.

### Logistical Nightmare

#### Regulating LAWS would be a *logistical nightmare* AND it does not solve case

Casper Lathram 22, is a law graduate, legal journalist and legal researcher based in London. He has worked as a Legal Associate in immigration and asylum law, where he assisted with the preparation of human rights appeals and judicial reviews, as well as drafting advice on a range of areas across immigration, asylum and nationality law., “[How The Rules Of Customary International Humanitarian Law Fail To Govern Autonomous Artificial Intelligence In Warfare](https://www.humanrightspulse.com/mastercontentblog/how-the-rules-of-customary-international-humanitarian-law-fail-to-govern-the-use-of-autonomous-artificial-intelligence-warfare)”, Human Rights Pulse 3-1-2022, https://www.humanrightspulse.com/mastercontentblog/how-the-rules-of-customary-international-humanitarian-law-fail-to-govern-the-use-of-autonomous-artificial-intelligence-warfare)/maze

**COMPLEXITY IN** REGULATING **AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS**

The first problem with regulating LAWS under existing legal frameworks lies in assessing proportionality. The **principle of proportionality**, codified in article 51(5)(b) of [Additional Protocol I](https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/WebART/470-750065) prohibits “any attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated”. Bombing an entire building in order to kill one sniper, for example, would be disproportionate, due to collateral damage outweighing any military advantage. Two problems are raised by LAWS in this context. Firstly**, clarity is required about the assessment at the “time of attack**”. It is unclear whether “time of attack” refers to the moment when the weapon is deployed, or the moment when the anticipated use of force occurs, which might be days or weeks later. This raises the second problem. If the time of attack is separate from the moment when the weapon is deployed, how can commanders “reasonably determine” collateral damage and military advantage that “may be expected” to result from an attack, given their limited insight into the eventual attack? The fact that LAWS, by definition, carry out attacks without human supervision threatens to undermine the key principles of IHL, which are founded on an assumption of human assessments of proportionality. The principle of proportionality is essential in determining whether an attack was unjustified and in delivering justice for victims of war. The **nature of LAWS’ deployment** essentially **muddies the water**s and makes this a **vague** and nebulous **exercise.** The second major problem with **regulating LAWS** is the **accountability gap**. Accountability facilitates the punishment of unlawful acts and aims to deter the commission of future ones. It gives victims the satisfaction that there has been retribution and promotes reconciliation. International humanitarian law and international human rights law mandate personal accountability for war crimes. **Given the importance of accountability for the delivery of justice in times of warfare, how are we to attribute blame to a machine**? These weapons have the potential to commit criminal acts for which **no one would be responsible**. Any attempt to accord responsibility to human operatives or manufacturers is thwarted by their distance from the criminal act itself. Furthermore, even if the law was amended to encompass such machines, a judgment would **not fulfil the purposes of punishment for a victim of a war crime**. A machine cannot be deterred nor be “punished” in any meaningful sense.

### Perm

Note: This assumes the mechanism of the plan is to maintain meaningful human control.

#### Perm do the counterplan. Including meaningful human control is a way to mitigate the autonomy of the weapon.

Sauer, 21 [Frank Sauer is a Senior Research Fellow at Bundeswehr University in Munich, March 2021, accessed on 6-30-2022, International Review of the Red Cross, "Stepping back from the brink: Why multilateral regulation of autonomy in weapons systems is difficult, yet imperative and feasible", https://international-review.icrc.org/articles/stepping-back-from-brink-regulation-of-autonomous-weapons-systems-913]/ISEE

It should be noted up front that the term LAWS itself is problematic. After all, neither “lethality” nor “autonomy” are decisive factors in the debate. The military application of non-lethal force raises concerns as well (take the prohibition against blinding lasers as just one example), and the term “autonomy”, philosophically speaking, inappropriately anthropomorphizes machines that have limited agency and are incapable of reasoning and reflecting, as well as being unable to take on responsibility. Nonetheless, at this point the term LAWS is widely used as a shorthand, so the article will stick to this common vocabulary. Also, the article uses the term “regulation” – rather than, for instance, “ban” – because what potential new, binding international law on this issue is commonly understood to eventually codify is not a prohibition of a category of weapons. Instead, it is a positive obligation to retain meaningful human control over the use of military force. And while one might argue that ensuring meaningful human control and prohibiting autonomous weapons (AKA “killer robots”) are two sides of the same coin, these two sides nevertheless represent different ways of approaching the issue, as I will argue further below. Lastly, I use the term “technology diffusion” rather than “proliferation” because the latter suggests a distribution from one or only a few points of departure (as in the case of nuclear proliferation) whereas the former suggests an omnidirectional spread from multiple sources, a more fitting picture in this case of widely (and oftentimes even commercially) available hardware and software.

### Enforcement

#### Only a ban can solve---norms and robust enforcement prove.

**Freedberg, 19** [Sydney J. Freedberg Jr. is the deputy editor for Breaking Defense, 3-11-2019, accessed on 6-30-2022, Breaking Defense, "Should We Ban 'Killer Robots'? Can We? - Breaking Defense", https://breakingdefense.com/2019/03/should-we-ban-killer-robots-can-we/]/ISEE

UPDATED with Russell rebuttal WASHINGTON: We now live in a world where a Campaign To Stop Killer Robots is a deadly serious thing, officially endorsed by 26 national governments. (28, if you count Palestine and the Vatican). China is on that list, albeit with a huge asterisk: It wants to ban only the use of “lethal autonomous weapons systems,” not research, development and production. (After all, Beijing has an enormously ambitious plan to dominate AI by 2030.) The US is not on the list of countries who want to ban killer robots. Nor is Russia. Nor is the UK, nor are any of our leading allies. Should we be? Robert Work There’s a strong argument that the US has already sworn off “killer robots.” Civilian officials and military leaders alike have said for years the US will always keep a “human in the loop” for any use of lethal force. There is a waiver provision in Pentagon policy, but no one’s ever used it. Plus arms control is a hard sell in Washington these days. The US has finally abandoned the landmark INF Treaty after years of futilely complaining about well documented Russian violations. “The Department of Defense has no intention…. to go after what are now called ‘lethal autonomous weapons systems,'” says Bob Work, who as deputy secretary of defense under Obama did more than any other person to push the Pentagon to embrace AI. “What commander would want that?” But there’s a contradiction here, argues Stuart Russell, a Berkeley AI scientist and activist. “At present, the US is opposed to discussions on a Lethal Autonomous Weapons System treaty, while officially claiming not to be developing LAWS,” Russell told me. “This amounts to military suicide,” he argued: If you won’t build a new weapon yourself, why leave potential adversaries free to pursue it? The cynical answer, of course is that a ban would be so difficult to enforce it would only create a sense of false security. But might it have real benefits? XQ-58A Valkyrie “loyal wingman” drone, built by Kratos for Air Force Research Lab Benefits of a Ban? Russell emphasizes he doesn’t oppose all military uses of artificial intelligence, only AI that can kill without a human authorizing each attack. And if the US did agree to a ban on lethal artificial intelligence, it would make it much easier for computer scientists and engineers to work with their Pentagon on those other kinds of military AI, Russell argued, just as the Biological Weapons Convention let biologists develop defenses against germ warfare without fear their work would be perverted for offense. (In the US, that is. The Soviet Union massively violated the BWC, which had no inspection mechanism: just ask around about Bio Preparat and Ken Alibek). Stuart Russell “Having a ban in place would make it much easier to develop ATLAS-like technologies that can protect soldiers’ lives,” Russell said, citing an Army program to use AI to assist in aiming and targeting (but not firing) weapons. “Quite possibly there would have been much less pushback against Project Maven at Google, because researchers would have some assurance that the technology would not be used in autonomous weapons. There would be a big steel gate closing off the slippery slope.” Certainly, US civilian and military leaders insist, over and over, they want a “human in the loop” at all times for reasons both ethical and tactical. “The last thing I want is you to go away from this thinking this is all about technology,” Work said during a speech on his AI push back in 2015. “The number one advantage we have is the people in uniform, in our civilian work force, in our defense industrial base, and the contractors who support us.” If Russia or China decide to take their people out of the loop and rely on automation alone, Work argued, then we can beat them with our combination of humans plus machines — creativity and calculation, intuition and precision. Then there’s the ethical aspect — which also ties to the military’s deep cultural need to control the chaos of battle as much as possible. “The commander who uses a lethal autonomous weapons system that chooses its own target [is] delegating for his culpability for a law-of-war violation to a free-willed machine,” Work said at CNAS. “I’ve never talked to any commander in the West who’s said, ‘hey, that’s a real good idea.’” So if the US military doesn’t really want lethal AI, should we ban it? Well, one former defense official told me, that depends on what kind of AI you mean. What Work and other national security insiders are objecting to is an AI that can choose and revise its own objectives — in rough terms, what scientists mean when they talk about artificial general intelligence. US military leaders are not objecting to so-called narrow AI that can only perform certain pre-defined tasks: shoot down incoming missiles (which the Navy’s Aegis, not even an AI, can do already), for example, or hear a rifle fire, instantly calculate a return trajectory, and kill the sniper before he gets off a second shot. A drone’s eye view of the target in the anti-lethal AI video “Slaughterbots” Even a swarm of drones that hunt and kill specific individuals — one of Russell’s nightmare scenarios — would count as narrow AI, at least as long as human beings drew up the target list. (An AI that decides for itself who needs to die, perhaps based on a big-data analysis of terror suspects, might still not qualify as general AI, but it would give most generals a heart attack). And a drone that can recognize a “high value target” on sight, then kill him with three grams of explosives to the face, may be less likely to kill civilians by accident than human beings watching a long-distance video feed, then launching a Hellfire with a 20-pound warhead. UPDATE “This strategy of saying it’s not really autonomous unless it’s conscious/superhuman/mysterious is just a deflection tactic,” Russell told me after the original version of this article appeared. A “narrow” AI, he argued, is quite capable of carrying out genocidal orders — like killing every light/dark-skinned adult male — or making catastrophic errors — like mistaking children for adults — and repeating them with mindless efficiency long after a human would have starting asking questions. “I don’t think we should declare we will never use a lethal artificial narrow intelligence weapon, designed for specific battlefield missions,” the former defense official said. As for general AI, “we should debate whether or not we should pursue such a weapon, and if the answer is no, we should state it as policy.” What about an international treaty banning lethal AI, which would have the force of law? “Such a treaty would be very difficult to monitor and enforce,” the official said. “That doesn’t mean an international treaty should be ruled out.” Inspectors from the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), a potential model for the monitoring of military AI. The Enforcement Problem “Autonomous weapons have all of the features that make arms control hard,” said Paul Scharre, a former Army Ranger, now at CNAS, who worked on the current Pentagon policy. International inspectors can’t tell by looking at an unmanned tank, plane, or warship whether it’s programmed to ask a human for permission before opening fire. Even if they get to see the actual code — a security breach few countries would allow — “there’s nothing to stop you from upgrading the software as soon as the inspectors leave,” he told me. Paul Scharre “Having said that,” Scharre continued, “I think that the kind of arms control that Stuart Russell is advocating for is actually more feasible.” If someone’s building vast swarms of lethal mini-drones, you don’t have to see the code to know they have to be fully autonomous: There’s no practical way, Scharre told me, for humans to review and approve “a million targets.” Conversely, such mini-drones are only truly threatening in vast numbers. “A country or an individual… might be able to build a few hundred of these,” Scharre said, “but if you’re going to build millions of them, there’s no way to hide that.” So how would you find them? The best model is probably the Chemical Weapons Convention, which, unlike many other treaties — the Biological Weapons Convention, the landmine ban, and so on — has a robust enforcement mechanism. The scope of the problem is similar. Lethal chemicals like chlorine and phosgene are widely used in legitimate industry, so you can’t ban them outright any more than mini-drones; they’re relatively easy to turn into weapons, again like drones; and yet only rogue states like Syria and Iraq have used them since the end of World War I. Much of the reason militaries abandoned poison gas is that a weapon that blows with the wind is hard to control — yet another similarity with AI, since even “narrow” machine-learning algorithms modify themselves in ways beyond human understanding. But there is also a robust monitoring regime, run by the Organisation to Prevent Chemical Weapons, which has about 250 inspectors who can rapidly respond to reported violations. Such “challenge inspections” are a crucial tool, said Irakli Beridze, a Georgian-born veteran of both OPCW and the UNICRI chem, bio, radiological, & nuclear program — with service in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Syria — who now runs the Centre for AI & Robotics at UNICRI, the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute. (Beridze emphasized he was only expressing his personal opinion as an expert, not as a UN official). Mini-drone production would be easier to hide than chemical plants — for one thing, it doesn’t stink like a lot of toxic chemicals — but investigative techniques have advanced since the CWC entered into force in 1997. It might even be possible, Beridze said, to set an AI to catch an AI: use artificial intelligence to crunch big data — social media or parts orders, for example — and correlate subtle clues no human inspector could catch. Irakli Beridze Robust inspections, however, are only one part of the solution, he told me. Countries need not only to sign the treaty but use their own intelligence agencies and domestic law enforcement to watch for violations. And, after initial reluctance in the private sector, “buy-in and participation of the chemical industry… was absolutely essential,” he said. “Otherwise this treaty would not work.” Once compliance became a norm in the chemical industry, in large part because of the moral stigma that attached to chemical weapons, it became much harder to produce poison gas in militarily significant amounts. Given widespread anxiety in the tech community about lethal AI, it should be possible to reach a similar consensus among drone manufacturers — eventually. Getting private industry, law enforcement, and national governments on board, even simply making them aware of the problem, would take years. “We don’t have too much time,” Beridze warned. In a few years, “we will have a widespread technology where criminals can use small drones [for] mass terrorist attacks, assassinations, contract killing, you name it.” Emerging threats and complex challenges to situational awareness require a next generation of sensor systems. While it’s comforting to imagine that US hardware will only be directed at terrorists and Iranian threats, “Bahrain’s history of suppressing internal dissent with external weaponry suggests that these choppers may end up serving a police function during times of crisis, as well.”

## \*\*2AC – AT: NC3 PIC\*\*

### War/Conflict

#### Negative turns are nonsense and should be assigned zero risk- even the head of the DOD AI program says no to autonomous nuclear weapons

Klare, PhD, 20

(Michael T., SecurityStudies@hampshireEmeritus, <https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2020-04/features/skynet-revisited-dangerous-allure-nuclear-command-automation>, April)

The quest to further automate key elements of the U.S. NC3 architecture is being driven largely by an altered perception of the global threat environment. Although the existing framework was always intended to provide decisionmakers with prompt warning of enemy nuclear attack and to operate even under conditions of nuclear war, the operational challenges faced by that system have grown more severe in recent years. Most notably, the decision-making system is threatened by the ever-increasing destructive capacity of conventional weapons, the growing sophistication of cyberattacks, and, as a result of those two, the growing speed of combat. The existing NC3 architecture was designed in the previous century to detect enemy ICBM and bomber launches and provide decision-makers with enough time, as much as 30 minutes in the case of ICBM attacks, to assess the accuracy of launch warnings and still ponder appropriate responses. These systems did not always work as intended—the history of the Cold War is replete with false warnings of enemy attacks—but the cushion of time prevented a major catastrophe.2 The reasonably clear distinction between conventional and nuclear weapons, moreover, enabled military analysts to avoid confusing non-nuclear assaults with possibly nuclear ones. With the introduction of increasingly capable conventional weapons, however, the distinction between nuclear and non-nuclear weapons is being blurred. Many of the new conventionally armed (but possibly nuclear-capable) ballistic missiles now being developed by the major powers are capable of hypersonic speed (more than five times the speed of sound) and of flying more than 500 kilometers (the limit imposed by the now-defunct Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty) and are intended for attacks on high-value enemy targets, such as air defense radars and command-and-control facilities. With flight durations of as little as five minutes, defensive NC3 systems have precious little time to determine whether incoming missiles are armed with nuclear or conventional missiles and to select an appropriate response, possibly including the early use of nuclear weapons.3 Cybercombat occurs at an even faster speed, potentially depriving nuclear commanders of critical information and communication links in a time of crisis and thereby precipitating inadvertent escalation.4 In the highly contested environment envisioned by the 2018 NPR report, decision-makers may be faced with an overload of inconclusive information and have mere minutes in which to grasp the essential reality and decide on humanity’s fate. Under these circumstances, some analysts argue, increased NC3 automation will prove essential. They claim that increased reliance on AI can help with two of the existing system’s most acute challenges: information overload and time compression. With ever more sensors, (satellite monitors, ground radars, and surveillance aircraft) feeding intelligence into battle management systems, commanders are being inundated with information on enemy actions, preventing prompt and considered decision-making. At the same time, the use of more hypersonic missiles and advanced cyberweaponry has compressed the time in which such decisions must be made. AI could help overcome these challenges by sifting through the incoming data at lightning speed and highlighting the most important results and by distinguishing false warnings of nuclear attack from genuine ones.5 Automation could be even more useful, advocates claim, in helping commanders, up to and including the president, decide on nuclear and non-nuclear responses to confirmed indications of an enemy attack. With little time to act, human decision-makers could receive a menu of possible options devised by algorithms. “As the complexity of AI systems matures,” the Congressional Research Service noted in 2019, “AI algorithms may also be capable of providing commanders with a menu of viable courses of action based on real-time analysis of the battle-space, in turn enabling faster adaptation to complex events.”6 Some analysts have gone even further, suggesting that in conditions of extreme time compression, the machines could be empowered to select the optimal response and initiate the attack themselves. “Attack-time compression has placed America’s senior leadership in a situation where the existing NC3 system may not act rapidly enough,” Adam Lowther and Curtis McGiffin wrote in a commentary at War on the Rocks, a security-oriented website. “Thus, it may be necessary to develop a system based on [AI], with predetermined response decisions, that detects, decides, and directs strategic forces with such speed that the attack-time compression challenge does not place the United States in an impossible position.”7 That commentary provoked widespread alarm about the possible loss of human control over decisions of nuclear use. Even some military officials expressed concern over such notions. “You will find no stronger proponent of integration of AI capabilities writ large into the Department of Defense,” said Lieutenant General Jack Shanahan, director of the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC), at a September 2019 conference at Georgetown University, “but there is one area where I pause, and it has to do with nuclear command and control.” Referring to the article’s assertion that an automated U.S. nuclear launch ability is needed, he said, “I read that. And my immediate answer is, ‘No. We do not.’”8 Shanahan indicated that his organization was moving to integrate AI technologies into a wide array of non-nuclear capabilities, including command-and-control functions. Indeed, JAIC and other military components are moving swiftly to develop automated command-and-control systems and to ready them for use by regular combat forces. Initially, these systems will be employed by conventional forces, but the Pentagon fully intends to merge them over time with their nuclear counterparts.

**Maintaining human control over nuclear decisions is crucial to peace**

**Klare, PhD, 20**

(Michael T., SecurityStudies@hampshireEmeritus, <https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2020-04/features/skynet-revisited-dangerous-allure-nuclear-command-automation>, April)

Given these multiple risks, U.S. policymakers and their Chinese and Russian counterparts should be **very leery of accelerating NC3 automation**. Indeed, Shanahan acknowledged as much, saying nuclear command and control “is the **ultimate human decision** that needs to be made…. We have to be very careful,” especially given “the immaturity of technology today.” **Exercising prudence** in applying AI to nuclear command and control is the responsibility, first and foremost, of national leaders of the countries involved. In the United States, military officials have pledged to expose all new AI applications to rigorous testing, but Congress needs to play a more active role in overseeing these endeavors and questioning the merits of proposed innovations. At the same time, all three nuclear powers would benefit from mutual consultations over the perils inherent in increased NC3 automation and what technical steps might be taken to reduce the risk of inadvertent or accidental war. This could occur as an independent venture or in the context of the irregular strategic stability talks held by senior U.S. and Russian representatives. There is no more fateful decision a leader can make than to order the use of nuclear weapons. Ideally, such a decision will never have to be made. But so long as nuclear weapons exist, **humans, not machines, must exercise ultimate control over their use**.

#### NC3s can be exploited for information warfare that undermines societal and political stability.

Center for Strategic & International Studies (**CSIS**), 7-9-20**20**, "NC3: Challenges Facing the Future System," No Publication, https://www.csis.org/analysis/nc3-challenges-facing-future-system

Public Communication and Information Warfare

The architecture, procedures, and policies on which the current U.S. NC3 system depends were developed to optimize security, speed, and secrecy, not public scrutiny and confidence. That confidence was assumed as the citizenry and their congressional representatives largely deferred to presidential authority in this domain and entrusted the military with wide-ranging responsibilities of execution and communication. Cloaked in secrecy, the public has little authoritative, fact-based information on many essential C2 questions. The participants discussed and raised major concerns about the risks that disinformation could pose before and during a crisis in ways that could seriously tax the legitimacy of, and confidence in, crisis decisionmaking generally and the NC3 system in particular.

Today, the NC3 system is likely a target for information warfare and disinformation as a means of disrupting presidential decisionmaking and exploiting societal divides to undermine public confidence in the government. Disinformation campaigns could be deployed to distract decisionmakers, slowing their ability to respond in a crisis and giving adversaries an advantage. Furthermore, by promoting false narratives or simply flooding the public with conflicting facts, potential adversaries could break confidence in U.S. institutions and decisionmakers, sow distrust and confusion, and coerce desirable outcomes at lower levels of conflict as publics latch on to the maliciously spread information.

Today, the NC3 system is likely a target for information warfare and disinformation as a means of disrupting presidential decisionmaking and exploiting societal divides to undermine public confidence in the government. While secrecy and opacity can be advantageous in countering some threats to the NC3 system, they simultaneously increase the vulnerability of NC3 to disinformation tactics, which attack public confidence in the system rather than attacking the system itself. Weaponized social media, targeted adversary message amplification through conspiracy theorists and automated bots, and the strategic use of deepfakes are just a few examples of how the new age of information warfare could threaten the confidence in and legitimacy of NC3 systems. The future NC3 system must better balance trade-offs in complexity, effectiveness, and resiliency as well as security and transparency to address the disinformation threat.

#### AI control of nuclear weapons makes escalation more likely by removing *humanity* from decisions

Rodriguez, PhD, 19

(Jonathan founded Vergence Labs in 2011, which developed computerized smartglasses. Vergence was acquired by Snap Inc., where he is now manager of new device prototyping. https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-04/features/keep-human-control-over-new-weapons)

Michael T. Klare’s article “Autonomous Weapons Systems and the Laws of War” (ACT, March 2019) highlights important issues, but omits enormous strategic risks inhearent to the use of artificial intelligence (AI) in a role of command. In a war between major powers, both sides’ AI systems would be able to outperform humans in the application of game theory, similar to state-of-the-art poker-playing AI, which can now readily defeat the top human players. Nation-states would be tempted to endow these genius-level autonomous killing systems with the authority to escalate, bringing the risk of bad luck causing misunderstandings that lead to uncontrolled escalation. Exacerbating the risk of near-instant autonomous escalation is the risk of an AI system deciding that it, unlike a human, may have nothing to lose. A human commander might be a father or mother who might choose to put the preservation of the human race above nationalistic warmongering. Recall how Soviet air defense officer Stanislav Petrov (a father of two) saved the world in 1983 by choosing to disbelieve a computerized system that claimed a U.S. nuclear first strike was in progress. His decision may have included a desire to put mercy over patriotism and not to participate in the annihilation of the human race. Unfortunately, an AI system would have no such qualms. An AI system might or might not be trained with a self-preservation instinct. If not, it would not care if it is destroyed, and it could take needless risks, carelessly bluffing and escalating, seeking to make the adversary back down through suicidal brinksmanship. One might think, therefore, that it is important to endow battlefield AI systems with a self-preservation instinct, but the consequences of doing so could be even worse. Once a weaponized AI system is given a self-preservation instinct, it may become impossible to shut down, as it would kill anyone who tried to shut it off, including its own country’s military or government leaders. These killings might play out in several ways. On a small scale, the system could limit its “self-defense” killings by targeting only the officials trying to disable the AI system. Worse, the AI system could try to preserve itself by threatening mutually assured destruction: if it ever suspected, even incorrectly, that its shutdown was imminent, the AI system could retaliate with the launch of nuclear weapons. A dying AI system, still energized for a few milliseconds by the last electrical charge remaining in its internal capacitors, could even nuke not just its own nation but the entire surface of Earth.

#### Even suspected development of nuclear AI causes war

Boulanin, PhD, 18

(Vincent, Senior Researcher at SIPRI, <https://cpr.unu.edu/ai-global-governance-ai-and-nuclear-weapons-promise-and-perils-of-ai-for-nuclear-stability.html>, 12-7)

On the other, the adoption – or even suspected adoption – of new AI capabilities by one or several nuclear-armed states could incentivize other states (be they nuclear-armed or not) to respond with destabilizing measures that could increase the likelihood of a nuclear conflict. This could include entering into an arms race, doubling down on the modernization of nuclear arsenals, renouncing a ‘no first use’ policy, increasing alert statuses, or further automating nuclear launch policies. Historical events like the 1983 Petrov incident (where the Soviet early warning systems wrongly detected a US nuclear attack) have also shown that AI technology could be the cause of an accidental or inadvertent escalation into a nuclear conflict.

### Machine Learning

#### NC3s are dangerous and vulnerable because they are trained through machine learning

Vincent **Boulanin**, May 20**19**, "," No Publication, https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2019-05/sipri1905-ai-strategic-stability-nuclear-risk.pdf

It is already known that a broad range of models trained through machine learning are susceptible to a new kind of vulnerability, termed ‘adversarial examples’: an adversary can craft a malicious input that reliably causes a trained model to produce the wrong behaviour (e.g. misclassify an object in an image or take an inappropriate action in the environment).7 While this vulnerability has been known and researched heavily for several years, no robust solution has yet been found. Nonetheless, given the promise of new capabilities that machine learning and automation offer, the pressure to deploy potentially insecure systems may present itself.8 When considering threats that might be introduced from increased autonomy and use of machine learning, it is important to consider the entire sprawling range of systems and functions that make up and support NC4ISR. Specific attention has been given to delivery systems and to nuclear command, control and communications (NC3).9 The awareness of potential threats to ‘core’ computer systems in NC3 has led to significantly improved security for such systems, and some reluctance to introduce autonomy and machine learning into them.10 However, more peripheral systems can also pose a threat, especially as they are more likely sites for the introduction of autonomy and machine learning. These include, for example, systems onboard satellites that relay communications and images or the simulators used to plan and test strategies. They can also extend as far as the vast computer systems and networks that provide news information to the public and to civilian officials, which may affect tactical or strategic decision-making. Admittedly, it is not always easy to chart a scenario that begins with a compromise of a particular peripheral system and ends with the unauthorized launch of a nuclear weapon.11 It is similarly difficult to describe a scenario whereby an adversary would intervene in the authorized launch of a nuclear weapon. However, these systems are present for the well-funded and patient adversary to explore and exploit. In particular, there is increasing concern about attacks that initially target command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems that are ‘entangled’—that is, used for both nuclear and conventional weapons—such as satellites, intelligence gathering and logistics.12 Entangled systems present two challenges here: first, they are often not considered ‘nuclear’ systems, so are subject to a lower level of security scrutiny than nuclear systems. Second, attacks on such systems may be considered by an adversary as unlikely to trigger a nuclear escalation, leading to a miscalculation—the adversary may not even know that the system has an NC4ISR purpose and may therefore consider the attack to be conventional while the targeted state may perceive the attack as an attack on its nuclear capabilities.

## \*\*2AC – AT: Ukraine PIC\*\*

### Not Being Used

#### No evidence that they are being used in Ukraine

Gregory C. Allen 22, , AI Governance Project and Senior Fellow, Strategic Technologies Program, “Russia Probably Has Not Used AI-Enabled Weapons in Ukraine, but That Could Change”, Center for Strategic and International Studies., 5-26-2022, https://www.csis.org/analysis/russia-probably-has-not-used-ai-enabled-weapons-ukraine-could-change)/maze

The WIRED story understandably attracted a lot of attention, but those who only read the sensational headline missed the article’s critical caveat: “It is **unclear if the drone may have been operated in** this [an AI-enabled autonomous] way in **Ukraine.”** [Other](https://www.army-technology.com/projects/zala-kyb-strike-drone-russia/) outlets re-reported the WIRED story, but irresponsibly did so without the caveat. WIRED’s assessment that Kalashnikov claims the KUB-BLA “boasts the ability to identify targets using artificial intelligence” is based on two main pieces of evidence: a Kalashnikov [press release](https://kalashnikov.media/article/technology/zala-aero-predstavila-novuyu-tekhnologiyu-na-osnove-iskusstvennogo-intellekta) about ZALA Aero’s “Artificial Intelligence Visual Identification (AIVI)” capabilities for its unmanned aircraft, and the original Kalashnikov press release [announcing](https://kalashnikovgroup.ru/media/bespilotnye-letatelnye-apparaty/kontsern-kalashnikov-razrabotal-vysokotochnyy-udarnyy-bespilotnyy-kompleks-kub-bla) the KUB-BLA in 2019. However, these two pieces of evidence are less than they seem. The Russian-language AIVI press release never mentions the KUB-BLA or military applications. Instead, it describes a ZALA Aero machine-learning AI drone product line that is marketed to industrial and agricultural sectors. Incorporating modern machine-learning AI into military applications is **significantly more difficult** than in industrial or agricultural applications. Modern machine-learning AI using deep neural networks offers the opportunity for incredible gains in performance, but that performance depends on **having lots of training data during development.** Moreover, that training data needs to closely resemble operational conditions. In general, it is much easier to get such training data from commercial customers than from an enemy military, especially if friendly weapons systems and sensors do not often come within range of enemy ones. The most **mature military AI applications are** ones like **satellite** reconnaissance: even in peacetime, satellites get to take a lot of pictures of Russian and Chinese military forces, and those pictures can be digitally labeled by human experts to turn them into training data. Training data is what machine learning AI systems learn from. The combination of a learning algorithm and training data is how AI systems learn to recognize what is in the image. But training data is generally application-specific. Satellite image recognition training data only helps build satellite image recognition AI. One cannot magically use labeled satellite image data to train an AI for a robotic drone’s targeting computer (at least not with today’s technology).

# \*\*AT: Disadvantages\*\*

## \*\*2AC – K of Disads Toolbox\*\*

### War – Positive Peace

#### Sexual violence happens on a continuum – focus on systemic impacts is key since patriarchal warmaking causes endless violence.

Sheperd 09

[Laura J. Dept of Political Science and International Studies, U of Birmingham (UK), “Gender, Violence and Global Politics: Contemporary Debates in Feminist Security Studies,” Political Studies Review, V7 I2, Apr]

According to conventional accounts of international relations (IR), scholars focus on war (predominantly as a means to providing the sovereign state with security) and the existence of war's corollary is a foundational assumption that goes largely unquestioned. Peace must exist, for international relations are not characterised by perpetual conflict. However, peace is implicitly defined, in dichotomous terms, by the absence of violent conflict, as 'not-war'. Of more analytical interest is conflict, which is always a possibility and which, moreover, occurs between states. International relations as a discipline, narrowly conceived, is largely unconcerned with activities that occur within the state. Minimally, feminist and other critical approaches to IR seek to correct such disciplinary myopia. While classical realism theorises the political actor –Hans Morgenthau's 'political man' (1973, pp. 15–6) – in order to construct the state as actor, the now dominant neo-realism abstracts the human subject from its disciplinary musings, leading to the infamous 'black box' model of the state. Early feminist scholarship challenged this assumption as well, arguing that individuals, as human subjects in all their messy complexity, are an integral part of international relations (see Shepherd, 2007, pp. 240–1). Attention to the human subject in I/international R/relations – or, as Christine Sylvester phrases it, 'relations international', to emphasise the embedded nature of all kinds of relations in the international sphere, including power relations and gender relations (Sylvester, 1994, p. 6; see also Enloe, 1996) – allows critical scholars to look beyond the disciplinary obsession with war. Further, it allows us to investigate one of the simplest insights of feminist IR, which is also one of the most devastating: the war/peace dichotomy is gendered, misleading and potentially pathological. In this essay, I address each of these concerns in turn, developing a critique of the war/peace dichotomy that is foundational to conventional approaches to IR through a review of three recent publications in the field of feminist security studies. These texts are Cynthia Enloe's (2007) Globalization and Militarism, David Roberts' (2008) Human Insecurity, and Mothers, Monsters, Whores: Women's Violence in Global Politics by Laura Sjoberg and Caron Gentry (2008). Drawing on the insights of these books, I ask first how violence is understood in global politics, with specific reference to the gendered disciplinary blindnesses that frequently characterise mainstream approaches. Second, I demonstrate how a focus on war and peace can neglect to take into account the politics of everyday violence: the violences of the in-between times that international politics recognises neither as 'war' nor 'peace' and the violences inherent to times of peace that are overlooked in the study of war. Finally, I argue that feminist security studies offers an important corrective to the foundational assumptions of IR, which themselves can perpetuate the very instances of violence that they seek to redress. If we accept the core insights of feminist security studies – the centrality of the human subject, the importance of particular configurations of masculinity and femininity, and the gendered conceptual framework that underpins the discipline of IR – we are encouraged to envisage a rather different politics of the global. From Boudica to Bhopal As Sjoberg and Gentry recount (2008, pp. 38–9), Boudica was an Iceni queen who led an uprising against the Roman forces occupying the British Isles circa 61 AD. Prior to launching the attack, Boudica's refusal to allow a Roman general to claim ownership of her land resulted in the rape of her two daughters as punishment. However, 'many inherited tales about Boudica do not emphasise her personal or political motivations, but the savage and unwomanly brutality of her actions' (Sjoberg and Gentry, 2008, p. 39). Almost two thousand years later and half a planet away, a toxic gas leak in 1984 at a Union Carbide plant in Bhopal, India caused the immediate deaths of approximately 3,000 people and left tens of thousands suffering the after-effects for decades (Roberts, 2008, p. 10). At first reading, little links these two accounts of quite different forms of violence. The first is an instance of violent resistance against imperial oppression, and Boudica has been vilified, her efforts delegitimised, in much the same way as many actors in 'small wars' tend to be in global politics today (see Barkawi, 2004). The second is perhaps more usefully seen as the result of structural violence, following Johan Galtung's explanation of the same, as 'violence where there is no such actor' (cited in Roberts, 2008, p. 18). However, by asking questions about Boudica and Bhopal that are born of a 'feminist curiosity' (Enloe, 2007, p. 1, p. 11), these texts demonstrate connections beyond the simplistic equation that is applicable to both: actor/structure plus violence equals death. In Human Insecurity, Roberts poses the question, 'What is violence?' (2008, p. 17). This is a question rarely asked in international relations. Violence is war: large-scale, state-dominated, much studied, war. However, the three texts under review here all offer more nuanced theories of violence that focus analytical attention on complex constructions of agency (institutional and international), structure, and the global context that is product and productive of such violence. Through an intricate and beautifully accessible analysis of modernity –'that pot of gold at the end of the global rainbow' (Enloe, 2007, p. 64) – Enloe encourages her readers to seek the connections between globalisation and militarisation, arguing that at the heart of this nexus lie important questions about violence and security. Roberts notes a broad dissatisfaction with the concept of 'human security' (2008, pp. 14–7), offering instead his investigative lens of 'human insecurity', defined as 'avoidable civilian deaths, occurring globally, caused by social, political and economic institutions and structures, built and operated by humans and which could feasibly be changed' (p. 28). Placing the human at the centre of concerns about security immediately challenges a conventional state-based approach to security, as Enloe explains. In a convincing account of the hard-fought expansion of the concept of security, mapped on to strategic and organisational gains made by various feminist organisations, Enloe reminds us that if we take seriously the lives of women – their understandings of security – as well as on-the-ground workings of masculinity and femininity, we will be able to produce more meaningful and more reliable analyses of 'security'– personal, national and global (Enloe, 2007, p. 47). This latter quote typifies an approach for which Enloe has become somewhat famous. In the early 1980s, Enloe began asking the questions for which she is rightly acknowledged as a key figure in feminist security studies, including Does Khaki Become You? (Enloe, 1983) and 'where are the women?' (Enloe, 2000; see also Enloe, 2004). Inspired by her own curiosity about the roles played by women and the functions performed by gender in the militarisation of civilian life, Enloe has explored prostitution, marriage, welfare and war making with an eye to the representation (both political and symbolic) of women. In Globalization and Militarism she offers detailed vignettes that illuminate just how interwoven violence is with the quest for (various types of) security, and demands that nothing is left unquestioned in a critical analysis of these concepts. Even baby socks (embossed with tiny fighter planes, a gift to the parent of a small boy) have something to tell us about gender, militarism and the casual representations of violence and war that society accepts (Enloe, 2007, pp. 143–4). Following a similar logic, although he initially defines human insecurity as avoidable civilian deaths, Roberts focuses on 'preventable female deaths ... and avoidable deaths in children under five' (2008, p. 31). While this conflation of 'civilian' with 'women and children' is rather problematic (see Carpenter, 2006), in asking not only, where are the women? but also, why are they dying in such disproportionate numbers? Roberts enhances his critique of 'most security studies ... [that] largely [miss] the scale of avoidable human misery and avoidable human death' (2008, p. 4). As mentioned above, Roberts uses Galtung's concept of structural violence to draw attention to the manifest ways in which an increasingly interconnected global system relies on gender and violence (and gendered violence) for its perpetuation: 'The process of globalization, to which few are ideologically or otherwise opposed, is an essential conveyor and articulator of the masculinity that underpins andrarchy' (Roberts, 2008, p. 157). Whereas Enloe offers a persuasive and accessible account of patriarchy, a concept familiar to feminist and non-feminist scholars alike (Enloe, 2007, pp. 66–8), Roberts suggests 'andrarchy' as an alternative, which he defines as 'the gender-partisan ideological domination and rule structure that determines and sustains the general relative power of males over females globally' (Roberts, 2008, p. 140). However, it is difficult to see how this reformulation either differs substantively from patriarchy as an analytical tool or assists in the construction of an alternative theory of global violence that centralises the individual, and therefore takes gender seriously, in that it seems to essentialise violent actors (males) and violated victims (females). In contrast, Enloe's explanation of patriarchy challenges such essentialism as its first point of critical intervention. That is, the assumption of essential differences between men and women is part of patriarchal ideology, feeding into stereotypical notions of how such men and women should behave, which in turn constitute recognisable discourses of gender: sets of narratives about masculinity and femininity and how these are, in general, respectively privileged and marginalised. The most theoretically coherent account of gender and violence offered in these three texts comes from Sjoberg and Gentry and employs the notion of discourse to great effect. Whereas Roberts seeks to map out a consciously structural account of global violence, where the structure in question is a hybrid of andrarchy and a 'rapacious, increasingly competitive and hyper-masculine' neoliberalism (Roberts, 2008, p. 118), Sjoberg and Gentry offer a more sophisticated analysis of structure and agency in their 'relational autonomy framework' that accounts for both individual agency and structural constraint (Sjoberg and Gentry, 2008, pp. 189–98). When people perform acts of political violence, they argue, this is a conscious choice, but crucially individuals 'choose within a specified spectrum of socially acceptable choices' (p. 190). 'In its simplest form, relational autonomy is the recognition that freedom of action is defined and limited by social relationships' (p. 194) and this has profound implications for the study of violence in global politics. Sjoberg and Gentry use this insight to demonstrate that women's violence in global politics is rendered unintelligible, through narrative representations of the perpetrators as mothers, monsters or whores (in media discourse and academic discussion), rather than as autonomous agents. From the abuses of prisoners held at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, via the 'black widows' of Chechnya, to female perpetrators of genocidal violence in Rwanda, the authors show how representations of women's violence conform to and further confirm the stereotypes of violent women as either mothers (supporting or vengeful), monsters or sexually deviant whores (Sjoberg and Gentry, 2008, pp. 30–49). The very different theories of violence outlined in these three texts all contribute to the development of a more comprehensive and holistic understanding of violence in global politics. By insisting that international relations are also gender relations – by demanding that we recognise that states are an analytical abstraction and politics is practised or performed by gendered bodies – all of the authors put forward theories of violence that are corrective of gender blindness, in that the violences in question are simultaneously gendered and gendering (see Shepherd, 2008, pp. 49–54). They are gendered because they have different impacts on male and female bodies (Enloe, 2007, p. 13), both materially as people experience violence differently depending on their gender (and race, class, sexuality and so on) and also discursively, as what we expect of men and women in terms of their behaviours, violent and otherwise, is limited by the meaning(s) ascribed to male and female bodies by society. Regarding the former, Roberts proposes that we term the global victimisation of women 'structural femicide' (Roberts, 2008, p. 65), but does not sufficiently engage with the question of whether defining gendered violence as violence against women (and children) functions to constitute the subject of 'woman' as a perpetual victim, in need of protection and lacking in agency (Shepherd, 2008, p. 41). In contrast, Sjoberg and Gentry neatly articulate the interplay between material and discursive violence as they write a theory that accounts 'for people's impact on global politics and for the impact of narratives others construct for and about them' (Sjoberg and Gentry, 2008, p. 216, emphasis in original). Thus, violence is gendering as our understanding of politics is in part reproduced through violent actions. Through discursive violence against individuals – for example, representing Chechen women suicide terrorists as 'black widows', which demands that they are attributed the characteristics of the venomous and deadly black widow spider and, further, that their violence is grounded in familial loss, 'born directly of a desire for vengeance for the deaths of their husbands and sons' (Sjoberg and Gentry, 2008, p. 100) rather than as the result of a process of political decision making – our understanding of that individual and of the act of violence itself is produced. Similarly, through material acts of violence, discourses of gender are given physical form; the detainees at Abu Ghraib who were forced to simulate oral sex with each other were forced to do so in part because of crude cultural understandings of homosexuality as deviant and homosexuals as lesser men – that is, as women. To force a man to perform oral sex on another man is to undermine his masculinity and simultaneously to reinforce the gendered power relations that claim privilege for masculinity over femininity, heterosexuality over homosexuality – power relations that render such an act intelligible in the first instance. Such understandings of violence are beyond the remit of conventional state-based approaches to international relations. However, 'it is by tracking the gendered assumptions about how to wield feminization to humiliate male[s]' (Enloe, 2007, p. 115) and how to represent gendered individuals in such a way as to render some acts of violence intelligible as political and others as monstrous that we can begin to piece together a useful feminist account of global violence, which is a necessary component of understanding security. Everyday Violence and In-Between Days In addition to questioning what violence is, how it is represented and with what effects, feminist security studies scholarship also asks which violences are considered worthy of study and when these violences occur. Expanding the concept of violence that underpins feminist analysis, as outlined above, allows us to take seriously what Arthur Kleinman (2000) refers to as 'the violences of everyday life'. Beyond a narrow focus on war and state-based violence lies a plethora of everyday violences that feminist security studies seeks to address. In the field of security studies the broadening and deepening of the concept of security, such that it is no longer assumed to apply only to the sovereign state, has demonstrated the multiple insecurities experienced by individuals and social collectives (Booth, 2005, pp. 14–5). The development of the concept of 'human security' largely took place within the parameters of a wider disciplinary debate over the appropriate referent object for security studies (the individual, society, the state) and the types of threat to the referent object that would be recognised. In a move similar to Ken Booth's (1991) reformulation of security as emancipation, Roberts' quest for individual empowerment seeks to overcome the 'élite-legitimized disequilibrium' that results in the manifest insecurity of the majority of the world's population (Roberts, 2008, p. 185). As might be expected, the violences Roberts identifies are innumerable. In addition to the physical violences of 'infanticide, maternal mortality, intimate ("domestic", "honour" and "dowry") killings and lethal female genital mutilation; and avoidable deaths in children under five' (Roberts, 2008, p. 31), his analysis attacks the institutional structures of the dominant international financial institutions (pp. 117–35) and the andrarchal and neoliberal discourses that sustain them (pp. 136–58). In short, Roberts' answer to the question of which violences matter in global politics is quite simple: all of them. However, while studies of human security, he argues, seek to provide the human with security, his reformulated analytic takes as its starting point human insecurity; that is, he starts with the threat(s) to the sovereign subject rather than the subject's ontological condition. Roberts suggests that this circumvents the disciplinary definitional problem with human security – identified by Roland Paris (2001), Edward Newman (2001; 2004) and others – but I cannot see how this is the case, given that the answer to the question 'what is it that humans do to make the world a more dangerous and dysfunctional place?' (Roberts, 2008, p. 28) is also quite simple: we live in it. Thus Roberts' analytic seems to suffer the same lack of definitional clarity – and therefore policy relevance – that he ascribes to more conventional approaches; it is no easier to identify, quantify and ultimately reduce the threats experienced by coexisting human subjects than it is to provide those human subjects with security, if security can first be defined as freedom from fear or want. I do not espouse some construction of human nature (if such a thing were to exist) that assumes essential selfishness and a propensity for violence, nor do I assume that security is a zero-sum game, in that one person's security must always be at the expense of another's, but I recognise that even the most well-intentioned security policy can have unforeseen and sometimes disastrous effects. Sometimes, moreover, as Sjoberg and Gentry demonstrate, the decision to perform acts of political violence that are a source of insecurity for the intended victims can be understood if not condoned. Enloe's analytical remit is similarly wide-ranging to Roberts', in that she focuses on processes – globalisation and militarism – that are inherently violent. However, although Enloe also insists that all violences should count in the study of global politics, she grounds this claim in an analysis of specific sites of violence and demonstrates with startling clarity just how everyday items – for example, sneakers – are both globalised and militarised: Threaded through virtually every sneaker you own is some relationship to masculinized militaries. Locating factories in South Korea [in the 1960s and 1970s] was a good strategic decision in the eyes of those Oregon-headquartered male Nike executives because of the close alliance between male policymakers in Washington and Seoul. It was a relationship – unequal but intimate – based on their shared anticommunism, their shared commitment to waging the Cold War, and their shared participation in an ambitious international military alliance (Enloe, 2007, p. 28). By drawing her readers' attention to the ways in which discourses of gender (ideas about how 'proper' men and women should behave) function, Enloe reminds us that adhering to ideals of masculinity and femininity is both productive of violence and is a violence in itself, a violence against the empowered human subject. 'Ideas matter', she concludes, ideas about modernity, security, violence, threat, trust. 'Each of these ideas is fraught with blatant and subtle presumptions about masculinity and femininity. Ideas about both masculinity and femininity matter. This makes a feminist curiosity a necessity' (Enloe, 2007, p. 161). While conventional studies of IR and security may be willing to concede that ideas matter (see Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001), paying close attention to the work that gender does allows for a fuller understanding of why it is that particular violences fall outside the traditional parameters of study. As to the question of when violence is worthy of study, all three texts implicitly or explicitly draw on the popular feminist phrase: 'the personal is political'. This slogan neatly encapsulates the feminist critique of a supposed foundational divide between the private and the public realms of social life. In arguing that the personal is political, feminist theory refuses to accept that there are instances of human behaviour or situations in social life that can or should be bracketed from study. At its simplest, this critique led to the recognition of 'domestic violence' as a political, rather than a personal issue (see, for example Moore, 2003; Youngs, 2003), forming the foundation for critical studies of gendered violence in times of war and in times of peace that would otherwise have been ignored. Crucially, Enloe extended the boundaries of critique to include the international, imbuing the phrase with new analytical vitality when she suggested, first, that the phrase itself is palindromic (that is, that the political is also personal, inextricably intertwined with the everyday) and, second, that the personal is international just as the international is personal. 'The international is personal' implies that governments depend upon certain kinds of allegedly private relationships in order to conduct their foreign affairs. ... To operate in the international arena, governments seek other governments' recognition of their sovereignty; but they also depend on ideas about masculinised dignity and feminised sacrifice to sustain that sense of autonomous nationhood (Enloe, 2000, pp. 196–7). These ideas about dignity and sacrifice are not neatly contained within the temporal boundaries of any given war, nor are they incidental to the practice of warfare. Further, there is of course also the question of who gets to define or declare war, or peace. While some of the violent women whose actions are analysed by Sjoberg and Gentry perform their violences in wartime (for example, Lynndie England, who received the most attention from global media of the women involved in prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib; see Sjoberg and Gentry, 2008, pp. 67–70), others are fighting wars that are not sanctioned by the international community (such as the Chechen women [pp. 97–111] and female Palestinian suicide bombers [pp. 112–40]). As discussed above, ideas about masculinity and femininity, dignity and sacrifice may not only be violent in themselves, but are also the product/productive of physical violences. With this in mind, the feminist argument that 'peacetime' is analytically misleading is a valid one. Of interest are the 'in-between days' and the ways in which labelling periods of war or peace as such can divert attention away from the myriad violences that inform and reinforce social behaviour. [W]ar can surely never be said to start and end at a clearly defined moment. Rather, it seems part of a continuum of conflict, expressed now in armed force, now in economic sanctions or political pressure. A time of supposed peace may come later to be called 'the pre-war period'. During the fighting of a war, unseen by the foot soldiers under fire, peace processes are often already at work. A time of postwar reconstruction, later, may be re-designated as an inter bellum– a mere pause between wars (Cockburn and Zarkov, cited in El Jack, 2003, p. 9). Feminist security studies interrogates the pauses between wars, and the political processes – and practices of power – that demarcate times as such. In doing so, not only is the remit of recognisable violence (violence worthy of study) expanded, but so too are the parameters of what counts as IR. Everyday violences and acts of everyday resistance ('a fashion show, a tour, a small display of children's books' in Enloe, 2007, pp. 117–20) are the stuff of relations international and, thus, of a comprehensive understanding of security. In the following section I outline the ways in which taking these claims seriously allows us to engage critically with the representations of international relations that inform our research, with potentially profound implications. The Violent Reproduction of the International As well as conceiving of gender as a set of discourses, and violence as a means of reproducing and reinforcing the relevant discursive limits, it is possible to see security as a set of discourses, as I have argued more fully elsewhere (Shepherd, 2007; 2008; see also Shepherd and Weldes, 2007). Rather than pursuing the study of security as if it were something that can be achieved either in absolute, partial or relative terms, engaging with security as discourse enables the analysis of how these discourses function to reproduce, through various strategies, the domain of the international with which IR is self-consciously concerned. Just as violences that are gendering reproduce gendered subjects, on this view states, acting as authoritative entities, perform violences, but violences, in the name of security, also perform states. These processes occur simultaneously, and across the whole spectrum of social life: an instance of rape in war is at once gendering of the individuals involved and of the social collectivities – states, communities, regions – they feel they represent (see Bracewell, 2000); building a fence in the name of security that separates people from their land and extended families performs particular kinds of violence (at checkpoints, during patrols) and performs particular subject identities (of the state authority, of the individuals affected), all of which are gendered. All of the texts under discussion in this essay argue that it is imperative to explore and expose gendered power relations and, further, that doing so not only enables a rigorous critique of realism in IR but also reminds us as scholars of the need for such a critique. The critiques of IR offered by feminist scholars are grounded in a rejection of neo-realism/realism as a dominant intellectual framework for academics in the discipline and policy makers alike. As Enloe reminds us, 'the government-centred, militarized version of national security [derived from a realist framework] remains the dominant mode of policy thinking' (Enloe, 2007, p. 43). Situating gender as a central category of analysis encourages us to 'think outside the "state security box"' (p. 47) and to remember that 'the "individuals" of global politics do not work alone, live alone or politic alone – they do so in interdependent relationships with others' (Sjoberg and Gentry, 2008, p. 200) that are inherently gendered. One of the key analytical contributions of all three texts is the way in which they all challenge what it means to be 'doing' IR, by recognising various forms of violence, interrogating the public/private divide and demanding that attention is paid to the temporal and physical spaces in-between war and peace. Feminist security studies should not simply be seen as 'women doing security', or as 'adding women to IR/security studies', important as these contributions are. Through their theorising, the authors discussed here reconfigure what 'counts' as IR, challenging orthodox notions of who can 'do' IR and what 'doing' IR means. The practices of power needed to maintain dominant configurations of international relations are exposed, and critiquing the productive power of realism as a discourse is one way in which the authors do this. Sjoberg and Gentry pick up on a recent theoretical shift in Anglo-American IR, from system-level analysis to a recognition that individuals matter. However, as they rightly point out, the individuals who are seen to matter are not gendered relational beings, but rather reminiscent of Hobbes' construction of the autonomous rational actor. '[T]he narrowness of the group that [such an approach] includes limits its effectiveness as an interpretive framework and reproduces the gender, class and race biases in system-level international relationship scholarship' (Sjoberg and Gentry 2008, p. 200, emphasis added). Without paying adequate attention to the construction of individuals as gendered beings, or to the reproduction of widely held ideas about masculine and feminine behaviours, Sjoberg and Gentry remind us that we will ultimately fail 'to see and deconstruct the increasingly subtle, complex and disguised ways in which gender pervades international relations and global politics' (2008, p. 225). In a similar vein, Roberts notes that 'human security is marginalised or rejected as inauthentic [because] it is not a reflection of realism's (male) agendas and priorities' (2008, p. 169). The 'agendas and priorities' identified by Roberts and acknowledged by Sjoberg and Gentry as being productive of particular biases in scholarship are not simply 'academic' matters, in the pejorative sense of the term. As Roberts argues, 'Power relationships of inequality happen because they are built that way by human determinism of security and what is required to maintain security (p. 171). Realism, as academic discourse and as policy guideline, has material effects. Although his analysis employs an unconventional definition of the term 'social construction' (seemingly interchangeable with 'human agency') and rests on a novel interpretation of the three foundational assumptions of realism (Roberts, 2008, pp. 169–77), the central point that Roberts seeks to make in his conclusion is valid: 'it is a challenge to those who deny relationships between gender and security; between human agency (social construction) and lethal outcome' (p. 183). In sum, all three texts draw their readers to an inescapable, and – for the conventional study of IR – a devastating conclusion: the dominance of neo-realism/realism and the state-based study of security that derives from this is potentially pathological, in that it is in part productive of the violences it seeks to ameliorate. I suggest that critical engagement with orthodox IR theory is necessary for the intellectual growth of the discipline, and considerable insight can be gained by acknowledging the relevance of feminist understandings of gender, power and theory. The young woman buying a T-shirt from a multinational clothing corporation with her first pay cheque, the group of young men planning a stag weekend in Amsterdam, a group of students attending a demonstration against the bombing of Afghanistan – studying these significant actions currently falls outside the boundaries of doing security studies in mainstream IR and I believe these boundaries need contesting. As Marysia Zalewski argues: International politics is what we make it to be ... We need to rethink the discipline in ways that will disturb the existing boundaries of both that which we claim to be relevant in international politics and what we assume to be legitimate ways of constructing knowledge about the world (Zalewski 1996, p. 352, emphasis in original). Conclusion: 'Let a Hundred Flowers Bloom, Let a Hundred Schools of Thought Contend' (Mao Tse-Tung) In this essay, I have used the analysis of three contemporary publications in the field of feminist security studies to demonstrate three significant sets of analytical contributions that such scholarship makes to the discipline of IR. Beyond the war/peace dichotomy that is frequently assumed to be definitive of the discipline, we find many and various forms of violence, occurring in and between temporally distinct periods of conflict, which are the product/productive of socially acceptable modes of gendered behaviour, ways of being in the world as a woman or man. I have also argued that critical engagement with conventional, state-based approaches to (national) security must persist as the academic discourses we write are complicit in the construction of the global as we understand it. Further, 'if all experience is gendered, analysis of gendered identities is an imperative starting point in the study of political identities and practice' (Peterson, 1999, p. 37). To this end, I conclude by suggesting that we take seriously Enloe's final comment: 'Tracking militarization and fostering demilitarization will call for cooperative investigations, multiple skills and the appreciation of diverse perspectives' (2007, p. 164). While there has been intense intra-disciplinary debate within contemporary feminist security studies over the necessary 'feminist credentials' of some gendered analyses, it is important to recognise the continual renewal and analytical vigour brought to the field by such debates.

### Deterrence

#### Deterrence analysts use “clean language” do separate emotions from decision making

Cohn 87 - Dr. Carol Cohn is the founding director of the Consortium on Gender, Security and Human Rights, and a leader in the scholarly community addressing issues of gender in global politics, armed conflict and security. Dr. Cohn’s research and writing has focused on gender and security issues ranging from work on the discourse of civilian nuclear defense intellectuals and U.S. national security elites to gender integration issues in the US military, feminist approaches to thinking about weapons of mass destruction, the gender dimensions of contemporary armed conflicts, the concept of “vulnerability” in security and humanitarian discourse, and gender mainstreaming in international peace and security institutions, including the passage of UN Security Council Resolutions on women, peace and security and the on-going efforts to ensure its implementation at the international, national, and grassroots levels. Dr. Cohn’s work has been published in a number of arenas in both the academic and policy world., Summer 1987, "Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals," The University of Chicago Press, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/3174209>

Entering the world of defense intellectuals was a bizarre experience- bizarre because it is a world where men spend their days calmly and matter- of-factly discussing nuclear weapons, nuclear strategy, and nuclear war. The discussions are carefully and intricately reasoned, occurring seemingly without any sense of horror, urgency, or moral outrage-in fact, there seems to be no graphic reality behind the words, as they speak of "first strikes," "counterforce exchanges," and "limited nuclear war," or as they debate the comparative values of a "minimum deterrent posture" versus a "nuclear war-fighting capability." Yet what is striking about the men themselves is not, as the content of their conversations might suggest, their cold-bloodedness. Rather, it is that they are a group of men unusually endowed with charm, humor, intelligence, concern, and decency. Reader, I liked them. At least, I liked many of them. The attempt to understand how such men could contribute to an endeavor that I see as so fundamentally destructive became a con- tinuing obsession for me, a lens through which I came to examine all of my experiences in their world. In this early stage, I was gripped by the extraordinary language used to discuss nuclear war. What hit me first was the elaborate use of abstraction and euphemism, of words so bland that they never forced the speaker or enabled the listener to touch the realities of nuclear holocaust that lay behind the words. Anyone who has seen pictures of Hiroshima burn victims or tried to imagine the pain of hundreds of glass shards blasted into flesh may find it perverse beyond imagination to hear a class of nuclear devices matter-of- factly referred to as "clean bombs." "Clean bombs" are nuclear devices that are largely fusion rather than fission and that therefore release a higher quantity of energy, not as radiation, but as blast, as destructive explosive power.7 "Clean bombs" may provide the perfect metaphor for the language of defense analysts and arms controllers. This language has enormous de- structive power, but without emotional fallout, without the emotional fallout that would result if it were clear one was talking about plans for mass murder, mangled bodies, and unspeakable human suffering. Defense analysts talk about "countervalue attacks" rather than about incinerating cities. Human death, in nuclear parlance, is most often referred to as "collateral damage"; for, as one defense analyst said wryly, "The Air Force doesn't target people, it targets shoe factories."8 Some phrases carry this cleaning-up to the point of inverting meaning. The MX missile will carry ten warheads, each with the explosure power of 300-475 kilotons of TNT: one missile the bearer of destruction approx- imately 250-400 times that of the Hiroshima bombing.9 Ronald Reagan has dubbed the MX missile "the Peacekeeper." While this renaming was the object of considerable scorn in the community of defense analysts, these very same analysts refer to the MX as a "damage limitation weapon."'? These phrases, only a few of the hundreds that could be discussed, exemplify the astounding chasm between image and reality that character- izes technostrategic language. They also hint at the terrifying way in which the existence of nuclear devices has distorted our perceptions and rede- fined the world. "Clean bombs" tells us that radiation is the only "dirty" part of killing people. To take this one step further, such phrases can even seem healthful/ curative/corrective. So that we not only have "clean bombs" but also "surgically clean strikes" ("counterforce" attacks that can purportedly "take out"-i. e., accurately destroy-an opponent's weapons or command cen- ters without causing significant injury to anything else). The image of excision of the offending weapon is unspeakably ludicrous when the surgi- cal tool is not a delicately controlled scalpel but a nuclear warhead. And somehow it seems to be forgotten that even scalpels spill blood.

#### The language used to describe nuclear war is full of sexual undertones that exacerbate hegemonic masculinity

Cohn 87 - Dr. Carol Cohn is the founding director of the Consortium on Gender, Security and Human Rights, and a leader in the scholarly community addressing issues of gender in global politics, armed conflict and security. Dr. Cohn’s research and writing has focused on gender and security issues ranging from work on the discourse of civilian nuclear defense intellectuals and U.S. national security elites to gender integration issues in the US military, feminist approaches to thinking about weapons of mass destruction, the gender dimensions of contemporary armed conflicts, the concept of “vulnerability” in security and humanitarian discourse, and gender mainstreaming in international peace and security institutions, including the passage of UN Security Council Resolutions on women, peace and security and the on-going efforts to ensure its implementation at the international, national, and grassroots levels. Dr. Cohn’s work has been published in a number of arenas in both the academic and policy world., Summer 1987, "Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals," The University of Chicago Press, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/3174209>

Feminists have often suggested that an important aspect of the arms race is phallic worship, that "missile envy" is a significant motivating force in the nuclear build-up.12 I have always found this an uncomfortably reductionist explanation and hoped that my research at the Center would yield a more complex analysis. But still, I was curious about the extent to which I might find a sexual subtext in the defense professionals' discourse. I was not prepared for what I found. I think I had naively imagined myself as a feminist spy in the house of death-that I would need to sneak around and eavesdrop on what men said in unguarded moments, using all my subtlety and cunning to unearth whatever sexual imagery might be underneath how they thought and spoke. I had naively believed that these men, at least in public, would appear to be aware of feminist critiques. If they had not changed their language, I thought that at least at some point in a long talk about "penetra- tion aids," someone would suddenly look up, slightly embarrassed to be caught in such blatant confirmation of feminist analyses of What's Going On Here.'3 Of course, I was wrong. There was no evidence that any feminist critiques had ever reached the ears, much less the minds, of these men. American military dependence on nuclear weapons was explained as "irresistible, because you get more bang for the buck." Another lecturer solemnly and scientifically announced "to disarm is to get rid of all your stuff." (This may, in turn, explain why they see serious talk of nuclear disarmament as perfectly resistable, not to mention foolish. If disarmament is emasculation, how could any real man even consider it?) A professor's explanation of why the MX missile is to be placed in the silos of the newest Minuteman missiles, instead of replacing the older, less accurate ones, was "because they're in the nicest hole-you're not going to take the nicest missile you have and put it in a crummy hole." Other lectures were filled with discussion of vertical erector launchers, thrust-to-weight ratios, soft lay downs, deep penetration, and the comparative advantages of pro- tracted versus spasm attacks-or what one military adviser to the National Security Council has called "releasing 70 to 80 percent of our megatonnage in one orgasmic whump."14 There was serious concern about the need to harden our missiles and the need to "face it, the Russians are a little harder than we are." Disbelieving glances would occasionally pass between me and my one ally in the summer program, another woman, but no one else seemed to notice. If the imagery is transparent, its significance may be less so. The temptation is to draw some conclusions about the defense intellectuals themselves-about what they are really talking about, or their motivations; but the temptation is worth resisting. Individual motivations cannot neces- sarily be read directly from imagery; the imagery itself does not originate in these particular individuals but in a broader cultural context. Sexual imagery has, of course, been a part of the world of warfare since long before nuclear weapons were even a gleam in a physicist's eye. The history of the atomic bomb project itself is rife with overt images of competitive male sexuality, as is the discourse of the early nuclear physi- cists, strategists, and SAC commanders.'5 Both the military itself and the arms manufacturers are constantly exploiting the phallic imagery and promise of sexual domination that their weapons so conveniently suggest. A quick glance at the publications that constitute some of the research sources for defense intellectuals makes the depth and pervasiveness of the imagery evident. Air Force Magazine's advertisements for new weapons, for example, rival Playboy as a catalog of men's sexual anxieties and fantasies. Consider the following, from the June 1985 issue: emblazoned in bold letters across the top of a two-page advertisement for the AV-8B Harrier II-"Speak Softly and Carry a Big Stick." The copy below boasts "an exceptional thrust to weight ratio" and "vectored thrust capability that makes the . .. unique rapid response possible." Then, just in case we've failed to get the mes- sage, the last line reminds us, "Just the sort of'Big Stick' Teddy Roosevelt had in mind way back in 1901. "16 An ad for the BKEP (BLU-106/B) reads: The Only Way to Solve Some Problems is to Dig Deep. THE BOMB, KINETIC ENERGY PENETRATOR "Will provide the tactical air commander with efficient power deny or significantly delay enemy airfield operations." "Designed to maximize runway cratering by optimizing penetration dynamics and utilizing the most efficient warhead yet designed."17 (In case the symbolism of "cratering" seems far-fetched, I must point that I am not the first to see it. The French use the Mururoa Atoll in South Pacific for their nuclear tests and assign a woman's name to eac the craters they gouge out of the earth.) Another, truly extraordinary, source of phallic imagery is to be found in descriptions of nuclear blasts themselves. Here, for example, is o journalist William Laurence, who was brought to Nagasaki by th Force to witness the bombing. "Then, just when it appeared as though thing had settled down in to a state of permanence, there came sh out of the top a giant mushroom that increased the size of the pillar to of 45,000 feet. The mushroom top was even more alive than the seething and boiling in a white fury of creamy foam, sizzling upward then descending earthward, a thousand geysers rolled into one. It kept struggling in an elemental fury, like a creature in the act of breaking the bonds that held it down."'8 Given the degree to which it suffuses their world, that defense intellec- tuals themselves use a lot of sexual imagery does not seem especially surprising. Nor does it, by itself, constitute grounds for imputing motiva- tion. For me, the interesting issue is not so much the imagery's psychody- namic origins, as how it functions. How does it serve to make it possible for strategic planners and other defense intellectuals to do their macabre work? How does it function in their construction of a work world that feels tenable? Several stories illustrate the complexity. During the summer program, a group of us visited the New London Navy base where nuclear submarines are homeported and the General Dynamics Electric Boat boatyards where a new Trident submarine was being constructed. At one point during the trip we took a tour of a nuclear powered submarine. When we reached the part of the sub where the missiles are housed, the officer accompanying us turned with a grin and asked if we wanted to stick our hands through a hole to "pat the missile." Pat the missile? The image reappeared the next week, when a lecturer scornfully declared that the only real reason for deploying cruise and Pershing II missiles in Western Europe was "so that our allies can pat them." Some months later, another group of us went to be briefed at NORAD (the North American Aerospace Defense Command). On the way back, our plane went to refuel at Offut Air Force Base, the Strategic Air Command head- quarters near Omaha, Nebraska. When word leaked out that our landing would be delayed because the new B-1 bomber was in the area, the plane became charged with a tangible excitement that built as we flew in our holding pattern, people craning their necks to try to catch a glimpse of the B-1 in the skies, and climaxed as we touched down on the runway and hurtled past it. Later, when I returned to the Center I encountered a man who, unable to go on the trip, said to me enviously, "I hear you got to pat a B-I." What is all this "patting"? What are men doing when they "pat" these high-tech phalluses? Patting is an assertion of intimacy, sexual possession, affectionate domination. The thrill and pleasure of "patting the missile" is the proximity of all that phallic power, the possibility of vicariously appro- priating it as one's own. But if the predilection for patting phallic objects indicates something of the homoerotic excitement suggested by the language, it also has another side. For patting is not only an act of sexual intimacy. It is also what one does to babies, small children, the pet dog. One pats that which is small, cute, and harmless-not terrifyingly destructive. Pat it, and its lethality disappears. Much of the sexual imagery I heard was rife with the sort of ambiguity suggested by "patting the missiles." The imagery can be construed as a deadly serious display of the connections between masculine sexuality and the arms race. At the same time, it can also be heard as a way of minimizing the seriousness of militarist endeavors, of denying their deadly conse- quences. A former Pentagon target analyst, in telling me why he thought plans for "limited nuclear war" were ridiculous, said, "Look, you gotta understand that it's a pissing contest-you gotta expect them to use every- thing they've got." What does this image say? Most obviously, that this is all about competition for manhood, and thus there is tremendous danger. But at the same time, the image diminishes the contest and its outcomes, by representing it as an act of boyish mischief.

### Hegemony

#### Hegemony does not create peace- their theorization uses masculine assessments for war and obscures ongoing structural violence.

Sjoberg 10

(Laura, Assistant Professor of Political Science with an affiliation with the Center for Women’s and Gender Studies at the University of Florida. Her research has focused on theoretical and empirical approaches to gender and security, including war theorizing and the study of women’s violence “Gendering Power Transition Theory”, JKS)

Hegemony and peace ¶ PTT claims that the greater and more stable the concentration of power, the more peaceful that system will be. PTT associates peace with the absence of armed conflict 'between great powers. As such, the world can still be "at peace" if dozens of civil wars are going on in countries outside of the class of "great powers." The dominant/challenger dichotomy means that PTT ignores all but the most powerful states. Instead of limiting the discourse on security to the concerns of the dominant global power and the (few or even only one) challenger(s), feminists pay attention to the entire global political community.¶ The PTT understanding of "peace" obscures terrible atrocities and conceals a crucial and contradictory effect of the concentration of power in the international arena. Feminist work has consistently shown that, as the powerful wield more power, the weak feel more pressure. This pressure is manifested not only in the form of interstate war, but also in civil war and structural violence. Feminists' interrogation of state centrism suggests that lack of War between great states does not automatically create peace within them,"mind that the marginalized citizens of great states should be a topic of concern in global politics. Feminists' interest in gender subordination shows that women's security and their lives are constantly at risk. ¶ As such, the feminist reformulation (R2) predicts that concentrated power is a net negative, empirically, normatively, and epistemologically. Empirically, it is likely to increase international conflicts and internal unrest outside of the center of power, and to draw attention away from the world's worst humanitarian disasters. As Ann Tickner notes, much of the violence in the world is outside of great power war and, as theorists, "we in the west can no longer afford to privilege a tradition of scholarship that focuses on the concerns and ambitions of great powers."1Â°3 Feminists reject the dominance of the strong over the weak as a' mechanism of control in favor of empathy and connectedness. Epistemologically, feminists note different social experience produces different knowledges.1Â°"' A theory of international security that excludes most people also leaves out important knowledge."˜Â°5 An empathetic approach might increase the inclusiveness of knowledge about global politics.¶ These insights mean that a feminist perspective would draw attention to the security of the people on the margins rather than focusing on an improbable conflict between the US and China. Feminist insights suggest it is important to recognize that in a world where the US and China compete for dominance, more than four billion other people neither compete nor dominate. Decisions made by states with the preponderance of power-over reverberate around the world. If the US and China decided to fight a nuclear then their decision would be felt around the world. Even less severe decisions by powerful states have wide-ranging impacts on individuals' lives. For example, the US governments decision to condition continued military presence in South Korea on mandatory STD testing in Korean prostitution villages impacted the social and economic dynamic between Korean prostitutes.1¶ Neither the US nor China provides its poorest citizens adequate humanitarian aid to avoid death from starvation or preventable disease." Yet the US and China are the two biggest military spenders in the world." In real terms, the most marginalized citizens of each nation lose when strategic posturing inspires them to focus on military readiness. Feminists have documented how militarization of women's lives decreases freedoms and changes economic and social patterns.1Â°9 Because of the these threats, feminists problematize the assumption that entities called the US and China legitimately merit more consideration than the most marginal citizens within those states or the citizens of states that their dominance subordinates.

### Realism

#### Realism isn’t inevitable, but their assertion is informed by masculinity—it assumes that each actor perceives its national identity in the same away, as separate from gender hierarchies that make states compete for survival in the first place.

Sjoberg 14

(Laura, Assistant Professor of Political Science with an affiliation with the Center for Women’s and Gender Studies at the University of Florida. Her research has focused on theoretical and empirical approaches to gender and security, including war theorizing and the study of women’s violence, Gender, War, and Conflict, Polity Press, JKS)

This discussion (albeit briefly) makes the case that a struc- tural gender order can be seen as reflected in state identities, state relative power, and processes of state interaction, the places where Waltz suggests structure shows. Most mainstream scholarship on the causes of war at the international system level comes from the tradition of structural realism (see Mearsheimer 2001; Waltz 1979). I argue that gender analysis has something to add both to neorealist system-level theories of war and to system-level theories that fall outside of the neorealist paradigm. In order to see the value-added of gender analysis, a brief discussion of those theories is necessary. ¶ Structural realists suggest that the international system structure (how it works) is anarchical - that there is no government among states, and that this anarchy is key in shaping how states behave (Waltz 1986). Drawing from political theory that suggests that, before government, life for people was "nasty, brutish, and short" (Hobbes 1996 [1651]), realists contend that a similar reality currently rules in the inter- national system. Without a government to protect their rights, enforce rules, and defend their survival, states can only rely on and trust themselves (Waltz 1979). This creates an incentive to behave competitively with other states, since survival in anarchy is, in this interpretation, a game where one either kills or is killed (Waltz 1979). Some structural realists are called offensive realists - they suggest that states go out, find, and take resources in order to maximize their relative power (Elman 2004; Mearsheimer 2001). Others are defensive real- ists - they suggest that states amass resources to defend themselves in the event that other states attack them (Walt 1987; Taliaferro 2000/1). Both see states as fundamentally competitive, and that competition as deriving from the anarchical international system structure. They therefore see sur- vival as states' primary concern, and relative power as the way that states ensure survival. ¶ While neorealist approaches dominate system-level war theorizing, their critics also sometimes theorize the causes of war at the system level. Neoliberal system-level theorist David Lake (1996, 2009), for example, agrees with the realists that the international system anarchy causes conflict, but dis- agrees with the realist assertion that the resultant conflict is inevitable. Lake and other neoliberal war theorists suggest that the violence of anarchy can be tempered by positive state relationships and effective utilization of international law (e.g., Keohane 1986). Marxist theorists also sometimes see a system-level cause of war, but they locate it in what they have identified as the capitalist world-system, rather than interna- tional anarchy (Chase-Dunn and Podobnik 1995; Wallerstein 1984). These theorists are arguing that the international system is not anarchic, but organized by global capitalist trade, and that it is that organization which inspires state competitiveness and (therefore) violence. All of these theories share the assumption that the international system struc- ture is gender-neutral; an assumption I argue is problem- atic. I suggest that gender order is part of the international system structure (see Sjoberg 2012 for an expansion of this argument). It is possible to use Waltz's properties of the international system to build an understanding of the ways that system is gendered. Waltz describes system anarchy as "invisible" (1979: 82) and suggests that the invisibility of the interna- tional structure is how observers know that it does not exist - that the system is anarchical. He then explains that, though no one can see anarchy, it has observable implications: a structure is the principle by which the system is ordered, the mechanism of specification of functions of different units within the system, and the distributor of capabilities across those units (Waltz 1979: 81). More accessibly, Waltz expects an international system (whether anarchy or government, which are in his mind the only possible structures) to be the logic by which states function, the determinant of what states do, and the distributor of relative power among them. Waltz sees anarchy as playing this role, where, because there is no government, states' logics prioritize survival, states become primarily providers of order and defense, and states' relative power is measured by military capability (Waltz 1959: 233). ¶ The biggest faulty assumption that Waltz and other sys- tem-level scholars of war make in this logic is that a structure must be visible to exist. In the discussions of women's and men's roles in wars in Chapters 2 and 3, gender analysis routinely confronted roles that people play in wars that are invisible in war narratives. It also revealed narrative limits on ¶ people's roles in wars that come from the invisible gendered logics of war. In other words, no one writes out wars' gen- dered scripts; wars have just come to function with those ideal-typical gender roles as a crucial element. While it is possible to see manifestations of gender orders everywhere - from women's economic inequalities to the ways men and women are expected to dress - it is not possible to see gender orders. Perhaps the international system contains a gender ¶ order that Waltz could not see? The evidence discussed above that gender hierarchy provides an ordering principle for the international system, specifies the functions of units, and distributes capabilities among them suggests the existence of such a gender order. ¶ Seeing a gender order as part of the international system structure has implications for ways to think about war and conflict. Structural IR theorists see international anarchy as a permissive cause of war - war is possible because there is no government between states. Though that may be true, other theorists (e.g., Suganami 1996) argue that there is nothing inherent in anarchy that necessitates the competition that we see between states. There is, however, something essential about structural gender hierarchy that necessitates ¶ (gendered) competition. Since gender-based traits are often measured relatively, structural gender hierarchy provides an incentive for not only competition but also competition for relative position along gender hierarchies - the very sort of competition that states engage in regularly in the interna- tional arena. Seeing gender hierarchy as a permissive cause of war, then, explains more about the possibility of war than seeing anarchy as the only system-structural principle.

#### Seriously, our understanding of IR is just more accurate

Sjoberg 12

(Laura, March, Associate Professor of Political Science with a courtesy affiliation in Women’s Studies and Gender Research at the University of Florida. Her research on gender and international security has been published in more than three dozen journals in political science, international rela- tions, and gender studies. She is the author or editor of nine books, most recently, Gendering Global Conflict: Toward a Feminist Theory of War (Columbia University Press, 2013) and Gender, War and Conflict (Polity Press, 2014). Dr. Sjoberg is the homebase editor of the International Feminist Journal of Politics and the 2015–2016 Vice President of the International Studies Association, Gender, structure, and war: what Waltz couldn't see, International Theory / Volume 4 / Issue 01 / March 2012, pp 1 – 38, JKS)

One element of a gender-hierarchical international system would be that that assumptions about gender underlie the structure and ordering prin-ciples of the international system and provide commonsense ground for theorizing them. This is an observation consonant with feminist observations of global politics, which have characterized the global political arena as a ‘patriarchal structure of privilege and control’ (Enloe 1993, 70). Others see the global political arena a place where ‘the structure of political communities has assumed gendered forms’ (Steans 2003, 43), and ordered by ‘gender relations [which] structure social power’ (Pettman 1996, 43). These observations are rooted in feminist work which shows gender operating in how political leaders are chosen (Tickner 1992), how state governments work (Peterson 1992), how militaries function (Enloe 1989), and how economic benefit is distributed (Pettman 1996). States have been shown their relative military prowess, judged and asserted their relative power, and demonstrated and adjusted their relative economic status through gendered competition using gendered language (e.g. Cohn 1988). The gender hierarchy in the world ‘out there’ can be read as replicated in the ‘commonsense ground’ or traditional theorizing in IR, which feminist theorists (e.g. Tickner 1988) have characterized as partial at best and unre- presentative at worst because it often analyzes the perspectives and lives of only a small, elite, male portion of the global population. ¶ This theme in feminist theorizing in IR suggests that there might be something to the idea that international structures are theorized as gender- neutral because men take their perspectives to represent the human. Feminists have characterized conventional knowledge in IR as problematic because it is constructed only by those in a position of privilege, which affords them only distorted views of the world.14 As such, it has been a crucial part of the feminist project in IR to ‘not only add women but also ask how gender – a structural feature of social life – has been rendered invisible’ by working to ‘distinguish ‘‘reality’’ from the world as men know it’ (Peterson and True 1998, 23). Often, in disciplinary knowledges, ‘gender’ is seen as a proxy for ‘women’ because ‘women’ are perceived to have gender, where men are not. ¶ Another element of a gendered international system structure would be that, when it is acknowledged that gender plays a role in global politics, ¶ it is often discussed as a corruption of a gender-neutral system rather than a product of a gendered system. For example, work like that of Inglehart and Norris (2002) and Hudson et al. (2009)15 argues that it is states that treat their women the worst that corrupt not only the gender order but the potential for interstate peace, cooperation, and development. This logic is replicated in many discussions of gender in the policy world as well. For example, ‘gender mainstreaming’ agendas (see True and Mintrom 2001; Shepherd 2008) engage in a process of integrating gender concerns into the structures that already exist in governments and organizations. The scenario derived from Acker’s theorizing suggests that when gender sub- ordination is characterized as the exception, rather than the rule, in international political interactions, gender is difficult to see because the masculine is at once assumed and invisible. The recurrent focus in feminist work on the need to ask IR theory ‘where are the women?’ (Enloe 1983) and ‘where is gender?’ (Bell and O’Rourke 2007) suggests that it is plausible that gender is difficult to see in IR because the masculine dominates our visions of the international system. It is important to note that the masculine here involves and implicates, but is not reducible to, men. ¶ Waltz ‘tests’ his idea of structure primarily by its predictive power and its indirect manifestations (1986, 72). He argues that, since the anarchical nature of the international system is invisible and thus cannot be directly verified or proven, it must be verified by its manifestations and implica- tions (Waltz 1986, 73). This verification, to Waltz, comes by examining unit function, distribution of capabilities across units, and political pro- cesses of unit interaction. The remainder of this section considers whether there is evidence in those three observable parts of global politics that the international system may be gender-hierarchical. ¶ Unit function: does state identity have gendered components? ¶ In Waltz’s account, ‘a system is composed of a structure and of interacting units’ where ‘the structure is the system-wide component that makes it possible to think about the system as a whole’ and ‘the arrangement of units is a property of the system’ (1986, 70, 71). Waltz sees the system as an anarchy, which by definition specifies that units have the same function. Still, Waltz gives a sense of what would be different if the system was a hierarchy, since ‘hierarchy entails relations of super- and subordination among a system’s parts, and that implies their differentiation’ (1986, 87). Calling states ‘like units’ in Waltz’s terms is ‘to say that each state is like ¶ all other states in being an autonomous political unit’ (Waltz 1986, 89). Waltz sees states as performing fundamentally similar tasks in similar ways, and argues that the differences between states are in capabilities not in function or task (1986, 91). ¶ This section explores two arguments about gender and the function of the units of the international system. First, it argues that gender can be seen as constituting unit ‘function’ in the international system, whether the units are ‘like’ or differentiated. Second, it proposes that gender hierarchy actually differentiates unit function in the international system. ¶ The argument that gender constitutes the function of all units in the international system is supported by the degree to which states define their identities (and therefore the tasks of domestic and foreign policy) in gendered ways. A growing literature on ontological security (e.g. Mitzen 2006; Steele 2008) characterizes state identity in terms of ‘sense of self,’ a language that has long been used in feminist accounts of nation and nationalism. Feminists who have worked on nationalism have argued that national identity and gender are inextricably linked, and that ‘all nationalism are gendered, all nationalisms are invented, and all are dangerous’ (McClintock 1993).16 Feminists have shown that gendered imagery is salient in the construction national identities, particularly when, often, women are the essence of, the symbols of, and the reproduction of state and/or national identity (Yuval-Davis 1997; Wilcox 2009). ¶ A number of examples illustrate the link between national identity and gender. Feminist studies have demonstrated that gender has been essential to defining state identity in Korea (Moon 1997), modernizing Malaysia (Chin 1998), Bengal (Sen 1993), Indonesia (Sunindyo 1998), Northern Ireland (Porter 1998), South Africa (Meintjes 1998), Lebanon (Schulze 1998), Armenia (Tachjian 2009), and a number of other states. For example, Niva has noted that, during the First Gulf War, the United States’ identity was understood as a ‘tough but tender’ masculinity where it was expected that the United States military would courageously defeat the Iraqi military, but would at the same time rescue the feminine state of Kuwait from the hypermasculine clutches of the Iraqi state (1998). On the other hand, responding to the United States’ and United Nations’ threats of military intervention in Kuwait, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq consistently used gendered references to hypermasculine understandings of state identity (Sjoberg 2006b). Gendered nationalisms, however, do not just arise in ¶ conflict situations. Bannerji has noted that Canadian national identities are constructed through ‘race,’ class, gender, and other relations of power, where subordinate classes and ‘races’ are feminized in relation to the dominant image of Canadian identity, not only within the Canadian state but also in Canada’s external projection of nationalist identity (2000, 173). Taylor’s analysis of the ‘Dirty War’ in Argentina characterizes identity in the conflict as ‘predicated on the internalization of a rigid hierarchy’ of gender and argues that ‘the struggle, as each group aimed to humiliate, humble, and feminize its other, was about gender’ (1997, 92, 34). ¶ A brief look at one example recently used in the literature might further illustrate the point. In his book, Ontological Security in International Relations, Steele (2008) notes that honor and shame shape states’ self- perception of their identities. Contrary to the realist logic that state prioritizes prudence and survival over honor and justice, Steele sees honor as a universal part of state self-identity, where states look for honor even sacrificing physical integrity. To illustrate the role of honor in state self- identity, Steele uses the example of the Belgian choice to fight a losing war against the Germans in 1914 rather than allow Germany access to Belgian territory and avoid the casualties and terror involved in their inevitable defeat. Steele notes that honor was implicated in Belgium’s response to Germany’s ultimatum, given that most policy statements stressed their need to ‘fight for the honor of the flag’ and ‘avenge Belgian honor’ (Steele 2008, 112). ¶ Feminist analysis suggests that we cannot understand the role of honor in state self-identity without reference to both masculine and feminine conceptions of honor in the state (Jowkar 1986). Masculine conceptions of honor vary between chivalric and protection-oriented and aggressive and prideful, while feminine conceptions of honor often focus on the purity and innocence of the territory of the state and/or the women and children inside (see Elshtain 1985). Through gender lenses, the Belgian discussion of national honor in 1914 was one where the leaders’ (mas- culine) honor was tied to not giving in to, and even resisting, the would-be violators of the territory’s (feminine) honor, which was tied to purity. The ‘honor’ of the Belgian government then was tied to unwillingness to sacrifice the ‘honor’ of the innocent, neutral, vulnerable, and untouchable identity and position of Belgium vis a vis its neighboring Germany. It is no coincidence that the following attack was referred to as the ‘Rape of Belgium’ (Niarchos 1995). In the ‘Rape of Belgium’ narrative, the German invasion spoiled the feminine elements of Belgian state identity, and emasculated Belgian leaders as protectors of its feminized territory. Survival or prudence cannot account for Belgium’s actions in 1914; in fact, as Steele pointed out, Belgium acted contrary to both. Honor can explain the ¶ behavior, but neither the form nor function of that honor is clear without accounting for the gendered elements of Belgian state identity. The story about gendered state identity can also be read onto Germany (as a hypermasculine aggressor) and Britain (as a chivalrous protector). ¶ While some might see the influence of gender on state or national identity as a ‘second-image’ or unit-level explanation,17 Waltz explains that a factor is structural if it is not influencing state identity (and therefore state function) in states individually, but instead influencing the identities (and therefore functions) of states generally. In other words, forces that define one state’s identity or five states’ identities are second- image; forces that influence all states identities are third-image. Feminist scholars have shown that ‘nationalism is naturalized, and legitimated, through gender discourses that naturalized the domination of one group over another through the disparagement of the feminine’ (Peterson 1999). These gender hierarchies are always present even if specific genders and their orders in hierarchies are fungible. In other words, it is not particular nationalisms that are gendered (and some nationalisms that are not), it is that gender hierarchy as a structural feature of global politics defines the properties and functions of the system’s constituent units, including their national identities. All nationalisms being gendered does not mean that all nationalisms are the same, however. ¶ The mechanism through which gender hierarchy can be seen to influ- ence national identity and state function is through the link between any given state’s national identity and the ‘hegemonic masculinity,’ or parti- cular ideal-typical gender that is on top of the gender hierarchy that state ‘units’ are situated in at any given time and place (Hooper 1998, 34). The argument that states’ structures and functions are often defined by mas- culinities (see Peterson 1992) is not based on the observation that states are (mostly) governed by men. Instead, as Connell explains, ‘the state organizational practices are structured in relation to the reproductive arena’ (1995, 73). Some states’ hegemonic masculinities are aggressive and projected, others are tough but tender, and still others are stoic and reserved. All hegemonic masculinities relate to a feminized other, but they do so in different ways: some encourage violating it, some define themselves in ¶ opposition to it, some understand it as treasured and to be protected, and some mix elements of all of the above. The gendered nature of national identities influences the function of states, particularly in the areas of war- making and war-fighting, but also in terms of citizenship, economic organization, diplomatic relations, and involvement in international organizations.18 For example, feminists have catalogued throughout the history of the modern state system a relationship between military service, masculinity, and full citizenship (either de jure or de facto) in states (Moscovici 2000). ¶ Though the relationship between gender and nationalism generally (and genders and nationalisms specifically) influences the function of units whether they are like units (in anarchy) or not like units (indicative of a hierarchical system in Waltz’s terms), evidence of different gendered nationalisms suggests that gender hierarchy in global politics differentiates between functions of units in the system rather than dictating that all units function similarly. Units in the system (even defined in the narrow realist terms where only states count as units) do have many similar functions in terms of governance, education, health care, and the like. But especially in their external relations, states also have a number of differentiated functions. Some states were/are colonizers, some states were colonized and still deal with remaining markers of colonization. Some states are aggressors, while other states are the victims of aggression. Some states are protectors, while other states require protection. Some states provide peacekeeping troops, international humanitarian aid, and other public goods, while other states do not serve those functions, depending on state identity (e.g. Savery 2007). Some states serve to facilitate international cooperation while others act as cogs in cooperation’s wheels. Some states see their masculinity as affirmed in the interstate equivalent of rape and pillage, while other states see it in chivalry, honor, and a sense of the genteel. ¶ While Waltz might classify these differences as merely capabilities gaps, different state functions in the community of states do not map one-to- one onto capabilities. Instead, I propose that they map onto the ways that gender shapes state identities and functions. As Peterson (2010) notes, ‘not only subjects but also concepts, desires, tastes, styles, ways of knowing y can be [masculinized or] feminized,’ such that states’ ontological security is related to their gendered identities. For example, a number of feminist analyses of the United States during the first Gulf War identify its policy ¶ choices and military strategies as consonant with a new, post-Cold War ‘tough-but-tender’ image of the United States’ masculinity, which maintained the Cold War-era projection of strength, but added an element of sensitivity and a chivalric conception of protecting the weak (e.g. Niva 1998; Sjoberg 2006a). Seemingly inconsonant functions for the US military as at once an attack force and a tool for protection then make sense, because the state does function differently based on its self-perception of identity, which might be seen as (at least in part) a product of structural gender hierarchy in the international arena.

### Warming/Climate Change

#### GCMs and mainstream climate science are entrenched in masculinity which distorts their conclusions and erases the gendered nature of warming

Nagel 16

(Joane, 2016, Distinguished Professor of Sociology at the University of Kansas, is the author of Race, Ethnicity, and Sexuality: Intimate Intersections, Forbidden Frontiers., Gender and Climate Change: Impacts, Science, Policy, Routledge, hardback, JKS)

Gender Critique of Climate Change Science

If gender matters in some medical research, does it matter in all medical research, or all scientific research, especially climate science? Various critics of the research findings of the IPCC have focused on its reliance on large-scale general circulation models (GCMs).69 Feminist scholars argue that GCMs reflect a classically masculine approach which minimizes knowledge gained from human lived experience in favor of abstract mathematical representations of reality.7°Climate change skeptics charge that the models are "alarmist" social constructions that generate "phantom threats" designed to satisfy environmental press groups and to promote scientists' self-interest in fame and funding. Beyond their negative evaluations of GCMs, there is little other common ground for proponents of these two critiques, though both likely would agree that:¶ [I]t is difficult to imagine an environmental phenomenon less directly observable, more remote from everyday experience, and more dependent on the technical apparatus of science for con-structing its apparent "reality" than the so-called greenhouse effect.72¶ Although GCMs are acknowledged by their designers to be complex, inaccurate, and incomplete representations of the actual global climate system, they are the backbone of the IPCC reports.73 Climate models rest on the prestige of their mainly male designers (prominent scientists and engineers), advanced technology used to create them (supercomputers), technical language (Navier-Stokes equations and computation ally intensive numerical models), and elevated status of the institution where they are refined and tested (national laboratories, scientific agencies, leading universities).¶ The work of climate scientists and the IPCC has been and remain essential to understanding the physical processes associated with climate change and sounding the alarm about its seriousness. The predictions of these models and the science that supported them were' the basis of our discussion of climate change and its impacts in the¶ previous three chapters. In fact, we spent the last two entire chapters examining the impacts of climate change on men and women, relying largely on the findings associated with GCMs reported in the 2013 IPCC's AR5, Climate Change 2013: 1he Physical Science Basis. Despite the importance of this research, there have been major ~~blind spots~~ weaknesses in¶ climate science and the work of the IPCC, particularly in the area of¶ climate justice, and especially with regard to gender inequalities related to climate change.¶ In the first three chapters of this book on gender and climate change we¶ depended on the 1552-page IPCC Working Group I report on Climate Change 2013 - The Physical Science Basis to estimate the gendered¶ implications of its predictions, though the words “gender” or¶ “women'' never appear in its pages. A word search of the report does, however generate dozens of entries for "human," mostly referring to human influence on the climate system. Apparently the IPCC's AR5 Working Group I is interested in humans, but not men or women. A similar search of the IPCC AR5 of Working Group II's "Summary for Policymakers," which focused on climate change "impacts, adaptation, and vulnerability," yields similar results - no men or women, only humans. The same absence of references to gender or women characterized IPCC ARS of Working Group Ill's "Summary for Policymakers," which focused on "mitigation of climate change." Some of the chapters of the full Working Group II and III reports do reference gender and women, but they do not discuss men, and few readers look beyond the more succinct "Summary" documents, since presumably that is what is important for policymakers and non-specialists to know.¶ The disjuncture between "human'' causes and impacts of climate ¶ change and the gender causes and impacts, or the class or racial or regional or age-related causes and impacts of reflects the level of generality of much climate change science, including climate models. Climate science depicts the causes and impacts of climate change as a universal process in which human distinctions are irrelevant. This emphasis on "human" obscures differences between men and women, rich and poor, young and old, educated and uneducated, urban and rural, or global North and global South as they¶ relate to the causes and consequences of climate change. “Human" implies a common and equal contribution to and fate in the face of climate chance.¶ “Human” ignores unequal inputs as well as unequal impacts within ¶ and across populations. A critique of this universalism is that while we all may be human, and we all may be in this¶ together, we do not all equally contribute to the problem,¶ nor are we going to have the same experience of climate change. The IPP acknowledges¶ that historically most greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions originated in the global North with increasingly catastrophic effects in the global South. Its failure to deconstruct "anthropogenic” climate change, however, obscures the raced, classed, and gendered nature of both its causes and consequences.¶ The focus of GCMs and IPCC reports on "humans" creates a comfortable "objectivity" and distance for the model makers- a safe space that equalizes blame for the problem being studied by¶ mostly male climate scientists from developed countries. By¶ emphasizing the “human contribution" to climate change, researchers can¶ ignore exactly which groups of humans are doing the causing and paper over who is responsible for climate injustices and inequality. How should we understand climate modelers' difference-erasing focus on the universal "human'' aspects of climate change? The study of gender inequalities in European molecular biology cited above offers two possible explanations: the emphasis on "human" is because male scientists do not see any significant differences among humans, or because they prefer not to acknowledge differences that are an indictment of the system in which they have not only an investment,¶ but a controlling interest. Critics make a direct connection between¶ the overrepresentation of men in climate science and policy and the¶ gender biases and ~~blind spots~~ weaknesses in both climate science and climate policy.¶ Men dominate the issue at all levels, as scientific and economic experts, entrepeneurs, policy makers and spokespeople. Since the 1970s climate change had been identified and explained by natural scientists... It is not irrelevant that the majority of climate scientists are men. The Intergovernmental Panel on ¶ Climate Change (IPCC) is mostly made up of male scientists, with "chairman'' Rajendra Pachauri leading at the global level. Men also dominate in the climate policy arena ... The most prominent politicians associated with the issue are male ... In 2007 an Internet survey of "global consumers" in 47 countries¶ conducted by The Nielsen Company and Oxford University found that 18 out of the 22 "most influential spokespeople on climate change” are men.

### Econ

#### Reducing life to existing economic markers disavows the really-existing labor such as care and nurturing which aren’t given an economic valuation. Such a masculine measure of economics epistemically guarantees their predictions are false while sustaining exploitation and violence against women.

Roberts 15

(Adrienne Roberts is Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Manchester. (2015) Gender, Financial Deepening and the Production of Embodied Finance: Towards a Critical Feminist Analysis, Global Society, 29:1, 107-127, DOI: 10.1080/13600826.2014.975189, JKS)

Theorising Finance as Gendered and Embodied The centrality of bodies to economic processes is a basic ontological premise that underpins the great majority of feminist economics and feminist International Political Economy (IPE), though this is often implicit rather than explicit. Drawing on fem- inist and historical materialist scholarship, we can identify three theoretical entry points, or premises, that are useful for thinking about both the inherently embodied nature of finance and the specific ways in which TBF agendas work to produce, or at times to disappear, bodies. The first premise is that all economies, including financial economies, are constituted by productive and reproductive labour, including the labour associated with biological reproduction. Insofar as many of the projects associ- ated with TBF remove from view the vast amounts of labour linked to social reproduction, they intensify the demands placed on women as workers and nurturers. The second premise is that we are witnessing the increasing “financialisation of social reproduction”, which is contributing to the commodification of women’s bodily capacities as they are projected as “untapped resources” in need of exploitation by (Western) capital. The third premise is that financial deepening contributes to the differential production of bodies, which includes the production of differences between bodies that stem from the differential valuation of their labour (the valuation of paid above unpaid, productive above reproductive, etc.). The production of differ- ence also takes shape here through processes that work to ostensibly erase the bodies of financial consumers in the Global North (i.e. through “abstract” assessments of risk) while actively producing financial consumers in the Global South as “people of the body” who make good investments precisely because of their association with maternalism. I will elaborate each of these in turn. (1) Economies are constituted by productive and reproductive labour, including the labour associated with biological reproduction. The first theoretical entry point is based on the observation first made by socialist feminists in the 1970s and 1980s that the economy is constituted by the social relations of labour that are involved in the production and exchange of commod- ities and the meeting of human needs on a daily and generational basis.8 These latter forms of labour are now more commonly described as “social reproduction”, which has a distinctly embodied dimension as it includes the work associated with: (a) biological reproduction (including social constructions of motherhood); (b) the reproduction, socialisation and education of the labour force; and (c) the reproduc- tion and provisioning of care.9 This work is linked to historically specific ideals regarding the gendered division of labour that feminise the (paid and unpaid) work of social reproduction and contribute to its devaluation.10 Given that finance is deeply connected to other forms of production and exchange, it should also be seen as structurally linked to labouring bodies, as well as to the mothering and caring bodies that together perform the productive and reproductive labour underpinning accumulation in capitalist societies. Most mainstream economics would reject this view of finance, as finance tends to be treated as an objective (and pseudo-scientific) tool that is used to allocate assets and liabilities across time. Bodies, as bearers of productive and reproductive labour, do not generally appear at all, though an abstract figure of homo oeconomicus does figure into the analysis. In this andocentric model, homo oeconomicus is presumed to represent all people, appearing as both disembodied and socially disembedded. Feminist economists have called this the “separative-self model”, as it abstracts the utility-maximizing rational actor away from all other social forms and leaves little to no room for considering non-maximizing behaviour and motivations (i.e., love, nurture, altruism, etc.).11 Yet, in the process of removing the material body from economic analysis, it simultaneously works to devalue the bodies of those tradition- ally associated with “non-rational” and “emotional” behaviour, which have historically included the poor, women and non-European “others”.12 What is particularly interesting when using this lens to look at the gender dis- courses of TBF is that while it tends to adhere to a neoclassical view of markets as coordinating mechanisms that are fundamentally disembodied and gender- neutral, it also draws on a historically constructed view of female economic actors as mothering and nurturing. That is, the body reappears here as women’s higher aversion to risk and greater likelihood to invest in their children is natura- lised, and implicitly linked to their (socio-)biological role as mothers. Yet, as I will further evidence in the third section, this does not lead the proponents of TBF to see markets as inherently gendered, but rather, gender continues to be externalised from broader economic processes. (2) The “financialisation of social reproduction” is rendering women’s bodies particularly susceptible to processes of commodification and exploitation A second theoretical entry point for thinking about the relationship between finance, gender and bodies has been opened up by recent writing on what we might refer to as “the financialisation of social reproduction”, by which I mean the mediation of social reproduction through financial markets and interest- paying financial transactions.13 For instance, it has been well documented in the academic and policy literature that finance has become increasingly important in mediating the social relations of housing (i.e. through privatised and securitised mortgage financing), forms of consumption (i.e. by using credit cards to pay for food), education (i.e. though student loans and, in the US, loans to pay for all levels of schooling), security in old age (i.e. through the privatisation of pension plans), and so on.14 In one of the clearest theoretical engagements with this trend, Bryan, Martin and Rafferty point out that the linking of financial circuits of accumulation to the reproduction of labour—though interest payments made on credit used to buy the commodities necessary for reproduction and other means—is helping to reconstitute labour as a form of capital.15 Although very little of this literature deploys a gender analysis or uses a frame- work of social reproduction per se, it is important in offering empirical evidence regarding the ways in which social reproduction, which has always been structu- rally linked to the accumulation of capital, is increasingly being structurally linked to finance. Given women’s positioning at the crossroads of production and social reproduction, it is therefore rather unsurprising that women’s bodies are increasingly being framed as “untapped resources” that offer potential profits to financial and other firms.

### Gendered Language

#### Their \_\_\_\_\_\_ evidence uncritically uses gendered language, which is a reason to reject their argument entirely. Gendered language discourages women to enter the field of IR and naturalizes patriarchal norms.

Mendenhall 15

(Beth, 2-26-25, Elizabeth Mendenhall is a PhD candidate at Johns Hopkins University, working with Daniel Deudney on a dissertation about the challenge of scientific and technological change for global commons regimes., THE BADASS HERSELF, [What You Say is What You Get: The Gender Problem in IR](http://www.e-ir.info/2015/02/26/what-you-say-is-what-you-get-the-gender-problem-in-ir/), <http://www.e-ir.info/2015/02/26/what-you-say-is-what-you-get-the-gender-problem-in-ir/>, JKS)

“Gendered language” refers to words that carry unnecessary masculine connotations, but are purportedly gender-neutral according to users and dictionaries. But the intention of the speaker and the denotation of a word [do not control the meaning](http://www.e-ir.info/2015/02/26/what-you-say-is-what-you-get-the-gender-problem-in-ir/books.google.com/books#v=onepage&q&f=false) that is received and internalized by listeners. Research in psychology suggests that word choice influences our [perception](https://litigation-essentials.lexisnexis.com/webcd/app?action=DocumentDisplay&crawlid=1&doctype=cite&docid=27+Okla.+City+U.L.+Rev.+297&srctype=smi&srcid=3B15&key=1564c455f2b7f916d000d5ea2fd5c01a) and [cognition](http://books.google.com/books/about/Language_Mind_and_Culture_A_Practical_In.html?id=rvgafOskC6gC), such that gendered language actually reinforces patriarchal attitudes about [who](http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev.psych.54.101601.145041) is qualified or expected to be a “congressman” or “statesman.” In other words, the connotation shapes the meaning of words, which shapes our understanding of concepts. Many gendered words, like “mankind,” have perfectly good alternatives that eschew any reference to gender, like “humankind” or “humanity.” These linguistic options, in addition to the [decreasing popularity of gendered words](https://www.academia.edu/1597246/The_extinction_of_masculine_generics) in the social sciences, present a puzzle for IR: why are so many IR academics still using gendered language, when they don’t have to, and when they should know better?¶ The list of gendered IR terms is long: “statesman,” “brinksmanship,” “man-made,” “mankind,” “manning,” and “manpower” are some of the most common. As a young woman pursuing a career in mainstream IR, and with an interest in security studies, these words add insult to the injury of seeing panels, syllabi, and the [TRIPS survey](https://trip.wm.edu/reports/2014/rp_2014/) dominated by men. These discouragements to women entering a male-dominated field are often overlooked because they are psychological. Being one of few women in an ISA panel makes one feel highly visible at best, and unwelcome at worst. Gendered language sends the message that I am not expected to be a foreign policymaker (because authors choose “statesman”) or the chair of a committee (because authors choose “chairman”). These kinds of daily exclusions weigh on my psyche.¶ I am often told, in response to such complaints, that I should take a class, attend a panel, or contact a scholar who works on Feminist IR theory. I am a materialist, a theorist of geopolitics. I should not have to change my scholarly interest in order to find an inclusive community. No subject or topic is inherently male-dominated, so there must be something discouraging women from pursuing the most masculinized areas of study. It is the responsibility of all IR scholars to help identify and extirpate the reasons young women are deterred from particular topics. The best places to look are those where we make active choices, choices that can be re-thought and re-directed to neutralize the highly gendered spaces we create with our words and actions.¶ Replacing “man-made” with “anthropogenic,” or coining “brinkship” to replace “brinksmanship,” will not solve the gender problem in International Relations, but it will increase the visibility of [our quotidian contributions to patriarchy](http://search.proquest.com/docview/1530414732?accountid=11752). What we read reinforces what we see, and what we write [reflects what we want to see](http://link.springer.com/article/10.1023%2FB%3ASERS.0000037757.73192.06). I do not see myself in most of the texts that I study and engage with. I do not see people who look like me on the Presidential Theme Panels at the ISA. Affirmative action in admissions, hiring, and panel placement can only do so much because there is problem of “self selection.” We need to seriously consider the idea that women select their field at least partially because of the “man-made” social environment that surrounds it.¶ My power is not “manpower,” but it is just as strong.

### Inevitability of Violence

#### Claiming violence is inevitable is what justifies the logic of “the worse of two evils” and necessitates a security state to protect against such violence.

Wright ’10 (Susan is Research Scientist in History of Science and International Relations in the Institute for Research on Women and Gender at the University of Michigan. “10 Feminist theory and arms control.” In Gender and International Security. Pg. 206-207. 2010.)-GirlsDebate

Bull and Schelling justify the use of “power over” states that are treated as adversaries, or potential adversaries, in several ways. First, violence in the state system, and therefore the need to defend against it, are taken as given. As Bull wrote: It is true that strategists take the fact of military force as their starting point … The capacity for organized violence between states is inherent in the nature of man and the environment. The most that can be expected from a total disarmament agreement is that it might make armaments and armed forces fewer and more primitive.75 This claim of the inevitability of violence and the consequent need for military protection have been extensively analyzed by feminist theorists. If violence is inevitable, then someone or something is required to defend against it. Jean Elshtain, Laura Sjoberg, and other feminist theorists have demonstrated the pervasive tradition of western political thought that claims that the inevitability of violence calls for the services of a Just Warrior (representing variously the state military apparatus or the soldier) who is “engaged in the regrettable but sometimes necessary task of collective violence in order to prevent some greater wrong” to the Beautiful Soul, representing variously patria or the homeland or innocent civilians.76 Bull’s political philosophy falls completely within this tradition.

### National Security

#### National security is profoundly gendered- it relies on binaries like protector/protected that sanitize global violence and shut down questions about militarism

Eroukhmanoff, PhD, 17

(Clara, IR@LondonSouthBank, A feminist reading of Foreign policy under Trump: Mother of All Bombs, wall ‘and the “locker room banter”‘, Critical Studies on Security, DOI: 10.1080/21624887.2017.1355156

This article offers a gendered reading of three recent events under newly elected Donald J. Trump: the attempt to build a ‘beautiful wall’ between Mexico and the United States, the recent Mother Of All Bombs (MOAB) military strike in Afghanistan and the ‘locker room talk’ scandal that emerged during the 2016 election campaign. I relate these events to international security by disturbing the cultural grammar on which these events are founded and respond to the feminist call that ‘the personal is international and the international is personal’ (Enloe [1989] 2000). A feminist American foreign policy analysis of ‘100 Days of Trump’ brings attention to the ways in which bordering practices like wall-building and military interventions are rendered legitimate through constructed gendered tropes that, in turn, transform the wider war on terrorism into a private ‘family affair’. In this light, military strikes are not political acts requiring legitimation in the public sphere but instead are necessary disciplinary tools unqualified for political discussion. The field of International Security addresses questions about the interactions between more or less secure sovereign states in an anarchical international system but tends to ignore questions about gender. In this view, states are considered as clearly separated entities in an anarchical international system ‘who’ become ‘alive’ by being attributed anthropomorphic qualities: they have a ‘body’ (the nation) and a mind (the state) with a capacity to think ‘rationally’ (Wadley 2010, 38). As Wadley (2010) notes, ‘this means that states are gendered, and are gendered in much the same way as people are: through repeated performances’. An example of this performance is the recent launch of the MOAB attack in the Nangarhar province. On 13 April 2017, the US military sent the largest non-nuclear bomb to Afghanistan, which impact, according to Afghans, ‘felt like the heavens were falling’ (Rasmussen for The Guardian, Rasmussen 2017). This colloquialism, which has dominated most accounts of the attack, has three important functions. First, it feminises the Other (the Islamic State) by forcing the Islamic State to be passive through the act of a feminine actor, the ‘Mother’. According to White House Press Secretary Sean Spicer (2017), the ‘Mother’ was launched to deny the Islamic State ‘operational access’. In turn, the feminisation of the Islamic State reaffirms US masculinity and agency. Linda Åhäll (2015) argues that ideas of motherhood and maternalism are valued as agency in International Relations (IR). Indeed, the ‘Mother attack’ is written as a powerful manifestation of US power. The strike is described with action verbs underpinned by sexualised masculine tropes of aggression, all in the active voice. The MOAB, is ‘designed for destroying underground targets but is not a deep-earth penetrating weapon’ (Rasmussen 2017 emphasis added). It ‘exploded above a complex of caves and tunnels’ and ‘killed dozens of ISIS fighters’ (CNN 2017 emphasis added). This excitement was shared by Fox News talk show host Geraldo Rivera and guests, who broadcasted the video over the top of country singer Toby Keith singing ‘courtesy of the red, white and blue’ and praised the attack as ‘what freedom looks like’ (Jamieson 2017). Making weapons exciting is not new. Carol Cohn (1987) has written in length about the phallic imagery that suffused the world of defence intellectuals during the Cold War. Cohn (1987) suggests that the words that described nuclear weapons as ‘vertical erectors, thrustto-weight ratios, soft lay downs, deep penetration’ constitute a form of distance by removing military strategists from the possibilities of nuclear destruction and instead making them thrilling. As Duncanson and Eschle (2008, 549) argue, ‘it makes the nuclear arms race seem the stuff of funny locker-room rivalry, denying its deadly consequences’. While action and sexualised verbs describing the strike has the potential to make military endeavours exciting while minimising harm, the reference to a ‘Mother’ also associates the strike with something that is instinctive, maternal and thus the product of a natural order. The work of Ruth Bloch (1978) on the rise of the Moral Mother in America in the mid-nineteenth century is quite insightful here. From the eighteenth century onwards, printed literature began to stress the unique value of the maternal role (Bloch 1978, 109). It merged New England Puritan ideas about women as ‘help-meet’, a form of domestic competence in assisting roles for men and essentially female subordination to them, and eighteenth-century notions of purity, femininity and ornamental refinement. In examining childcare books of this period, Bloch (1978) finds that mothers, who were considered as the natural carers of their infant, were also expected to ‘establish gentle but firm discipline as early as possible’. In this ‘MOAB’ war story, the United States is made the natural and legitimate actor who can nurse the Islamic State and be in charge of their physical management (‘denying them operational space’). More importantly, this war story equates the attack to a moral mission, just as women were idealised above all as ‘transmitters of moral values’ (Bloch 1978). Concomitantly, the ultimate goal of the strike becomes one of protection, moral directive and nurture, defining the relationship between a Moral Mother and her infant, and not one of war, aggressiveness or masculinity. Launching the GBU-43/B in the Nangahar province is a moral duty of care, just as Moral Mothers had a duty to protect their infant. Therefore, calling the largest airdrop munitions in the US arsenal a ‘Mother’ also infantilises the Islamic State. In this construction, bombing the Islamic State is not an act of war, but a necessary act of discipline of badly behaved children.1 Family tropes shape perception of military interventions by making certain interpretations more visible than others. For instance, referring to NATO at the end of the Cold War as a ‘nuclear family’ that welcomed ex-Soviet countries who ‘just got divorced’ and ‘looking to get married immediately’ attempt to naturalise unequal relations of power between countries in the international system (Costigliola 1997, 163). The second repeated performance reaffirming the gendered nature of the United States involves the practice of wall-building. At the heart of ‘America First’ and ‘make America great again’ is the idea of a community that is in decline. Not only does America ‘not win anymore’ but America is letting others control and dominate the American nation. On the one hand, the nation is gendered by acquiring a status of being threatened and in need of protection. ‘Bringing back borders’ here constitutes a practice that protects this gendered community against the ‘ravages of other countries’ (Trump 2017), which according to Trump, can be made secure again by the erection of a wall. Indeed, the ‘American carnage stops right here and stops right now’ (Trump 2017). On the other hand, the wall reinstates the state as masculine protector of the nation. This wall is ‘physical, tall, powerful, beautiful, southern’ and importantly, it is ‘impenetrable’ (Trump 2016b). The raison d’être of the nation-state is thus preserved through the fencing of the border, by physically locking out immigrant Others and other threatening states. Other security practices, by contrast, lock bodies in. On 7 October 2016, at the height of Donald J. Trump’s campaign, a lewd video revealed Trump boasting about ‘grabbing women by the pussy’ and ‘moving onto a woman like a bitch’ (Trump 2016a). This language was described as illustrating ‘rape culture’ (Dirks 2016) according to the New York Times, ‘constitut- [ing] rape culture’ (Mahdawi 2016) according to The Guardian, and ‘directly contributing to rape culture’ (Rivesz 2016) according to The Independent. Trump constructed the locker room as a non-political space, in which the agency of female bodies was irrelevant or was subjected to the power of a masculine other. Indeed, ‘they [women] let you do it, you can do whatever you want’ (Rivesz 2016). In response, Trump 2016a apologised ‘if anyone was offended’ and stated that his words were ‘locker room banter, a private conversation that took place many years ago’. By dismissing this incident as ‘locker room banter’, it implied that what goes on in the locker room should be left and ‘locked in’ the private sphere. Yet Trump’s comments in the ‘locker room’ are not simply a private matter of female agency. It entails a much more complex construction of a gendered subject along national lines. Forms of power between men and women in seemingly ‘private’ spaces are connected to forms of power in the international system (Enloe 2013, 40). ‘National security’ is gendered by reproducing the protector (state)/ protected (nation) script. As Hansen (2000, 59 original emphasis) notes, ‘gender security’ cannot be examined outside of the concept of ‘national security’ but ‘the discourse of “national security” might silence women’s security problems when “women’s problems” conflict with the securities of the national community’. Indeed, addressing gender security in the locker room may entail unlocking the American nation to encounter the Other, which is far from Trump’s strategy in building the beautiful wall. For feminist scholars of security and foreign policy, the research agenda is widened by expanding the analysis beyond war and international conflict to include poverty, patriarchy, domestic violence, rape (Sjoberg 2010, 4) and essentially ‘locker room banter’. The goal here is one of internationalising the locker room by examining the scandal as a security problem, not only of women in the locker room, but embedded in the construction of the American nation as an insecure community. Disturbing the cultural grammar2 of foreign policy thus involves seeing the gendered nature of military interventions entwined with what goes on in the locker room. The US–Mexico wall attempts to materialise and maintain gendered dichotomies between the national and the international, the inside and the outside, and importantly between the private/locker room and the public/political room. It is not only a wall between two states; it can be problematised to border two sets of spaces: the American nation and the locker room. ‘Winning again’ by regaining borders is thus tantamount to locking power hierarchies in the locker room and not simply a matter of ‘national security’. (1-3)

### Russia/Putin

#### The disad reinforces a gendered understanding of Putin’s national identity, which turns the DA

Riabov and Riabova 14

(Oleg Riabov & Tatiana Riabova (2014), Oleg Riabov is professor of philosophy and director of the Center for Ethnic and Nationalism Studies at Ivanovo State University, Russia. Tatiana Riabova is professor of sociology at Ivanovo State University The Remasculinization of Russia?, Problems of Post-Communism, 61:2, 23-35, DOI: 10.2753/PPC1075-8216610202, JKS)

Representing Nations: Masculinizing Us, Feminizing Them

In addition to establishing Putin as a symbol of national masculinity, the remasculinization of Russia requires the attachment of masculine attributes to the image of the nation itself. Carol Cohn points out, “to be abstract, logical, or dispassionate is not simply to be those things but also to be manly. And to be manly is not simply to be manly but also to be in the more highly valued position in the discourse. In other words, to exhibit a trait on that list is not neutral—it is not simply displaying some basic human characteristics. It also positions you in a discourse of gender. It associates you with a particular gender, and also with a higher or lower valuation.”50 In examining the gender connotations of Russia’s new image, we focus on such characteristics as independence and strength. First, these characteristics are dominant components of masculinity in modern cultures. Second, they have become marked as really masculine in the post-Soviet period, as survey results show.51 Moreover, independence has a clear gender association, especially in contemporary Russia. In analyzing the customs of post-Soviet societies, Elena Gapova writes, when poor, women still remain women (and even feminine): they are women “by the virtue of their bodies,” and hardly anything can change this perception of what they are. Not so with men: manhood is not about their bodies (or not only about their bodies), and those lacking affluence lack a big part of what constitutes masculinity. I refer here to the social construction of normative masculinity, which explains why the man pays for dinner at the restaurant. The reverse would also be true, i.e., paying for dinner makes him a man.52 In the 1990s, Russia’s dependence on foreign aid was evaluated as evidence of the country’s lack of self-determination and hence nonmasculinity. The idea of “sovereign democracy” became an ideological cornerstone of Putin’s second term. Sovereignty is seen as an opportunity for Russia to decide its own fate, to render it less dependent on international financial organizations, to make it a subject rather than an object in world politics, to lay claim to a measure of self-sufficiency—these are precisely the things credited to Putin’s rule. The second essential trait of the new image of Russia is strength. One might even describe a cult of strength in Russia—whether applied to national military might, athletic achievements, or the fitness of national leaders. Meriting our attention are Putin’s comments on the terrorist attack in Beslan in September 2004: “We displayed weakness, and the weak are always beaten.”53 In 2012, Putin wrote in his preelection article, “we should not tempt anyone by allowing ourselves to be weak.”54 The results of sociological surveys in Russia attest that these claims by Kremlin leaders reflect the opinion of many Russians. In 2003, one Russian sociological foundation asked respondents to complete the sentence “I would like the world to regard Russia as . . .” Forty-eight percent of respondents wished to represent the country as mighty or invincible; 22 percent chose wealthy or prosperous; and 9 percent picked independent. Only 6 percent preferred the perception of Russia as an educated or cultured nation, and 3 percent favored peaceful or friendly.55 The growing popularity of Russia’s “bear” image serves as an indirect confirmation of the trend toward cultivating strength as an attribute of Russians. This popularity, to be sure, has another source as well. It was generated by United Russia, whose logo is a polar bear. 56 At the same time, one should take into account that people of various political sympathies support this symbol. Its strength and ability to defend itself makes the bear the best symbol of the nation in the eyes of many Russians. As indicated by our sociological survey and interviews held in Russia (2009), strength is the primary trait associated with the bear as an allegory of Russia.57 Along with the “Russian bear,” the other image intended to demonstrate the country’s growing strength is “Russia rising from its knees,” which first appeared in Putin’s rhetoric in September 1999.58 This image, in fact, has served as one of most important means of legitimating power, especially in the 2012 presidential campaign.59 “Russia has once and for all risen from its knees. Now it is taking the next step: putting the rest of the world on its knees”—so journalists venomously commented on Dmitry Medvedev’s Foreign Policy Concept, proclaimed early in his presidency.60 As David Campbell points out, identity is constituted in relation to differences, while differences are constituted in relation to identity.61 Representations of the Other thus serve as a necessary part of an ideal image of Self. As social identity theory postulates, the desire for a positive identity, one of the basic needs of human beings, is realized not only by improving the image of the Self but also by worsening the image of the Other.62 The reverse side of remasculinization is demasculinizing Others, both external and internal, in mass-media discourse and political rhetoric. This symbolic demasculinization has been applied to the former “fraternal countries” of Eastern Europe and the post-Soviet states—particularly those that have undergone color revolutions. Political opposition by these states to Russian interests is often attributed to U.S. influence, with the states themselves portrayed as lacking sovereignty and independence—hence masculinity. Metaphors and images further demasculinize the neighbors. The case of Ukraine serves as a good example. In the gas supply dispute of 2006, a Russian television program described Ukraine as a Mammonish kept woman, a “flighty Ukrainian mistress” (TVTS-Postskriptum, March 26, 2006). Protestors at a demonstration near the U.S. Embassy in Moscow held a poster with the slogan “A Gentleman Always Pays for His Girlfriend,” calling on the United States to pay off Ukraine’s debts to Russia. In criticizing the Ukrainian leaders’ politics during the next gas war in 2009, Putin compared transit counties with an overly picky girl: “They should have no illusions; the girls should have no illusions: the groom has other choices; they have to understand.”63 The other target of criticism is Poland, especially during Lech Kaczyński’s presidency. It is no wonder that the Polish professor Włodzimierz Marciniak considers the image of Poland as a prostitute the most widespread stereotype among Russians. In his opinion, this stereotype has its sources in Russians’ attitudes toward the world: they believe that only large states have a say; the rest can only sell themselves.64 Indeed, Russian newspaper articles often mention “sponsors of Poland,” and users of Internet forums frequently evoke the metaphor of prostitution.65 Furthermore, Poland’s military and political weakness is emphasized, especially in contrast to the strength of the Russian bear.66 The West traditionally serves as the most important Other for Russian identity. Analyzing the remarkable shift in Russians’ perceptions of Us and Them, Edward Lucas points out that in the mid-2000s, the West ceased to be an indisputable moral authority for Russia.67 The same point applies to gender issues. In the 1990s, Western masculinity—above all, American masculinity— was considered a model, while Western civilization was endowed with masculine characteristics (strength, rationality, independence, individualism). In the 2000s, the situation changed, as reflected in various types of discourse.

### Terrorism

#### Their seemingly benign understanding of terror only regenerates masculine war-making.

Athanassiou 12

(Cerelia, PhD candidate at the School of Sociology, Politics and International Studies (SPAIS) at the University of Bristol, UK. Her research is on conceptualisations of security post-9/11, focusing specifically on the discursive strategies used by the Obama administration to disempower the Global War on Terror., ‘Gutsy’ Decisions and Passive Processes ¶ THE WARRIOR DECISION-MAKER AFTER THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR, International Feminist Journal of Politics, 2014, Vol. 16, No. 1, 6–25, JKS)

Analytically, the exceptionality of the GWOT most usefully serves in high- lighting its continuities with ‘normal’ politics (see Grewal 2005: 197; Puar 2007: 76; Richter-Montpetit 2007: 40; Parpart and Zalewski 2008: 5). The effects of the Obama administration’s efforts to roll back the GWOT’s overt militarization with a ‘return to the rule of law’ do not signify change from the masculine ‘war machine’, but rather generate this ‘war machine’s’ very conditions of existence. It is, after all, the warrior’s logic that is privileged and channelled through every decision, and it is this logic that subordinates other, seemingly more passive, processes. The Washington Post editorial on the killing of Osama bin Laden quoted Senator Lindsey Graham’s rationaliz- ation of the decision to kill and not capture: ‘From a Navy Seal perspective, you had to believe that this guy [Osama bin Laden] was a walking IED [impro- vised explosive device]’ (Washington Post 2011). A militarized understanding and treatment of ‘national security’ continues to re-write itself into the ¶ workings of the State, enabling the hegemonic masculinity of the warrior decision-maker to keep privileging itself, preventing meaningful change from happening. If we heed Enloe’s (2000: 3) invaluable advice on the matter, we notice that these are exactly the workings of militarization, and through that, of a continuing GWOT: ‘The more militarization transforms an individual or a society, the more that individual or society comes to imagine military needs and militaristic presumptions to be not only valuable but also normal’. It is this veneration of militarism, and its associated gender and race hierarchies, that offer the clue on the lack of change. ¶ Obama’s insistence on reintroducing the rule of law went against the tra- ditional understanding of ‘security’ because masculine posturing, not feminine public negotiation, is traditionally seen as being most effective in protecting the nation-state and its ‘women and children’ (Enloe 2007: 60–1). However, articulations on the importance of the law also prop up the warrior’s agenda: Abdulmutallab’s prosecution is an aspect of an operation geared pre- cisely towards achieving the effects of the bin Laden episode (see Cohen 2011). With the most recent debates centring on the validity of extrajudicially killing US citizens, we are shown a system in which the status of the warrior has not diminished (see Holder 2012), despite the promise in 2008 that different atti- tudes might be prioritized. Carver (2008: 84) provides valuable support here, because he points to the overarching framework of international politics that ‘incorporates a myth of a unitary, unproblematic masculinised being – “warrior man”/“economic man” – whose world is not in fact bifurcated by a war/peace distinction, but is rather one world of competitive, aggressive, self- interested and somewhat paranoid strategic interaction’ (emphasis in original). In such a framework, the ‘rational decision-maker’ alone cannot deliver any meaningful change when he is so closely correlated to the ‘warrior’; this was demonstrated by Obama’s reintroduction of the ‘rule of law’ only to keep subor- dinating it to the demands of the GWOT’s framework of war. The hegemonic masculinity of the executive decision-maker clearly has to privilege warrior definitions of ‘toughness’ over dangerous forays into public deliberation and accountability; and that is the masculine reality of national security.

### U.S. Leadership

#### “Global leadership” is code for masculine protection. The aff is the benevolent masculine protector who attempts to save feminized groups from insecurity, which requires women to forfeit autonomy to gain protection.

Young 03

(Iris Marion, Department of Political Science University of Chicago, The Logic of Masculinist Protection: Reflections on the Current Security State, Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 2003, vol. 29, no. 1], pgs 4-5, JKS)

The logic of masculinist protection contrasts with a model of masculinity assumed by much feminist theory, of masculinity as self-consciously dominative. On the male domination model, masculine men wish to mas- ter women sexually for the sake of their own gratification and to have the pleasures of domination. They bond with other men in comradely male settings that give them specific benefits from which they exclude women, and they harass women in order to enforce this exclusion and maintain their superiority (MacKinnon 1987; May 1998, chaps. 4–6).¶ This image of the selfish, aggressive, dominative man who desires sexual capture of women corresponds to much about male-dominated institutions and the behavior of many men within them. For my purposes in this essay, however, it is important to recall another apparently more benign image of masculinity, one more associated with ideas of chivalry. In this latter image, real men are neither selfish nor do they seek to enslave or overpower others for the sake of enhancing themselves. Instead, the gallantly masculine man is loving and self-sacrificing, especially in relation to women. He faces the world’s difficulties and dangers in order to shield women from harm and allow them to pursue elevating and decorative arts. The role of this courageous, responsible, and virtuous man is that of a protector.¶ The “good” man is one who keeps vigilant watch over the safety of his family and readily risks himself in the face of threats from the outside in order to protect the subordinate members of his household. The logic of masculinist protection, then, includes the image of the selfish aggressor who wishes to invade the lord’s property and sexually conquer his women. These are the bad men. Good men can only appear in their goodness if we assume that lurking outside the warm familial walls are aggressors who wish to attack them. The dominative masculinity in this way constitutes protective masculinity as its other. The world out there is heartless and uncivilized, and the movements and motives of the men in it are unpredictable and difficult to discern. The protector must therefore take all precautions against these threats, remain watchful and suspicious, and be ready to fight and sacrifice for the sake of his ones (Elshtain 1987, 1992). Masculine protection is needed to make a home a haven.¶ Central to the logic of masculinist protection is the subordinate relation of those in the protected position. In return for male protection, the woman concedes critical distance from decision-making autonomy. When the household lives under a threat, there cannot be divided wills andS I G N S Autumn 2003 ❙ 5¶ arguments about who will do what, or what is the best course of action. The head of the household should decide what measures are necessary for the security of the people and property, and he gives the orders that they must follow if they and their relations are to remain safe. As Stiehm puts it: “The protector cannot achieve status simply through his accom- plishment, then. Because he has dependents he is as socially connected as one who is dependent. He is expected to provide for others. Often a protector tries to get help from and also control the lives of those he protects—in order to ‘better protect’ them” (1982, 372).¶ Feminine subordination, in this logic, does not constitute submission to a violent and overbearing bully. The feminine woman, rather, on this construction, adores her protector and happily defers to his judgment in return for the promise of security that he offers. She looks up to him with gratitude for his manliness and admiration for his willingness to face the dangers of the world for her sake. That he finds her worthy of such risks gives substance to her self. It is only fitting that she should minister to his needs and obey his dictates.¶ Hobbes is the great theorist of political power founded on a need and desire for protection. He depicts a state of nature in which people live in small families where all believe some of the others envy them and desire to enlarge themselves by stealing from or conquering them. As a conse- quence, everyone in this state of nature must live in a state of fear and insecurity, even when not immediately under attack. Households must live with the knowledge that outsiders might wish to attack them, espe- cially if they appear weak and vulnerable, so each must construct defensive fortresses and be on watch. It is only sensible, moreover, to conduct preemptive strikes against those who might wish to attack and to try to weaken them. But each knows that the others are likely to make defensive raids, which only adds to fear and insecurity. In Hobbes’s state of nature some people may be motivated by simple greed and desire for conquest and domination. In this state of nature everyone has reason to feel in- secure, however, not because all have these dominative motives but be- cause he or she is uncertain about who does and each person understands his or her own vulnerability.

## \*\*2AC – AT: Terrorism DA\*\*

### Turn

#### LAWs strengthen terrorist groups and causes proxy escalation.

Ray 19 Trisha Ray [junior fellow with the Cyber Initiative, ORF] Machine-driven weapons need an international system of accountability, February 22, 2019, <https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/lethal-autonomous-weapons-systems-laws-5595449/> SM

In March 2014, hundreds of mysterious gunmen in camouflage appeared on the streets of Crimea and began taking over local government buildings. While Russia initially denied the existence of the “little green men”, as they came to be known, President Vladimir Putin admitted that they were Russian military at the one-year anniversary of the Crimean occupation. Ethical issues and the complete violation of the Geneva Conventions notwithstanding, the logic behind this tactic was quite straightforward and compelling: Aid pro-Russian forces while creating enough uncertainty about Russian involvement so as to prevent NATO retaliation and global backlash. The tactic itself has been deployed by rogue states before, but usually through proxies. Pakistan, for instance, has a history of supporting terrorist and insurgent groups in Jammu and Kashmir. Yet with fewer remaining strategic partners and important resources connecting it to more powerful states, Pakistan no longer possesses the leverage needed to shield itself from international backlash as Russia did. In such an environment, states like Pakistan may be tempted to turn toward new methods to achieve their goals. Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS) — which can detect, select and attack targets without human intervention — are one such avenue. International rules around LAWS are relatively underdeveloped, and in the absence of clear norms on human accountability and attribution for autonomous weapons, we could see states like Pakistan deploy LAWS for operations outside their borders. LAWS present several benefits for “middle powers”: They increase the reach and effectiveness of forces, reduce casualties and enable persistent presence in vast, inaccessible terrains. Countries like India or South Korea, which operate in a complicated geostrategic context, can therefore use LAWS to effectively police and protect their territory. On the flipside, LAWS can be used by state and non-state actors to engage in asymmetric tactics. This could take three forms: A state could directly deploy LAWS against an adversary state; a state could equip proxies such as insurgent or terrorist groups with autonomous weapons units; a non-state actor steals or otherwise illegally acquires autonomous systems or units. With this destabilising potential in mind, external state actors that actively aid insurgencies and terrorist organisations will be tempted to deploy autonomous systems and claim they are stolen or rogue units. While LAWS are still in the development stage and are fairly inaccessible for most states — let alone non-state groups — due to high costs, and lack of skilled AI talent and operators, it is not a complete stretch of imagination to envision a future where autonomous weapons are within the reach of any state or non-state actor that wants them.

## \*\*2AC – AT: Politics DAs\*\*

### Enloe – Must Read

#### Set aside concerns with political will or scarce resources - it’s what makes violence against women possible

Enloe 04 [Cynthia, prof of IR, The Curious Feminist, p. 74]

Thus we need to become more curious about the process of trivialization. How exactly do regimes, opposition parties, judges, popular movements, and the press go about making any incident of violence against women appear trivial? The gendered violence can be explained as inevitable- that is, **not worth the expenditure of political capital**. Or it can be treated by the trivializers as numerically inconsequential, so rare that it would seem wasteful of scarce political will or state resources to try to prevent it. Third, trivialization can be accomplished by engaging in comparisons: how can one spend limited political attention on, say, domestic violence or forced prostitution when there are market forces like global competition, structural adjustment, or nuclear testing to deal with- as if, that is, none of those had any relationship to the incidence of violence against women? Finally, trivialization may take the form of undermining the credibility of the messenger. As early as the 1800's trivializers already were labeling women who spoke out publicly against violence against women as "loose," "prudish," or disappointed (it would be the trivializers twentieth century successors who would thing to add "lesbian").

### Case Turns DA

#### Political leaders’ resistance to ban LAWs demonstrates their impulse to increase control and surveillance---even if they win the DA we are winning a root cause to long term governmental stability.

Sullins, 13 [John Sullins works for Sonoma State University’s department of philosophy, PhD, January 2013, accessed 6/30/22, 978-1-4799-0450-1, Cyber Conflict (CyCon), 2013 5th International Conference on Project: The Morality of Military Robotics, “An ethical analysis of the case for robotic weapons arms control,” https://www.researchgate.net/publication/261238028\_An\_ethical\_analysis\_of\_the\_case\_for\_robotic\_weapons\_arms\_control/]/ISEE

If you are a politician in a liberal democracy, then the technology of unmanned weapons is the answer to your dreams. While armed aggression between liberal democracies is rare, they are involved in many military conflicts driven by clashes with nondemocratic countries or interventions in unstable regions of the world. Given the norms and values espoused in liberal democracies there is a political will to spread the virtues of democracy and check the aggressions of non-democratic powers. But other values and norms such as the distribution of political power to the voting population, severely hampers the governments of these countries who try to act on their military aspirations. There are massive political costs to be paid when it comes to deploying large numbers of troops in foreign lands. Sauer and Schörnig (2012), note that the governments of democracies want to engage in military activities but the citizens of democracies demand that these adventure be low cost with no casualties from their own military and low casualties inflicted on the enemy and local population. [T]he need to reduce costs, the short-term satisfaction of particular ‘risk-transfer rules’ for avoiding casualties, and the upkeep of a specific set of normative values – constitute the special appeal of unmanned systems to democracies” (Sauer and Schörnig, 2012, p. 365). Unmanned weapons systems would seem to allow all constituents within a liberal democracy to achieve their goals. The weapons are not expensive compared to the massive expense of building, deploying and maintaining manned systems. The missions are secret and so small they hardly warrant mention in the daily news back home. There is almost no risk to military personnel in their use and the number of enemy casualties per strike is relatively small. Also, politicians such as President Barack Obama have made claims that these weapons are far less indiscriminate and more tightly controlled in their killing than alternative modes of attack (Landler, 2012). We should note that this claim is backed up by what appears to be questionable methods used in the official calculation of civilian casualties since every adult male in the blast of the weapon is often considered a combatant by default, a claim that is often disputable (Qazi and Jillani, 2012). So the more precise targeting available on modern drones does not necessarily correspond to less civilian casualties (ibid). These weapons also come with a moral veneer that comes from the assumption that a more ethical conduct of war is possible using these machines. Sauer and Schörnig go on to conclude that the political goals along with the normative drives of liberal democracies necessitates that unmanned systems will continue to be armed with more powerful weaponry and that they will be given more demanding missions which will require greater autonomy from the machine (Sauer and Schörnig, 2012, p. 370). This argument shows that we can expect the research into autonomous weapons systems to increase and for these systems to proliferate into every aspect of military activities across the globe. Recent history has given ample empirical evidence to back this theory up. Even though President Obama was elected largely on an anti-war vote, it has been reported that there has been an 8% increase in the use of drones during his first term and in 2011 drones were used in, “…253 strikes – one every four days…. [And] Between 2,347 and 2,956 people are reported to have died in the attacks – most of them militants” (Woods, 2011). This trend has only increased since that time. Other countries such as Israel and Italy are known to operate reconnaissance drones but recently the German government has announced plans to invest in both armed and unarmed drones (Kim, 2013). As the enthusiasm for this technology grows, a mounting opposition movement has also emerged that claims that this technology is not a cheap, easy, casualty free means of propagating just war. Instead they claim that these technologies contribute to unjust military adventures and a indefensibly immoral push button warfare that claims the lives of thousands of innocents caught in the cross fire. In the interest of furthering the ethical use of these technologies, it is important that we give these counter arguments our full attention in this paper. We should note that some technologies can cause what philosophers of technology call reverse adaptation; “…the adjustment of human ends to match the character of the available means” (Winner, 1978, p. 229). This is where the social and political milieu of a society changes to accommodate the inflexibility of a technology, rather than waiting to deploy the technology when it is more suited to the human environment. A prime example would be the way that human societies changed due to the adoption of mass production necessitating all manner of social upheaval that proved to be the fault lines of human conflict over the last two centuries. There are many other examples of this in recent history, think of the social disruption caused by the introduction of the automobile or cellular telephone, etc. It is obvious that autonomous weapons are again confronting our societies with the problems of reverse adaptation. These weapons are completing a trend in technological warfare begun in the nineteenth century that is making traditional notions of ethics in warfare largely untenable. These notions were always on shaky ground to begin with, but the tradition of just war that reaches back to the middle ages has become almost mute in its ability to influence decisions made on the modern battlefield. If this was not worrisome enough, as aging drone technologies are replaced with better equipment, the surplus will find use in civilian law enforcement duties, this will complete the circle and technologies that liberal democracies gladly used to control their enemies will now be used in ways that challenge and potentially curtail cherished civil liberties at home. Because of this, it is vital that we engage in discussion of these technologies at every opportunity. We will take up this issue again and apply it to the problem of creating a realistic robotic arms control at the end of this paper.

### Expediency Focus Bad

#### We must not shrink in favor of political expediency, leads to bad policy---covid proves.

Russel, 20 [Stuart Russel, is a Professor of Computer Science & Engineering at UC Berkley, date not clear, but about covid so earliest it could be is 2020, accessed on 6-30-2022, Future of Life Institute, "Stuart Russell | UC Berkeley - Future of Life Institute", https://futureoflife.org/background/stuart-russell/]/ISEE

We can analyze what went wrong this time and put in place the necessary resources and plans to avoid these problems next time. Clearly there has to be a capability to roll out testing at scale and to provide surge capacity for hospitals. We also need much more sophisticated and flexible models that capture the patterns of contacts and transmission at an individual level, can predict the effects of different kinds of intervention, etc. It seems that the best model of the US was the one created at Imperial College London, which should be concern for US policy makers. However, nothing can be done if knowledge and expertise are discarded in favor of political expediency and prejudice. Undoubtedly there will be a massive public relations war after the pandemic dies down, to try to blame events on anyone but those responsible. Indeed, this war is already beginning, with attacks on China, doctors, journalists, old people, epidemiologists, etc.

#### Prioritizing expediency is bad---leads to worse decision making.

Christen, 17 [Markus Christen, Thomas Burri, Joseph Chapa, Raphael Salvi, and Filippo Santoni de Sio John Sullins, No Date, accessed on 6-30-2022, Philarchive, October 2017, "An Evaluation Schema for the Ethical Use of Autonomous Robotic Systems in Security Applications", https://philarchive.org/archive/CHRAES-3]/ISEE

Risk transfer and lowering the threshold for the use of lethal force: Earlier we discussed these concerns in detail in our discussion of autonomous systems in general. However, these problems take on a more tragic character when decision makers realize the political expediency of risk transfer. Since lethal danger is transferred from the human warfighters to machines, this can cause increased, and less thoughtful, deployment of lethal autonomous systems. When this happens there is far less political risk to those who decide to take us to war, thus potentially leading to more armed conflict (Strawser 2013). This problem follows into the civil use of these systems where the use of them may be chosen over more traditional policing methods that might be more expensive or difficult. This would lead to an increased use of lethal force over the capture of those suspected of crime.

# \*\*AT: Kritiks\*\*

## \*\*2AC – Top Level\*\*

### Framework – Abstraction DA

#### Their abstract theorizing allows material harm to continue against marginalized women – we should instead focus on concrete particulars as a starting point as the only ethical strategy

Matsuda 88(Mari, Associate Professor of Law, University of Hawaii, “When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as Jurisprudential Method”, 11 Women's Rts. L. Rep. 7 1989)

The multiple consciousness I urge lawyers to attain is not a random ability to see all points of view, but a deliberate choice to see the world from the standpoint of the oppressed. That world is accessible to all of us. We should know it in its con- crete particulars. We should know of our sister carrying buckets of water up five flights of stairs in a welfare hotel, our sister trembling at 3 a.m. in a shelter for battered women, our sisters holding bloodied children in their arms in Cape Town, on the West Bank, and in Nicaragua. The jurispru- dence of outsiders teaches that these details and the emotions they evoke are relevant and impor- tant as we set out on the road to justice. These details are accessible to all of us, of all genders and colors. We can choose to know the lives of others by reading, studying, listening, and ventur- ing into different places. For lawyers, our pro bono work may be the most effective means of ac- quiring a broader consciousness of oppression. Abstraction and detachment are ways out of the discomfort of direct confrontation with the ugliness of oppression. Abstraction, criticized by both feminists and scholars of color, is the, method that allows theorists to discuss liberty, property, and rights in the aspirational mode of liberalism with no connection to what those con- cepts mean in real people's lives. Much in our mainstream intellectual training values abstrac- tion and denigrates nitty-gritty detail. Holding on to a multiple consciousness will allow us to op- erate both within the abstractions of standard ju- risprudential discourse, and within the details of our own special knowledge. Whisperings at Yale and elsewhere about how deconstructionist heroes were closet fascists remind me of how important it is to stay close to oppressed communities. High talk about language, meaning, sign, process, and law can mask racist and sexist ugliness if we never stop to ask: "Exactly what are you talking about and what is the implication of what you are saying for my sis- ter who is carrying buckets of water up five flights of stairs in a welfare hotel? What do you propose to do for her today, not in some abstract future you are creating in your mind?" If you have been made to feel, as I have, that such inquiry is theoretically unsophisticated, and quaintly naive, re- sist! Read what Professor Williams, Professor Scales-Trent, and other feminists and people of color are writing.' The reality and detail of op- pression are a starting point for these writers as they enter into mainstream debates about law and theory.

### AT: K’s of NATO

#### Interaction with NATO inevitable, only the AFF can expose the cracks in the project of NATO.

**Hurley, 19** [Matthew Hurley is interviewee the Senior Lecturer in Politics & International Relations at Sheffield Hammond University, Interviewer Christina Cheng, accessed on 6-30-2022, Millennium, vol. 47, no. 2, Jan. 2019, pp. 210–230, “Feminist Experiences of ‘Studying Up’: Encounters with International Institutions.,” https://eprints.ncl.ac.uk/file\_store/production/240565/029E15C4-CD65-4507-96FD-263C80BAD706.pdf /]/ISEE

International institutions shape and are shaped by human behaviour. We conduct most of our lives within institutions and interacting with them; working with them, supporting, opposing, resisting them. This complex interplay between these conscious and unconscious interactions is an important reason why institutions matter. Since institutions are often treated in mainstream IR theory as unified and homogeneous, they are often discussed in shorthand. My research is on NATO’s adoption and interpretation of the Women, Peace and Security agenda, but particularly how that impacts the reconstruction of militarised masculinities and femininities within NATO. One of the key questions for me is: ‘what is NATO’? As feminists we should seek to ‘crack open’ and expose the complexities and contradictions within institutions such as NATO to problematise shorthand understandings and what they have come to signify. Feminists should also care about international security institutions because institutions are never static. They are never constant. So they can never, in a sense, be fully understood. A constant, collective, critical feminist gaze achieved through a multiplicity of research methods, approaches, projects and theories is needed to account for this constant change and flux.

## \*\*2AC – AT: Cap/Neolib\*\*

### Perm / Gender DA

#### The alternative is worse. Anti-capitalist movements bolster gender-based oppression because feminized labor is rendered invisible.

Coleman and Bassi 11

(Lara Montesinos, Serena A., June, University of Bristol, UK and University of Warwick, UK, Deconstructing Militant Manhood MASCULINITIES IN THE DISCIPLINING OF (ANTI-)GLOBALIZATION POLITICS, International Feminist Journal of Politics, 13:2, pgs 207-208, JKS)

Gendered hierarchies and cultural scripts are not a side issue for movements that aim to contest the globalization of capitalism. Materialist feminists have highlighted how capitalism has relied upon concealed, underpaid or unpaid female labour (e.g. Eisenstein 1979; Barrett 1980; Fuentes and Ehren- reich 1983). As Rosemary Hennessy (2000: 6) puts it, ‘women provide most of the world’s socially necessary labor – that is, labor that is necessary to col- lective survival – but much of it is rendered invisible, both in and outside the value system of commodity exchange’. Materialist analyses have also highlighted the relationship between heteronormative and capitalist social relations. Leslie Feinberg (1997: 231, see also Hennessy 1996), for example, theorizes the oppression of transgender people under capitalism through a Marxist analysis of how an ideology of binary gender became hegemonic with ‘the rise of private property, the male-dominated family and class divisions’.¶ Moreover, the power-laden performances through which gender is produced are intricately bound up with cultural scripts deployed in the imposition of capitalist relations across the world. J. K. Gibson-Graham (1996: 120–47), for instance, draws a parallel of globalization’s ‘tightly scripted narrative of differential power’ that celebrates ‘the inevitability of capitalist penetration’ in every corner of the world and the script that normalizes and naturalizes the rape of female bodies (1996: 120–1). Lara Coleman (2007) has explored how the violent imposition of neoliberal development in Colombia has mobi- lized gendered imaginative geographies, through which spaces targeted for ‘civilizing’ interventions are marked out in terms of sub-ordinate gender identities counterposed to the identity of an ideal citizen cast in terms of a hegemonic, bourgeois-rational masculinity. Similarly, Penny Griffin (2007) has highlighted the way in which dominant forms of heterosexual masculinity mark out the norms of successful human behaviour reproduced in the neoliberal discourse of the World Bank.¶ The reiteration of gendered cultural scripts within (anti-)globalization politics does not only shore up capitalism’s unequal effects on women (cf. Sullivan 2005: 9). It also bolsters other effects of gender-based oppression on women, transgender people and men with non-hegemonic gender performances. Moreover, this reiteration of hierarchically ordered gender identities should be understood as reinforcing capitalist relations at a much deeper level, in that it restates the cultural scripts that capital deploys to normalize its interventions and policy ‘solutions’.¶ There is a circular element to this too. Who is visible and who can speak within (anti-)globalization politics, and which bodies are privileged or excluded, derives from the gendered performance of ‘resistance’. Cultural texts assign roles defining, for example, who is able to speak with authority and who is confined to a walk-on appearance as a ‘movement housewife’ (Roth 2001). This in turn forecloses the possibilities for contestation and re-signification within spaces of ‘resistance’, reinforcing the tendency to re-iterate those cultural scripts that enhance the status quo.

## \*\*2AC – AT: Gender Essentialism\*\*

### LAWS = Essentialism

#### LAWS reinforce gender norms, the aff critiques them.

RCW NBD Rcw, NO DATE, "Critical issues," Reaching Critical Will, https://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/resources/fact-sheets/critical-issues/7972-fully-autonomous-weapons]#//mb24

**Gender and fully autonomous weapons** Throughout history, we have seen that **weapons symbolise power**. The association of weapons with power comes from a very particular—and very dominant—understanding of masculinity. This is a masculinity in which ideas like strength, courage, and protection are equated with violence. It is a masculinity in which the capacity and willingness to use weapons, engage in combat, and kill other human beings is seen as essential to being “a real man”. Fully autonomous weapons are being developed in the context of the aforementioned norms of gender and power. Scholars of gender and technology have long argued that gender relations are “materialised in technology”. That is, the meaning and character (the norms) of masculinity and femininity are “embedded” in machines. These scholars argue that technological products bear their creators mark. If **technology is developed and utilised primarily by men operating within a framework of violent masculinity, their creations will be instilled with that framework of thought, knowledge, language, and interpretation.** Fully autonomous weapons, as tools of violence and of war, will likely have specific characteristics that may simultaneously reinforce and undermine hegemonic gender norms. The use of fully autonomous weapons can lead to gender-based violence against men. In conflict, civilian men are often targeted—or counted in casualty recordings—as militants only because they are men of a certain age.While men are not necessarily targeted solely because they are men, taking sex as a key signifier as identity and exacting harm on that basis constitutes gender-based violence. That is to say, if someone uses sex as a basis for assessing whether or not a person is targeted, or if an attack is allowed (are only men present?), or in determining the impact of an attack later (i.e. during casualty recording), then they are using the sex of that person not as the motivation for the attack but as a proxy for identifying militants, or “acceptable targets”. This is gender-based violence. This **erodes the protection that civilians should be afforded in conflict and violates many human rights, including the right to life and due process.** It alsohas broader implications in the reinforcement of gender norms, including violent masculinity. Assuming all military-age men to be potential or actual militants or combatants entrenches the idea that men are violent and thus targetable. This devalues male life—it suggests men are relatively more expendable than women. It increases the vulnerability of men, exacerbating other risks adult civilian men face such as forced recruitment, arbitrary detention, and summary execution. The gendered culture of violent masculinities that surrounds the development of autonomous weapons, likely to be embedded within the technology and its use, will create new challenges for preventing violence, protecting civilians, and **breaking down gender essentialisms or discrimination.** Understanding how autonomous weapons are likely to be perceived in a gendered way by their developers, operators, and their victims is crucial to developing policies that can help break the cycle of violence. This could include an understanding that the operation of weapons without meaningful human control, weapons programmed to target and kill based on pre-programmed algorithms of who is considered to pose a threat, used without consent in foreign lands or in the streets of local cities, will result in civilian casualties, psychological harm, and destruction of civilian infrastructure. That this in turn will result in a violent masculine response from affected communities, reinforcing gender inequalities and oppressions. What efforts have been taken to address the development and use of fully autonomous weapons? During the Human Rights Council session in April 2013, 24 states attended the presentation of the report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Christof Heyns, and discussed the issue of autonomous weapons. Participating states expressed concerns regarding the use of fully autonomous weapons and indicated an interest in continuing discussions. At the meeting of states parties of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) in November 2013, governments decided to convene a four-day meeting of experts on the topic of fully autonomous weapons. The CCW, adopted in 1980, regulatesweapons which are not derived from chemical, nuclear, or biological sources. Since 2014, the states parties of the CCW have discussed how to address the threat of killer robots. In 2016, the Fifth Review Conference of CCW decided to begin a formal process in 2017 to discuss autonomous weapon systems. The meetings since have focused on building a common understanding about the meaning of human control and the risks of fully autonomous weapons. Most governments, along with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres, and the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, have reached the conclusion that humans must maintain control over programming, development, activation, and/or operational phases of a weapon system. A growing number of states are calling for a **pre-emptive ban on killer robots** (currently 28 states). Furthermore, the Non-Aligned Movement, the largest bloc of states operating in the UN, has called for a legally binding instrument stipulating prohibitions and regulations of such weapons; Austria, Brazil, and Chile support the negotiation of “a legally binding instrument to ensure meaningful human control over the critical functions” of weapon system. A few others have expressed their interest in non–legally binding mechanisms, such as a political declaration proposed by France and Germany. Additional support for a prohibition has also come from thousands of scientists and artificial-intelligence experts. In July 2018, they issued a pledge not to assist with the development or use of fully autonomous weapons. This comes on the heels of broader activism from the scientific and technology community against misuse of technology. For example, 4000 Google employees recently signed a letter demanding their company cancel its Project Maven contract with the Pentagon, which was geared toward “improving” drone strikes through artificial intelligence. Twelve hundred academics announced their support for the tech workers. As a response, Google renounced its work on Project Maven. Furthermore, more than 160 faith leaders and more than 20 Nobel Peace Prize laureates back the ban.

### No Link !

#### Their essentialism argument misreads our evidence- gender is a social construction which is enforced contingently

Sjoberg 09

(Laura, Assistant Professor of Political Science with an affiliation with the Center for Women’s and Gender Studies at the University of Florida. Her research has focused on theoretical and empirical approaches to gender and security, including war theorizing and the study of women’s violence, Security Studies 18.2, JKS)

In order to understand feminist work in ir, it is important to note that **gender is not the equivalent of membership in biological sex classes.** Instead, **gender is a system of symbolic meaning that creates social hierarchies based on perceived associations with masculine and feminine characteristics.** As Lauren Wilcox explains, **“gender symbolism describes the way in which masculine/feminine are assigned to various dichotomies that organize Western thought” where “both men and women tend to place a higher value on the term which is associated with masculinity.”23 Gendered social hierarchy, then, is at once a social construction and a “structural feature of social and political life” that “profoundly shapes our place in, and view of, the world.”**24¶ **This is not to say that all people, or even all women, experience gender in the same ways**. While genders are lived by people throughout the world, **“it would be unrepresentative to characterize a 'gendered experience' as if there were something measurable that all men or all women shared in life experience.**”25 Each person lives gender in a different culture, body, language, and identity. Therefore, **there is not one gendered experience of global politics, but many.** By extension, there is not one gender-based perspective on ir or international security, but many. **Still, as a structural feature of social and political life, gender is “a set of discourses that represent, construct, change, and enforce social meaning.”26 Feminism, then, “is neither just about women, nor the addition of women to male-stream constructions; it is about transforming ways of being and knowing” as gendered discourses are understood and transformed**.27

#### Gender binary is the *object* of critique, not the method

Sjoberg, PhD, 17

(Laura, PoliSci@Florida, Towards Trans- gendering International Relations? http://www2.hhh.umn.edu/uthinkcache/gpa/globalnotes/Sjoberg.Towards%20Transgendering%20IR.docx)

Generally, “sex” is perceived membership in the biological categories of “male” or “female” based on (perceived) distribution of sex organs and sexed bodies. While most feminists see more than two “sexes” (including varieties of intersex and trans- bodies), we often talk about sex as dichotomous (male/female) either out of convenience or out of an interest in focusing on gender issues presented dichotomously in global politics (e.g., Keohane 1989). While some theorists have argued that “sex” is itself a social construction (Fausto-Sterling 2005) or a performance (Butler 1993), many continue to refer to sex as a biological fact. If “sex” is usually characterized as biological and dichotomous, “gender,” is usually characterized as social and a continuum (Hooper 2001). Gender is a set of socially and culturally constructed characteristics that are associated with persons based on their perceived sex. People understood to be “men” are expected to be “masculine” and associated with masculinity, while people understood to be “women” are expected to be “feminine” and associated with femininity (Tickner 1992; Sylvester 1994). These traits are organized hierarchically, where characteristics associated with masculinity are often symbolically and actually valued over characteristics associated with femininity (see Peterson 2010). In these terms, sexism is the assumed or explicit preference for men over women; gender hierarchy is the assumed or explicit preference for masculinities over femininities; and sex/gender discrimination is the enacting of these preferences in interpersonal interaction (see Enloe 2007).

### It’s Performative

#### Gender is not stable, rater it is a socially encoded state of doing – making gender performative.

Mikkola 17 [Mari Mikkola (Junior Professor in Practical Philosophy at the Humboldt-University, Berlin), 2017, “Feminist Perspectives on Sex and Gender,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/feminism-gender/>] // st

Further, being feminine and desiring men (for instance) are standardly assumed to be expressions of one's gender as a woman. Butler denies this and holds that gender is really performative. It is not “a stable identity or locus of agency from which various acts follow; rather, gender is … instituted … through a stylized repetition of [habitual] acts” (Butler 1999, 179): through wearing certain gender-coded clothing, walking and sitting in certain gender-coded ways, styling one's hair in gender-coded manner and so on. Gender is not something one is, it is something one does; it is a sequence of acts, a doing rather than a being. And repeatedly engaging in ‘feminising’ and ‘masculinising’ acts congeals gender thereby making people falsely think of gender as something they naturally are. Gender only comes into being through these gendering acts: a female who has sex with men does not express her gender as a woman. This activity (amongst others) makes her gendered a woman.¶ The constitutive acts that gender individuals create genders as “compelling illusion[s]” (Butler 1990, 271). Our gendered classification scheme is a strong pragmatic construction: social factors wholly determine our use of the scheme and the scheme fails to represent accurately any ‘facts of the matter’ (Haslanger 1995, 100). People think that there are true and real genders, and those deemed to be doing their gender ‘wrong’ are not socially sanctioned. But, genders are true and real only to the extent that they are performed (Butler 1990, 278–9). It does not make sense, then, to say of a male-to-female trans person that s/he is really a man who only appears to be a woman. Instead, males dressing up and acting in ways that are associated with femininity “show that [as Butler suggests] ‘being’ feminine is just a matter of doing certain activities” (Stone 2007, 64). As a result, the trans person's gender is just as real or true as anyone else's who is a ‘traditionally’ feminine female or masculine male (Butler 1990, 278).[5] Without heterosexism that compels people to engage in certain gendering acts, there would not be any genders at all. And ultimately the aim should be to abolish norms that compel people to act in these gendering ways.¶ For Butler, given that gender is performative, the appropriate response to feminist identity politics involves two things. First, feminists should understand ‘woman’ as open-ended and “a term in process, a becoming, a constructing that cannot rightfully be said to originate or end … it is open to intervention and resignification” (Butler 1999, 43). That is, feminists should not try to define ‘woman’ at all. Second, the category of women “ought not to be the foundation of feminist politics” (Butler 1999, 9). Rather, feminists should focus on providing an account of how power functions and shapes our understandings of womanhood not only in the society at large but also within the feminist movement.

## \*\*2AC – AT: Cybernetics\*\*

### AT: Cybernetics

#### Lethal autonomous weapons are the next step in posthumanism generating a new wave of dominant subjectivities.

Jones, 18 [Emily Jones is a Lecturer in Law at the University of Essex, 2018, Human Rights Clinic at the University of Essex, accessed on 6-21-2022, “A Posthuman-Xenofeminist Analysis of the Discourse on Autonomous Weapons Systems and Other Killing Machines” http://repository.essex.ac.uk/21540/7/E.%20Jones%2C%20posthumanxenofeminist%20autonomous%20weapons.pdf]/ISEE

Global military spending has been estimated by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) to have been around US$1.6 trillion in 2016. The military economy is not, however, just about state spending: direct and indirect employment within the U.S. aerospace and defence industry alone includes approximately 3.53 million people. Feminist scholars have highlighted how militarism goes further in that there are a number of key roles often played by women outside the formal work place. Militarisation can be seen as both creating and profiting from informal (unpaid) work by women, which also produces and maintains gender difference. In addition, military spending benefits companies. It does not, as two peace scholars point out, ‘compete directly with private investment. It supplements but does not supplant the private sector. Thus, its expansion will not undermine business confidence’. The military economy is a fast-moving one, creating continuous profits as technology advances and systems need replacing. Military development spending has increased over the past decade in many states including the U.S., Kenya, Brazil, Colombia, India, Malaysia, Poland and Russia. Much of this war economy is driven by the development and deployment of technology, which reaps profits not only through military use but also often later through civil use. Satellite navigation is a prime example of this. While existing weapons systems such as the PAC-3 and the Samsung SGR-A1 described below are more automated than autonomous, ‘there are significant global efforts in the research and development (R&D) of autonomous systems’. Artificial intelligence and machine learning technologies have seen considerable advancement in the commercial sector, which is leaving the military sector behind.11 States are beginning to note the need to “catch up with Silicon Valley”.Seeking to tap into the advancements made in the commercial sector, the creation of weapons systems with some level of autonomy has recently become a key focus for the U.S. Department of Defense through Project Maven. When establishing the project in 2017, the U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert O. Work stated that ‘the Department of Defense (DoD) must integrate artificial intelligence and machine learning more effectively across operations to maintain advantages over increasingly capable adversaries and competitors’. While Project Maven is currently focusing on the incorporation of algorithms into military operations, reflecting the current state of technological advancement, it seeks to consider and promote ‘all initiatives that develop, employ, or field, artificial intelligence, automation, machine learning, deep learning and computer vision algorithms’.In other words, Project Maven is not only creating more complex algorithms but is also actively seeking to ensure that the U.S. is at the forefront of the development of autonomous weapons technologies. In this paper I argue that feminist posthumanist theory is an important paradigm through which to understand our relationship to technology, and to autonomous weapons systems in particular. Feminist posthumanism uses technology (alongside the nonhuman animal and matter) to question what it means to be human, deconstructing the very notion of what the human is, noting that the concept of the human in dominant Western accounts of subjectivity creates hierarchies between humans as well as between the human and other living beings. A clear example of the way in which feminist posthuman theory challenges humanist accounts of subjectivity can be seen in Donna Haraway’s work. Haraway notes that humans are already cyborgs in that they are deeply connected to, desire, and are dependent upon technology.16 Such an understanding of technology is essential to understanding autonomous weapons systems. In noting the connection between the human and machine and deconstructing distinctions between autonomy and automation, a posthuman perspective on autonomous weapons foregrounds the need to focus not only on autonomous weapons but on the broad array of delegated killing. While current attempts at legal regulation distinguish between civil and military technologies, such a distinction becomes impossible in light of the clear links between civil and military technologies and the killing potential of many technologies, including artificial intelligence (AI). This article therefore contributes to legal studies as well as the discourse on autonomous weapons. It further contributes to feminist approaches to international law, inserting such approaches into the realm of military technologies and highlighting the relevance of feminist approaches to all areas of international law. Law and gender theory is an important lens through which to analyse military technologies. Military technologies touch on several political and philosophical issues that gender theorists have long discussed. Legal articulations of subjectivity in particular are something that feminist legal theory has long problematised, and is directly relevant to the question of the ‘legal person’ as machines become more and more autonomous.20 This may require legal change to allow for ‘electronic’ subject-recognition. In addition to this, gender theories have developed a nuanced set of tools through which to analyse issues around inclusion, exclusion and justice. This can be seen in gender theory’s commitment to intersectionality, which looks at gender alongside race, sexuality, ability, class, etc. A gender perspective ensures the consideration of the multiple ways in which technologies may impact on intersecting groups, which may be missed in mainstream discussions about the use of autonomous weapons systems. Despite the many debates on autonomous weapons, there has been little consideration of such systems from a feminist posthuman perspective. Mary Manjikian appears to be the only scholar who has sought to apply feminist posthumanism to the realm of autonomous technology. Manjikian discusses the ways in which military technologies may be used to create either a less or a more militarised world, concluding that technology is more likely to create a more militarised, hyper-masculine world. Heeding Manjikian’s suspicion of the hyper-masculinity of militarism, this article works in the vein of Haraway and other feminist posthuman thinkers such as Rosi Braidotti and the ‘xenofeminists’, a collective of scholars working under the name ‘Laboria Cuboniks’ who seek to use and appropriate technology for feminist aims – to think critically about the significance of autonomous weapons systems, for the ways in which law fashions our understanding of human subjectivity. This paper adds to the discourse on autonomous weapons by proposing a xenofeminist posthuman perspective, providing a different way of understanding these systems while contributing to the development of feminist approaches to international law. While Haraway is fundamentally positive about technology’s potential to be used for feminist aims, she notes that feminists must also ensure that technology is not used to create ‘the final abstraction embodied in a Star Wars apocalypse waged in the name of defence, about the final appropriation of women’s bodies in a masculinist orgy of war.’ Haraway also notes that technology is embedded within capitalism, pointing out the fact that the people usually making the machines are often poor women from the Global South.28 Haraway’s work seeks to create a feminist techno-future in spite of and while trying to avoid the risks of a possible hyper-masculine techno-future. While Haraway seeks to promote the use of technology for feminist aims, the Xenofeminist Manifesto (XFM) has a more focused feminist project in mind. The XFM seeks to destroy capitalism through the accelerated use of technology to create a post-work world, thereby directly advocating for post-capitalism as a feminist aim. Thus, the XFM insists not only on the need to accelerate our use of/dependence upon technology, but also to appropriate this technology for feminist aims, ensuring that such technology remains loyal to the politics they wish it to promote. Such feminist aims include the will to ensure the free distribution of hormones or the will to use technology to restructure gendered systems of reproductive labour and care.While the xenofeminists note the dilemmas technology brings and the need to ‘explicit[ly] acknowledge… these conditions as a target for elimination’, they do not address the fact that the creation of a post-capitalist world will not be not immediate. In the meantime, as Haraway notes, science and technology have both contributed to and changed the face of ‘late capitalism’, with more work becoming precarious and being done at home, which affects women and people of colour most. Technology is largely designed by (and profits) people who are white, male and living in the Global North, while the raw materials are mined and manufactured elsewhere, by others. While some xenofeminist scholars propose the ubiquitous use of technology as the way to a feminist future, that future is less utopic when one considers that much technology is developed, first and foremost, for military purposes. While there has not yet been a feminist posthuman reading of autonomous weapons systems which seeks to dissect the false binaries upheld within the debates on these weapons between the human-machine and autonomy automation, there has been some limited engagement with these systems from a feminist perspective by NGOs, one example being the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom’s disarmament programme, ‘Reaching Critical Will’. They consider the masculine nature of militarism and the ways in which this would only likely get worse if machines stripped of empathy engage in killing, instead of soldiers in face-to-face combat. It is interesting to note that many of the posthuman perspectives which currently exist on the topic of conflict and technology do come from a gender perspective. These works come from outside the legal discipline, however, and tend to focus on drone warfare. Posthuman theory, however, could have a key impact if applied to legal studies and the debates around autonomous weapons. In refusing to see the machine as other, noting the links between the machine and the human, a posthuman approach would refuse the exceptionalism promoted by existing discourses on autonomous weapons, allowing for discussions to encompass a wider range of human-machine life/death decision-making. Killing machines may not be created as killer robots but may come into existence through other civil or military technological developments, such as artificial intelligence (AI) which may not have been designed to kill, but may ultimately be used to kill.38 More mundane but equally dangerous are developments in algorithm-driven decision-making.39 Further to this, given the vast advances in wearable military technologies and human enhancement technologies, a killer machine of the dystopian kind envisaged by many NGOs may, in fact, come about through technologically enhancing soldiers and turning them into superhuman soldiers. While such cyborg soldiers would not be deemed autonomous weapons under existing understandings of such systems, they will beg the same ethical questions around control and accountability, something which has not yet been recognised by the existing work on autonomous weapons. After all, at what point does a technologically mediated human become more machine than human? While job automation may indeed help create a post-work, post-capitalist society,40 such systems pose vast ethical issues around control and accountability. ‘Fully automated luxury communism’ seems less luxurious in the face of machines taking professional killing jobs.41 Drawing on the XFM, this article concludes by proposing the need for a posthumanxenofeminist discourse on autonomous weapons systems and other civil and military technologies. This means that we do not need to ‘abandon’ technology, but rather to use it warily, drawing on the wisdom of intersectional critiques and seeking a post-capitalist vision of society.42 This article therefore makes several key contributions. First, the paper adds to the debate on ‘autonomous’ weapons by challenging existing definitions of such systems. The paper also analyses the international debates on these systems from the as-yet unapplied perspective of posthuman-xenofeminism, highlighting both what feminist posthuman and xenofeminist theory may add to the debates on autonomous weapons systems. Further, this article adds to feminist approaches to international law by situating them within discussions of autonomous weapons, proposing a new posthuman-xenofeminist methodology for such approaches. I conclude that there is a need for feminist posthuman intervention into the legal regulation of all technologies – one that understands the ways in which humans-machines work in connection while seeking to prevent the creation of all killer machines, thereby refusing current attempts at technological legal regulation which distinguish between civil and military technologies.

## \*\*2AC – AT: Baudrillard\*\*

### Boooooooo

#### Baudrillard would sacrifice a woman in a desert if given the chance

Brodribb 92

(Somer Brodribb teaches feminist theory/politics and women’s social and political thought at the University of Victoria, British Columbia. She has worked with the Yukon Indian Women’s Association to establish an emergency shelter for Native and non-Native women, and as a Canadian contact for the Feminist International Network in Resistance to Reproductive and Genetic Engineering (FINRRAGE). She studied in the Feminist focus of the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, NOTHING MAT(T)ERS: A Feminist Critique of Postmodernism, First published by Spinifex Press, 1992, JKS)

Jean Baudrillard blames the failure of the “revolution” on women and change, women’s change. He sees puritanical “hysterics” everywhere whom he accuses of exaggeration about sexual abuse (1986, p. 42). The radical nostalgia which pervades his postmodern scribbling is for Rousseau’s (1979) Sophie and Lasch’s haven in a heartless world. For Baudrillard, a rapist is a violent fetus who longs for ancient prohibitions not sexual liberation (1986, p. 47). Baudrillard’s pessimism is actually his hope for a defeat of feminist initiated change and a return to man and god in contract, the eternal sacrifice of woman. His ramblings in his cups of cool whisky (1986, p. 7) are given the status of thought. He considers himself outré and daring to criticize feminists but, as anyone who has taken a feminist position knows, misogynous attack is banal and regular. Sorry, Baudrillard: it is outré to support and to be a feminist. But is this in vino veritas, when Baudrillard proposes a Dionysian sacrifice of woman to the image of beauty, purity, eternity? In Amérique, he writes: “One should always bring something to sacrifice in the desert and offer it as a victim. A woman. If something has to disappear there, something equal in beauty to the desert, why not a woman? (1986, p. 66). When queried about this “gratuitously provocative statement” Baudrillard replied, “Sacrificing a woman in the desert is a logical operation because in the desert one loses one’s identity. It’s a sublime act and part of the drama of the desert. Making a woman the object of the sacrifice is perhaps the greatest compliment I could give her” (Moore: 1989, p. 54). A compliment postmodernism will make over and over, like opera.18 Commenting on a sacrificial scene in D.H.Lawrence’s The Woman Who Rode Away, Millett writes: This is a formula for sexual cannibalism: substitute the knife for the penis and penetration, the cave for a womb, and for a bed, a place of execution—and you provide a murder whereby one acquires one’s victim’s power. Lawrence’s demented fantasy has arranged for the male to penetrate the female with the instrument of death so as to steal her mana... The act here at the centre of the Lawrentian sexual religion is coitus as killing, its central vignette a picture of human sacrifice performed upon the woman to the greater glory and potency of the male (1971, p. 292).

#### Baudrillard is profoundly sexist- he just disguises it through a veneer of edginess

Gallop 13

(Jane Gallop is a distinguished professor at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, “French Theory and the Seduction of Feminism”, published in “Men in Feminism (RLE Feminist Theory), edited by Alice Jardine and Paul Smith, pg.113-114, 2013, date accessed: 4/8/15, <https://books.google.com/books?id=lFcr6KoNNF8C&pg=PA115&lpg=PA115&dq=%22french+theory+and+the+seduction+of+feminism%22&source=bl&ots=H4jhzfQg-B&sig=BUDRVC6ufSauzIDbwhjprQLb6Ho&hl=en&sa=X&ei=7oclVdDmNMetogTejoGgDQ&ved=0CCUQ6AEwAQ#v=onepage&q&f=false>)

Nonetheless, Baudrillard’s contradictions seem less subtle than those of other practitioners of such theory, since he remains within a classical theoretical rhetoric of assertion, category, logic. If Baudrillard’s case is interesting to me, it is, first of all, because of the blatant enormity of the contradictions which are better hidden by the stylistic charms of a Derrida or a Lacan. And second of all (this second reason being for me the primary one – my hidden agenda, in fact), because the contradictions seem linked to a rather rabid attack Baudrillard makes on feminism. Many of us have seriously wondered about the effect of French theory on feminism’s health. Baudrillard is, to my knowledge, the male French theorist who most explicitly and most frontally adopts an adversarial relation to feminism. I would like to quote you a passage from the first chapter of De la seduction where the theoretical contradiction occurs within Baudrillard’s pronouncement of the proper course for women: “Now, woman is only appearance. And it’s the feminine as appearance that defeats the profundity of the masculine. Women instead of rising up against this ‘insulting’ formula would do well to let themselves be seduced by this truth, because here is the secret of their power which they are in the process of losing by setting up the profundity of the female against that of the masculine” (p. 22). When he writes “insulting formula,” he puts the word “insulting” (injurieuse) in quotation marks. He does not consider it an insult to say that woman is only appearance. Baudrillard is writing against the history of writing against appearances. He is for appearances, and against profundity, so when he says that “woman is only appearance” it should be taken as a compliment. Nonetheless, when I read this passage, as a woman, I feel insulted. Baudrillard would have it that my feeling of offense is a great error which stems from my inscription within the sort of masculinistic essentialist thinking which condemns appearances as misleading mediations of essences, realities, and truths. Yet, in considering the passage carefully, I decide that it is not what he says about “woman” that offends me so much as what he says about “women”: “Women would do well,” he advises, “to let themselves be seduced by this truth.” It is the phrase “would do well” (feraient bein de) that irks me. Although he puts “insulting” in quotation marks, he uses the word -“truth” (verite) straight. He knows the truth – the profound or hidden truth, I might add – about women, and women, “would do well to let themselves be seduced” by the truth he utters. He speaks not from the masculine or masculinist position (which he identifies as against appearances and for profundities) but from a position that knows the truth of the feminie and the masculine and can thus, from this privileged position beyond sexual difference, advise women how best to combat masculine power. It is his assumption from this position of superiority, of speaking the truth – more than any content of “truth” that he may utter – which offends me. Women, he wants, are in danger of losing their power, but if they would only let themselves be seduced by what he says… A line if ever I heard one. The problem may not lie with the women – the women are not “letting themselves” be seduced – the problem may lie with Baudrillard’s “technique.” Perhaps truth never seduces, or at least not self-certain truth or certainly at all. Baudrillard asserts, in this book, which is, after all, very insightful about how seduction works, that “it is by our fragility that we seduce, never by powers or by strong signs.” (p. 115) As opposed to truth, which is necessarily irreverersible (the opposite of the truth cannot be true), seduction, as Baudrillard understands it, is the very principle of reversibility. Hence the very best “technique” for seduction turns out to be that which can never be simply a technique at all. As Baudrillard puts it: “To be seduced is yet again the best way to seduce… No one, if he is not seduced, will seduce others.” (p.112) Truth cannot seduce; only seduction seduces. Baudrillard cannot seduce feminism with his truth, because he protects his truth from being seduced by feminism.

**Baudrillard encourages sexist philosophy – means the alt can’t solve**

**Bayard 97**

(The End of Seduction: A Few Words About Baudrillard's "Sex" “The End of Seduction: A Few Words About Baudrillard's "Sex"”, Pg. 113-114, Vance)

In "The Destiny of the Sexes and the Decline of Sexual Illusion" Jean Baudrillard at once mourns the loss of the shimmering artifices and alluring indeterminacies of the seductive gaze, and condemns the emancipatory discourses of sexual identity which for him amount finally to so much "leering" (Baudrillard's word loucher, bears the connotations of ogling, squinting, and gawking). The depressing social scene that Baudrillard observes in the wake of these changes in perspective are as lurid as any hyper-reality that one could imagine. Gaping at each other across a gendered divide, Baudrillard sugests, men and women consolidate their respective fantasies of power, knowledge and identity, but only as a prelude to a further and more wide-reaching cultural and psychological disaster, here rather schematically described as "the commutation of sexual polarities." The ensuing situation is profoundly counter-intuitive, not to say iconoclastic, like so many of the social landscapes that now bear Baudrillard's name; it is as if once the sexes get a hard look at each other, abandoning the suspense and the tension of the playfully seductive glances, they in effect hold each other hostage. Sexual difference - which for Baudrillard is, properly speaking, the site of seductive gaming and of illusions that are freed from any nostalgic comparison to a 'reality' - thereby collapses into a field of indetermination where the subject positions designated "man" and "woman" threaten to switch uncontrollably like an alternating current. In a strategic move that remains extremely troublesome for many of his readers, Baudrillard chooses to identify the chief assassin of seduction and the subsequent triumph of sexual in-difference with **something called** "feminism." An old hand at decoding the stakes, displacments, decoys, and deceits of seduction (let us not forget that his initial meditation on the beguiling art, De la seduction, was written in the late 1970s), Baudrillard has for years warned readers that the positive capacity of each sex to be the bearer of a radical illusoriness had been irretrievably undermined by the politics and the epistemologies of sexual emancipation. For Baudrillard, "feminism" in particular subtly reproduces certain humanistic and melioristic assumptions about sexual identity and the subject, committed, as it is, to giving a voice to that subject's imagined "depths," or, 14 Jean Caroline Bayard, Michael Kliffer & Daniel Simeoni in his words, to be bringing "out 'the real woman' (or the biological or psychological being, conscious or unconscious, that she is supposed to be)." This "outing" of and grounding in "sex," he contends, spells the end of its seductive illusions, or, to be more precise, the end of its existence as seductive illusion; in the supposed name of truth and freedom, subject positions instead harden to the point that they become interchangeable, and consequently in-different to the difference that might otherwise keep their radical illusoriness alive. That Baudrillard continues to speak this way about sex, notwithstanding wholesale shifts in his thinking about many other questions, puts to us just how important "seduction" remains for him as a point of critical leverage on the postmodern condition. A world devoid of seduction and of the illusion of sexual differentiation is a world in which "passion" has been evacuated from "the firmanent of concepts," as Baudrillard melancholically puts it. Baudrillard writes in an age that has seen the collapse of utopian desires and the breaking of the greatest ideological icons; the commutation of sexual difference is not unconnected to these declines, yet it is one about which Baudrillard is tellingly regretful. It is perhaps worth noting that the single figure who is perhaps most closely identified with postmodern iconoclam here flirts shamelessly with making a fetishistic idol out of both "the sexes" and the "sovereign" power of "seduction" in whose thrall the chimera of the sexes is said to thrive. Hence the passion of his lament for the end of seductive passion, a lament that it is difficult to read - not to say unacceptable to a majority of feminist thinkers, several of whom have denounced Baudrillard as naive at best, and violently sexist at worst.

#### Their vague theoretical account can’t produce material change.

Best & Kellner 91

(Steven – Associate Professor of Philosophy @ the University of Texas-El Paso and Douglas – George Kneller Chair in the Philosophy of Education in the Graduate School of Education and Information Studies at the University of California, Los Angeles, Postmodern Theory, p. 117)

Moreover, while Baudrillard was calling for a cultural revolution¶ and total revolution (1975: pp.130ff.), he never explicitly formulated any concrete vision or practice of revolution, other¶ than some reflections on urban grafitti as a form of political¶ resistance (Baudrillard 1976: pp. 118ff.). Thus his micropolitics are rather vague and empty. His ultra-left politics of the time are really no more than slogans which position his theory as 'ultrarevolutionary'.¶ But, it is not clear what this revolution could¶ accomplish in view of the hegemony of the dominant codes that¶ he described. In fact, there is extreme tension between his advocacy of cultural revolution and his descriptions of the system's ability to absorb all oppositional practices. For a cultural revolution¶ would produce new practices, institutions, signs, codes,¶ values, and so on, but in Baudrillard's theory all practices and¶ signs are controlled by and absorbed into the almighty code - a¶ typically vague and undertheorized term. Thus, the only practice¶ that he can really recommend is total refusal, total negativity, and¶ the utopia of radical otherness (Baudrillard 1975: pp. 130ff.,¶ passim).¶ Like Foucault and Deleuze and Guattari, Baudrillard's politics¶ at this time circulate in the trajectory of ultra-leftist 'gauchiste'¶ discourses which purport to be more radical and revolutionary¶ than traditional Marxism. Such gauchistes took ultra-left positions¶ and operated outside of the major left parties, either forming¶ splinter parties or groups, or acting as an extra-parliamentary¶ opposition. Baudrillard and other French thinkers of the period,¶ deeply influenced by the heterogeneous uprisings of May 1968,¶ decisively broke with Marxian working-class politics and sought¶ alternative perspectives for revolutionary politics. Yet he never succeeded in articulating any concrete and specific political perspectives and in his later works turned away from political¶ reflection and critique altogether.

#### And they create epistemic disregard to material violence.

Best & Kellner 91

(Steven – Associate Professor of Philosophy @ the University of Texas-El Paso and Douglas – George Kneller Chair in the Philosophy of Education in the Graduate School of Education and Information Studies at the University of California, Los Angeles, Postmodern Theory, p. 138-139)

Furthermore, Baudrillard's analysis operates on an excessively high level of abstraction. He fails to make key distinctions and¶ engages in misplaced abstraction. For instance, Ron Silliman¶ pointed out in his response to Baudrillard at the Montana conference¶ that Baudrillard failed to distinguish between tranvestism and¶ transexuality. Transvestites play at dressing as members of the¶ opposite sex and enjoy the 'gender fucking' and subversion of¶ dress codes; transsexuals, by contrast, are often tortured and¶ suffering individuals who can appear uncomfortable in either sex ~¶ as evidenced by the high rate of suicides of those who undergo sex¶ change operations. But human suffering is erased from Baudrillard's semiological universe which abstractly describes certain sign spectacles abstracted from material underpinnings.¶ The same bad abstraction appears in his travelogue America¶ (l988d). Baudrillard speeds through the desert of America and¶ merely sees signs floating by. He looks at Reagan on TV and sees¶ only his smile. He hangs out in southern California and concludes¶ that the United States is a 'realized utopia'. He fails to see,¶ however, the homeless, the poor, racism and sexism, people dying of AIDS, oppressed immigrants, and fails to relate any of the phenomena observed to the vicissitudes of capitalism (he¶ denies that capital ever existed in America!), or to the conservative¶ political hegemony of the 1980s. Baudrillard's imaginary is thus a highly abstract sign fetishism which abstracts from social relations and political economy in order to perceive the¶ play of signs in the transvestite spectacles of the transaesthetic,¶ transsexual, and transpolitical. Baudrillard's 'trans' manoeuvres,¶ however, are those of an idealist skimming the surface of appearances¶ while speeding across an environment which he never contextualizes, understands, or really comes to terms¶ with.

#### WHO ON HELL IS BAUDRILLARD?

BALSAS 06

(BALSAS is an interdisciplinary journal on media culture.  Interview with Art Group BBM, “on first cyborgs, aliens and other sides of new technologies,” translated from lithiuanian <http://www.balsas.cc/modules.php?name=News&file=print&sid=151>)

Valentinas: We all know that Jean Baudrillard did not believe that the Gulf War did take place, as it was over-mediated and over-simulated. In fact, the Gulf War II is still not over, and Iraq became much more than just a Frankenstein laboratory for the new media, technology and “democracy” games. What can we learn from wars that do not take place, even though they cannot be finished? Are they becoming a symptom of our times as a confrontation between multiple time-lines, ideologies and technologies in a single place?¶ Lars: Actually, it has always been the same: new wars have been better test-beds for the state of art technologies and the latest computer-controlled firearms. The World War I already was a fully mechanized war where pre-robots were fighting each other and gassing the troops. And afterwards, the winners shape the new world order.¶ Olaf: **Who on hell is Baudrillard**? The one who earns money by publishing his prognoses after the things happen? **What a fuck,** **French philosophy deals too much with luxury problems and elegantly ignores the problem itself**. It’s no wonder, **this is the colonizer’s mentality**, you can hear it roaring in their words: **they use phrases made to camouflage genocide.**¶ I went to see that Virilio’s exhibition "Ce qui arrive" at Foundation Cartier in 2003. I was smashed by that banal presentation of the evil of all kinds: again, natural catastrophes and evil done by man were exposed on the same wall, glued together with a piece of "theory". There you find it all, filed up in one row: the pure luxury of the Cartier-funded Jean Nouvel building, an artwork without any blood in its veins, and that late Christian philosophy about the techno-cataclysm being the revenge of God. **Pure shit, turned into gold in the holy cellars of the modern alchemists’ museums.**¶ The artist-made video "documents" of the Manhattan towers opposed to Iraqian war pictures: that’s not Armageddon, that’s man-invented war technology to be used to subdue others. And **there is always somebody who pushes the buttons,** even when the button is a computer mouse some ten thousand kilometers away from the place where **people die**, or even if it is a civil airplanes redirected by Islamists. Everybody knows that. **War technology has always been made to make killing easier**. And to produce martyrs as well.¶ Janneke: Compare Baudrillard with **Henry Dunant,** the founder of the International Committee of the Red Cross. Dunant was no philosopher, he was just an intelligent rich man in the late 19th century. But his ideas went far more in the direction where **you should hope to find** **philosophers** as well. He experienced war as a "randonneur": he passed by, he saw the suffering and the inhumanity of war. **And he felt obliged to act**. Apart from the maybe 10 days he spent on the battlefield, on the beautiful meadows in the Europeans Alps, helping wounded people to survive, as a complete medical layman he decided to do something more sustainable against these odds. He knew that his efforts couldn’t prevent war in general, but he felt that he could alter the cruelty of reality. **And he succeeded in doing it**. No wonder that in our days we find the most engaged people to support the TROIA projects intention in Geneva, where they are still based. And they are not only doing their necessary surgeon’s work in the field: they are as well **fighting with the same energy on the diplomatic battlefield.**